Scott C. Hutchison

The appellants, a father, mother, and son, were convicted of four counts of first-degree murder after four family members were found drowned in a submerged vehicle.

On appeal, the son sought to introduce fresh evidence claiming he was a young person at the time of the offences, thereby challenging the adult court's jurisdiction.

The appellants also appealed on grounds relating to the admission of expert evidence on honour killings, instructions on post-offence conduct, the admission of ante-mortem hearsay statements, and the Crown's theory of liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to introduce fresh evidence, finding the proposed documents lacked threshold reliability.

The Court also dismissed all conviction appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The applicant brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing his Charter application for delay.

The application challenged the Toronto Police Service's practice of 'carding' or 'street checks'.

The court found that the applicant failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, noting that counsel being too busy is not a sufficient excuse.

The court also found a lack of bona fide intention to meet the time limits and presumed prejudice to the respondents.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant, a justice of the peace, sought judicial review of a Hearing Panel's decision removing him from office for judicial misconduct involving sexual harassment of female staff, and denying him compensation for his legal expenses.

The Divisional Court upheld the findings of misconduct and the penalty of removal, finding the panel's decisions reasonable given the applicant's lack of insight and the need to preserve public confidence in the judiciary.

However, the Court set aside the decision denying compensation for legal fees, finding the panel erred by presuming that a judicial officer found guilty of misconduct should not be compensated, and remitted that issue for reconsideration.

The plaintiffs in two class action proceedings sought leave to appeal the dismissal of their motion for contempt against the defendants.

The contempt motion alleged that the City of Windsor breached an order limiting communication with class members during an opt-out period.

The court denied leave to appeal, finding that the original judge correctly applied the test for contempt, which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a clear and unequivocal order, and deliberate and willful disobedience.

The court found no error in the original judge's conclusion that the order was ambiguous and that a wilful breach was not proven.

Furthermore, the court determined that the plaintiffs failed to identify any conflicting decisions or raise matters of such importance to warrant leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs in two class action proceedings sought leave to appeal a case management judge's dismissal of their motion for contempt.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant municipality breached a court order limiting communication with class members during the opt-out period.

The court denied leave to appeal, finding that the case management judge correctly applied the test for civil contempt, reasonably concluded the order was subject to multiple interpretations, and that there was no conflicting case law or good reason to doubt the correctness of the decision.

The applicants sought leave to appeal a Sending Order made under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, which directed that seized records be sent to Belgium for a criminal investigation.

The applicants argued the application judge erred in law by holding he had no jurisdiction to attach terms and conditions to the Sending Order to protect their trade secrets and confidential information from commercial competitors.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding that the scope of the sending court's power to impose terms under s. 15 of the Act is an unsettled question of law of general importance.

The appellant, a dentist, was injured in a motor vehicle accident and claimed damages for future income loss, arguing her injuries prevented full-time clinical practice.

The jury awarded significantly less for future income loss than claimed.

The appellant appealed, arguing the award was inconsistent and that the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding the propriety of pre-trial communications between her counsel and an expert witness.

The respondents cross-appealed on costs, assignment of collateral benefits, and prejudgment interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding evidence supported the jury's verdict, counsel had agreed to the jury charge regarding the expert witness, and the trial judge made no errors in her discretionary orders on costs, benefits, and interest.

The plaintiffs brought a contempt motion alleging that the defendants, the City of Windsor and the Town of Tecumseh, breached a January 29, 2016 order regarding an opt-out campaign in a class proceeding.

The alleged breaches involved new radio advertisements and a live interview by the Mayor of Windsor.

The court found that the order's terms were arguably subject to more than one interpretation and that the defendants did not deliberately and willfully breach the order.

The contempt motion was dismissed, and the plaintiffs' request for further disclosure was denied.

The applicant, a small craft distillery, applied for a declaration that the markup imposed by the LCBO on spirits sold at its on-site retail store was an unconstitutional tax under the Constitution Act, 1867.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the markup was a proprietary charge levied by the LCBO as the owner and commercial supplier of the spirits.

Alternatively, the court held that the markup was a contractual term freely agreed to by the applicant in exchange for the authorization to sell its products.

The defendant municipalities sought leave to appeal a Case Management Judge's order requiring them to cease and desist an opt-out campaign directed at class members, which the judge found created undue influence.

The plaintiff class representatives sought leave to cross-appeal, arguing the judge should have ordered the removal of existing communications.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the Case Management Judge's findings or the discretionary remedy granted.

The plaintiffs in two certified class actions regarding allegedly illegal bingo licence fees brought a motion to restrict the defendants' multi-media opt-out campaign.

