SCJ 2016

The parties brought cross-motions regarding interim child support and a restraining order.

The applicant sought to impute income to the respondent based on his previous earnings in Alberta, while the respondent sought interim child support for the child residing with him.

The court declined to impute income, using the respondent's current Ontario income, and ordered the applicant to pay interim Guideline child support.

The court dismissed the applicant's request for a restraining order, finding insufficient evidence of abuse and noting that a recently agreed-upon parallel parenting order provided a clear framework for communication and contact.

The self-represented plaintiff abandoned her motion for documentary production shortly before it was scheduled to be heard.

The defendants sought costs of the abandoned motion on a full indemnity basis, citing the plaintiff's conduct and previous abandoned motions.

The court awarded costs to the defendants on a partial indemnity basis, noting that while costs were justified under Rule 37.09(3), the plaintiff's self-represented status and health issues mitigated against an extraordinary costs sanction.

Costs were fixed at $3,500 for one defendant and $2,500 for the other.

Following a trial where the plaintiff was awarded damages for conspiracy and breach of fiduciary duty, the court determined costs.

The plaintiff sought over $124,000, claiming substantial indemnity costs based on an offer to settle.

The court found the judgment was not as favourable as the offer because the offer included the defendant surrendering his shares, which the court declined to order at trial.

The court also disallowed a $13,740 disbursement for a valuation report related to the unsuccessful share claim.

Costs were fixed at $80,000 payable by the primary defendant, with the co-defendant jointly and severally liable for $35,000.

The applicant condominium corporation sought an order enforcing its declaration and rules against the respondents, who were leasing their unit on a short-term basis through platforms like Airbnb.

The respondents argued that the application should be stayed for failure to mediate/arbitrate, that other owners needed notice, and that the rules did not prohibit their activities.

The court found that the respondents had waived the arbitration requirement, that notice to other owners was unnecessary, and that the short-term rentals violated the 'single-family dwelling' restriction in the declaration.

The court ordered the respondents to comply with the declaration and rules.

The applicant commercial tenant brought an application for damages for the tort of conversion, alleging the respondent landlord wrongly interfered with his property after the termination of his lease.

The respondent landlord brought a separate application seeking to declare the applicant a vexatious litigant.

The court dismissed the applicant's conversion claim, finding that he had intentionally abandoned his property by refusing to retrieve it despite multiple opportunities and court orders.

The court also dismissed the respondent's vexatious litigant application, concluding that while the applicant's conduct was troubling and in bad faith, it did not meet the high threshold required for such a declaration.

Costs of $2,500 were awarded to the respondent.

The defendant brought a Garofoli application to exclude evidence obtained through a series of wiretap authorizations, arguing the initial Information to Obtain (ITO) was inadequate and misleading.

The court reviewed the ITO, noting material omissions regarding the police agent's criminal record and financial compensation agreement.

After editing and amplifying the ITO, the court found that while there were reasonable grounds to believe an offence had been or would be committed, there were no reasonable grounds to believe that information relating to the offences would be obtained through the interception sought.

The initial authorization was set aside, rendering the evidence obtained a presumptive violation of s. 8 of the Charter.

Sentencing for historical sexual offences committed by an adult uncle against two teenage nieces over a ten-year period at repeated family gatherings.

The court applied the governing sentencing principles for sexual violence against children, giving primary weight to denunciation, deterrence, and separation from society under ss. 718 and 718.01 of the Criminal Code, and treated the offender's position of trust, the duration and escalation of abuse, the rape conviction, and the profound lifelong harm to the complainants as major aggravating factors.

Rehabilitation was given little weight, particularly in light of subsequent sexual offending and the offender's lack of remorse or insight.

A global penitentiary sentence of six years was imposed, together with SOIRA, DNA, weapons prohibition, s. 161, and non-communication orders.

During a lengthy matrimonial trial, the applicant alleged that the respondent's former counsel, SimpsonWigle LLP, breached a Mareva injunction by receiving payments from frozen offshore companies.

The parties agreed to defer the contempt hearing against the law firm until after the trial judgment.

At the commencement of the contempt hearing, the law firm brought a motion to dismiss, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction because the Mareva order was no longer live and operative.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no requirement in law that an order must be live and operative when a contempt motion is brought or a finding is made, particularly where the purpose is to address a deliberate breach rather than to coerce compliance.

Following a 10-day family law trial regarding child custody and access, both parties sought full recovery costs.

The respondent mother was the substantially successful party, having been awarded sole custody and primary residence, while the applicant father's claims were found to be untenable and pursued in bad faith.

The court applied the principles of bad faith under the Family Law Rules, noting the father's unreasonable litigation conduct and failure to prove serious allegations.

The court fixed the respondent's costs at $200,000 all-inclusive, deducting a prior $9,000 costs award owed to the applicant.

The applicant mother sought sole custody, supervised access, and child support.

The respondent father conceded custody but sought unsupervised access.

The court found both parents shared blame for a two-year lapse in access following an incident where the father refused to return the child.

