Russell G. Juriansz

The appellant sought a motion to review a decision of the motion judge.

The motion judge had heard both the respondent's motion to stay proceedings and the appellant's motion for an extension of time simultaneously.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the motion judge's discretionary order, as the motion judge had reasonably connected his decision on the respondent's motion to his disposition of the appellant's motion.

The motion to review was dismissed with costs fixed at $2,500.00 all-inclusive.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision that the respondent Pezzack Financial Services Inc. was entitled to proceeds of a mortgage action settlement held in escrow pursuant to a Notice of Garnishment.

The appellants claimed that the garnishee held the mortgage in trust for them, either as an express trust or a resulting trust.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings that the claimed express trust was a sham and that the circumstances did not support a resulting trust.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $10,000.00 all-inclusive.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial judge found a breach of the appellant's s. 8 Charter rights regarding the search of two vehicles, but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in characterizing the breach as technical, failed to consider misleading information in the Information to Obtain, failed to consider the unlawful resort to a telewarrant, and incorrectly balanced the Grant factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the breach was minor and made in good faith, the impact on the appellant's rights was relatively low, and the evidence was highly reliable and central to the Crown's case.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault on the basis that he struck the complainant with a beer glass, causing multiple lacerations to the face and neck.

The appellant claimed self-defence, asserting that the complainant attacked him first.

The trial judge applied the amended self-defence provisions of the Criminal Code retrospectively and instructed the jury accordingly.

The Crown argued that if the appellant struck first, self-defence was not available.

The trial judge failed to correct this legal misstatement.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's assertion was legally incorrect, as self-defence can apply even if the accused struck the first blow, provided the accused reasonably believed force or a threat of force was being used against them.

The trial judge's failure to correct this error rendered the verdict unsafe.

An employee with approximately 30 years of continuous service was dismissed without cause from part-time employment.

The employer relied on a written employment agreement purporting to waive the employee's years of service and common law entitlement to reasonable notice, providing only statutory minimums under the Employment Standards Act.

The motion judge found the employee had not waived his years of service for statutory purposes but was bound by a 2006 waiver of common law notice entitlements.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding the waiver was clear and unequivocal, the 2013 transition to part-time employment constituted an amendment rather than a new contract, and there was adequate consideration for the amendments.

The court also rejected the employer's cross-appeal on mitigation, finding the employee had made reasonable efforts to secure comparable employment.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed following conviction on firearms offences and a verbal threat charge.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal.

On the sentence appeal, the Crown conceded that the facts underlying the firearms offences were less serious than those in comparable cases establishing a 7 to 11 year sentencing range.

The court found the sentencing judge erred in imposing a 7-year sentence and reduced the concurrent sentence for the firearms and threat offences from 7 years to 6 years, resulting in a global sentence of 7 years.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder of his wife following a trial by jury.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant attempted a planned murder-suicide.

The defence argued an unknown assailant was responsible.

The appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility of 15 years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding the mental state required for murder, the treatment of the appellant's post-offence conduct and suicide attempt, and alleged imbalance in the instructions.

The appellant also made unsupported claims that evidence and exhibits were tampered with.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The appellant appealed a committal order for extradition to the United States on charges of murder.

The appellant challenged the admissibility of a critical statement made during a phone conversation with a Nashville police detective, arguing that because he was located in Toronto when the call was made, the evidence was gathered in Canada and must satisfy Canadian rules of evidence, which would render it inadmissible due to alleged Charter violations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the extradition judge's decision, finding that evidence obtained by telephone where the call is made by a police officer located in the United States to a person located in Canada for an American investigation is gathered where the officer is located, and therefore need not meet Canadian evidentiary requirements.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence from the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant failed to appear at the appeal hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice on February 5, 2019.

The Court of Appeal identified a mathematical error in the trial judge's calculation of credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appeal was allowed and the appellant was granted an additional 22 days of credit for pre-sentence custody, for a total credit of 33 days.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice on January 16, 2019.

The appeal was dismissed as abandoned after the St. Lawrence Valley Correctional and Treatment Centre communicated that it would receive the appellant immediately as he continued to serve his sentence.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice, specifically challenging the duration of a driving prohibition.

On consent and limited to the issue of the driving prohibition duration, the Court of Appeal reduced the prohibition from a lifetime ban to one expiring on May 20, 2022, pursuant to section 259(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of assault using a weapon and one count of assault causing bodily harm arising from an altercation at a pizza store.

The trial judge found the appellant used a screwdriver to assault the store owner and employee, and rejected his self-defence claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's excessive interventions during the appellant's testimony undermined the appearance of fairness and resulted in actual unfairness.

The trial judge's pointed cross-examination of the appellant, belittling comments to defence counsel, and persistent challenging of the appellant's account prevented him from presenting his version of events.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Justice dated June 26, 2017 and March 6, 2018.

The appellants were unsuccessful in their appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the appellants on a partial indemnity scale in the amount of $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The appellant was convicted of voyeurism under s. 162(1)(b) of the Criminal Code for taking still photographs from a live video stream during intimate video chats with the complainant without her knowledge or consent.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the complainant could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy since she willingly appeared nude on camera, and that he did not act "surreptitiously" because the complainant never explicitly objected to screenshots being taken.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the complainant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances and that the appellant acted surreptitiously with the intent that the complainant remain unaware of the recording.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, and unlawful confinement.

The appeal was dismissed as it constituted an attempt to retry the case and revisit the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility.

The trial judge had provided thorough reasons explaining the rejection of the appellant's version of events and the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

No appealable issue was raised.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal from a Superior Court judgment.

The appellants (The Attorney General of Canada and two officers) were successful on appeal and were awarded costs.

The Court of Appeal set aside the trial costs order and awarded the appellants costs at trial on a partial indemnity basis, in addition to costs of the appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed after pleading guilty to multiple offences including break and enter (x2), assault police with intent to resist arrest, possession of stolen property over $5,000, breach of probation, possession of counterfeit mark, and mischief to property under $5,000.

At a judicial pre-trial, the sentencing judge had indicated a range of approximately two and one-half years for the December offences.

However, at sentencing, the judge imposed a longer sentence.

The appellant argued this departure was unfair and sought reduction to 30 months for the December offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence that the appellant relied on the pre-trial remarks in entering his guilty plea and distinguishing the case from R. v. O'Quinn.

The court granted leave to appeal sentence and set aside victim fine surcharges by agreement with the Crown.

The appellant was charged with 14 offences and convicted of four.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the complainant was not a credible witness.

The court found that the convictions on counts 1, 3, and 13 were not based solely on the complainant's testimony.

The trial judge made no finding of guilt on count 5, and the conviction on that count was set aside.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference following a jury trial.

The defence argued the complainant fabricated the complaint due to pressure from his father.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's instruction that "the timing of the disclosure signifies nothing," arguing it was improper in the context of the case.

The Court of Appeal found the instruction was ill-advised but not misleading when considered in context with the full charge and counsel's closing addresses.

The court clarified the instruction referred to delay between incidents and disclosure, not the circumstances of disclosure.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed, and the victim fine surcharge was set aside with Crown consent.