The defendants, the City of Windsor and the Town of Tecumseh, launched an extensive campaign including newspaper ads, websites, and direct mailings, urging potential class members to opt out to save taxpayers from a potential $70 million uninsured damages award.

The court found that while defendants have a right to communicate with class members, the campaign went too far by pitting taxpayers and organizations against each other, creating undue influence.

The court ordered the defendants to add hyperlinks to the class action websites on their materials and directed that class members who had already opted out be given an opportunity to reconsider, but declined to impose broader communication restrictions.

The applicant sought directions under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act regarding servers seized in Canada pursuant to a warrant issued to assist a United States criminal investigation.

The applicant proposed that a “clean team” of United States investigators conduct a forensic examination of the servers in Canada and prepare a report to the court identifying potentially relevant evidence before any sending order.

The respondent argued that privacy interests required an independent Canadian forensic examiner instead.

The court held that the clean team proposal, subject to safeguards including supervision by Canadian authorities and prohibition on disclosure to investigators without court authorization, adequately protected privacy interests and complied with the Act and Charter principles.

The court emphasized the importance of international comity and cooperation in mutual legal assistance matters and granted the requested order.

The Court of Appeal issued an endorsement regarding costs following an appeal involving a class action.

Due to divided success and the plaintiffs' failure to produce a rational and workable class definition, which contributed to delays and added costs, the court ordered no costs in either the Court of Appeal or the Divisional Court.

The appellants appealed three decisions of the Ontario Securities Commission regarding a sanctions hearing.

After a merits hearing found the appellants contravened the Securities Act, the terms of the presiding panel members expired.

The OSC appointed a new panel for the sanctions hearing.

The appellants argued the original panel's terms were deemed extended under s. 4.3 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the OSC's interpretation of its own procedures and the SPPA—that the merits and sanctions hearings were separate—was reasonable.

The court also upheld the admission of merits hearing transcripts and the ultimate sanctions imposed.

The appellant, a criminal defence lawyer, was convicted of smuggling drugs into the Toronto Jail for a former client during a professional visit.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence and erred in refusing to order the production of third party records relating to the prevalence of drug smuggling at the jail.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge subjected the appellant's evidence to a stricter level of scrutiny than the Crown's evidence, and erred in concluding that the third party records were not likely relevant.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant municipalities appealed the certification of two class actions alleging that charitable lottery licensing fees were ultra vires direct taxes.

The appellants argued that the class definition, which included claims dating back to 1990, was overly broad and included presumptively time-barred claims.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, modifying the class definition to align with the 15-year ultimate limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court also created a subclass for the presumptively time-barred claims but held that the representative plaintiffs could represent both the main class and the subclass, and that a class proceeding remained the preferable procedure.

The accused brought a Charter application under s. 8 and s. 24(2) to exclude all evidence obtained from two search warrants executed on May 7, 2014.

The accused was charged with uttering threats to cause death, possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and possession of prohibited weapons.

The court found that police officers conducting the search exceeded the scope of the warrant by searching in containers too small to hold a shotgun while looking for gun parts, thereby violating the accused's s. 8 rights.

The court also found that the officers improperly seized cell phones and medical information without reasonable grounds, and that misleading reports were filed with the justice.

Applying the Grant analysis, the court excluded all evidence obtained from the searches due to the serious and deliberate nature of the Charter breaches and the importance of maintaining judicial oversight through accurate reporting.

The appellant creditor sought a declaration that the bankrupt's judgment debt survived his discharge from bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding that the bankrupt owed no fiduciary duty to the appellant, even though he had breached a fiduciary duty to a third party.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that s. 178(1)(d) applies only if the bankrupt owed a fiduciary duty directly to the creditor seeking the declaration.

The Crown appealed a judicial stay of proceedings granted at its own request during a pre-trial abuse of process motion.

The stay was requested after the motion judge ordered the production of communications between police investigators and Crown counsel, over which the Crown asserted solicitor-client privilege.

The Court of Appeal held that the Crown's appeal was not an abuse of process and that the motion judge correctly found no waiver of privilege by the police.

However, the Court concluded that the motion judge's disclosure order was premature, as solicitor-client privilege should only be abrogated as a last resort if a stay could not be granted without the privileged information.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the trial court.

The Crown obtained an ex parte transmission data recorder warrant and an assistance order compelling a telecommunications company to provide subscriber information for unknown phone numbers communicating with a target.

The company sought a review of the assistance order, arguing that a general warrant was required to obtain subscriber information due to privacy interests recognized in R. v. Spencer.

The Superior Court of Justice held that it had jurisdiction to review the order and concluded that an assistance order under s. 487.02 of the Criminal Code is sufficient to compel the production of subscriber information to give effect to a transmission data recorder warrant.