The court ordered sole custody to the mother and a progressive access schedule for the father, initially supervised by the paternal grandparents.

The court also imputed the father's income at $65,000 and ordered him to pay ongoing child support of $594 per month, plus $24,988 in arrears for table support and section 7 childcare expenses.

The offender was found guilty of touching a person under 16 for a sexual purpose, involving a long-term relationship with a young person in a position of trust.

The court determined a fit sentence was 7 years (84 months) imprisonment.

The court then considered the offender's pre-sentence custody at the Sudbury Jail, which involved frequent lockdowns, overcrowding, mice infestations, and extended segregation.

Applying the principles from Summers and Duncan, the court awarded 1.5:1 credit for time served plus an additional 9 months for harsh conditions, resulting in a total credit of 46.5 months and a net sentence of 37.5 months.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against a life insurance company, alleging breach of contract regarding increases to the cost of insurance and administrative fees for universal life insurance policies.

The court had previously adjourned the motion to allow for further evidence on how the fees were calculated.

After reviewing actuarial evidence, the court found that the insurer had set and adjusted the fees in accordance with the policy terms and industry practice.

Concluding there was no basis in fact for the breach of contract claims, the court dismissed the certification motion in its entirety.

The respondent, a young person, was convicted by a jury of two counts of second degree murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault, and reckless discharge of a firearm arising from the Danzig Street mass shooting.

The Crown applied under the Youth Criminal Justice Act to have an adult sentence imposed.

The court considered the seriousness of the offences, the respondent's background and progress in custody, and the societal interest in accountability and public protection.

Finding that the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness was rebutted and that a youth sentence would not be of sufficient length to hold the respondent accountable, the court imposed an adult sentence of life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for seven years.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in his wrongful dismissal and human rights claim against his former employer.

The plaintiff alleged he was terminated without cause, while the employer maintained he resigned or abandoned his position.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there were genuine issues requiring a trial due to significant conflicts in the evidence regarding the circumstances of the plaintiff's departure, his medical condition, and mitigation efforts.

The court declined to use its discretionary fact-finding powers, concluding that a fair and just determination required a full trial.

The plaintiffs sued three lawyers who represented them in a condominium purchase, alleging negligence for failing to rescind the transaction after the plaintiffs discovered water damage upon taking possession.

The defendant lawyers brought motions to strike the claim under Rules 21.01(1)(b) and 21.01(3)(d).

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to plead any material facts establishing a breach of the standard of care or causation of damages, as a completed real estate transaction cannot be unilaterally rescinded without the vendor's consent.

The court struck the claims against the three lawyers without leave to amend, finding them frivolous, vexatious, and disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The applicant mother sought sole custody and supervised access for the respondent father in an uncontested trial.

The parties separated after a long relationship, and the respondent had not seen the children since separation.

The applicant raised concerns about the respondent's mental health, anger management, and abusive behaviour, noting he was subject to a recognizance prohibiting contact with her and their eldest child.

The court granted the applicant sole custody and ordered that any access by the respondent be supervised at a supervised access facility.

No child support was ordered as the respondent's income was below the threshold, but he was ordered to provide notice of any employment changes.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment seeking specific performance, rescission, and damages arising from a complex commercial transaction involving the purchase of shares and two parcels of land.

The defendant vendor failed to obtain a necessary severance for one parcel and refused to transfer title to the other despite receiving substantial payments over six years.

The court granted rescission of the Petting Zoo Land purchase agreement and ordered the return of $122,246 in principal payments, plus $1,995 for survey costs.

Specific performance for the 511 Land and damages for removed signage were deferred to trial due to unresolved factual issues.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to qualify three police officers as expert witnesses in a prosecution for cocaine importation and money laundering.

The court applied the Mohan and Abbey tests for admissibility.

The court admitted the general opinion evidence of the money laundering expert, excluding portions relating to methods not alleged against the accused.

The court fully admitted the evidence of the cocaine trafficking expert, including opinions on pricing and cell phone use.

However, the court excluded the proposed evidence regarding Mexican drug cartels, finding it irrelevant to the charges and highly prejudicial as bad character evidence.

Following a summary judgment finding the defendants liable for breaching two settlement agreements by importing and selling goods bearing the plaintiff's trademarks, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that the defendants brazenly breached their agreements and engaged in reprehensible litigation tactics that maximized costs and delay.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs of $225,000 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The applicant, awaiting trial for obstruct justice, brought a motion to exclude the transcript of his compelled testimony from his mother's preliminary inquiry, alleging violations of sections 7 and 13 of the Charter.

The applicant had refused to answer substantive questions at the preliminary inquiry, leading to the obstruct justice charge.

The court dismissed the section 7 claim, finding no principle of fundamental justice that balances the necessity of evidence against a witness's psychological integrity.

However, the court granted the section 13 claim, holding that the transcript constituted incriminating evidence and that the obstruct justice charge, which was based on a refusal to provide material evidence rather than giving false evidence, did not fall within the perjury or contradictory evidence exceptions to section 13.