Roy Douglas Elliott

The appellants, current and former uniform members of the Waterloo Regional Police Service, appealed from a motion judge's order dismissing their proposed class action for want of jurisdiction and denying certification.

The appellants alleged systemic gender-based workplace discrimination and harassment, including breach of Charter rights and breach of the duty of fair representation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction because the appellants' claims fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitrators under the Police Services Act and the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

The court noted that the collective agreement permits group grievances and arbitrators possess broad remedial powers.

The plaintiffs, current and former female police officers, sought to certify a class action against the Waterloo Regional Police Services Board and Association for systemic gender-based discrimination and sexual harassment.

The defendants challenged the court's jurisdiction, arguing that labour arbitrators and the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario had exclusive jurisdiction.

The court found it lacked jurisdiction, as the claims arose from the employment relationship governed by a collective agreement and the Police Services Act, which provide a comprehensive dispute resolution scheme.

Furthermore, the court determined that even if it had jurisdiction, the claims did not disclose a viable cause of action under common law, as human rights legislation precludes independent civil actions for discrimination and sexual harassment.

In a proposed class action alleging systemic gender-based discrimination and sexual harassment within the Waterloo Regional Police Service, the parties brought several pre-certification motions.

The plaintiffs' motions to compel answers to questions refused on cross-examination by the Chief of Police and the Association President were dismissed.

The defendants' motions to strike the plaintiffs' expert evidence and portions of the plaintiffs' affidavits were deemed premature and deferred to the certification motion, though the expert opinion portion of the report was excluded.

Following a motion where the moving party successfully sought to withdraw admissions involving approximately $14,000,000, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court found that the responding parties took a tactical and precarious position in opposing the motion, as the granting of leave was foreseeable absent any evidence of prejudice.

Costs were awarded to the moving party fixed at $15,000.

The moving party, in the midst of complex family trust litigation, sought leave to withdraw admissions made in a previous affidavit and to file three new affidavits.

The moving party argued the admissions regarding multi-million dollar shareholder loans were made inadvertently due to confusion and reliance on her former, now-deceased counsel.

The responding parties opposed, arguing the admissions were formal and the new evidence was an attempt to repair her case mid-hearing.

The court granted the motion, finding the admissions were likely inadvertent, raised a triable issue, and caused no non-compensable legal prejudice to the responding parties.

The court emphasized the need to decide the case on its true merits rather than a solicitor's or party's mistake.

The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action for civil conspiracy, defamation, and intentional infliction of mental distress against the defendants for distributing alleged hate speech pamphlets at a Pride Parade.

The lead defendant moved to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions and as an abuse of process, and alternatively to strike the claim.

The plaintiffs moved for a Norwich Order to identify the anonymous co-defendants.

The court held that the defendant was estopped from denying the pamphlets were hate speech based on a prior Supreme Court decision, and thus the anti-SLAPP motion failed.

However, the court struck the class action because the torts pleaded are individual in nature and cannot be brought on behalf of a collective group.

The court granted leave to amend the claim to an opt-in joinder action and granted the Norwich Order on terms.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to amend their statement of claim to add a new corporate defendant and to consolidate two related actions.

The proposed defendant opposed the motion, arguing the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court applied the discoverability doctrine and found that the plaintiffs did not know, and ought not to have known, the true identity of the testing laboratory until they received a letter from defence counsel in 2011.

The court granted leave to add the defendant, concluding the claim was not clearly statute-barred, but allowed the defendant to raise the limitation defence at a later stage.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking orders compelling a lawyer for the defendant to answer questions refused on cross-examination and granting leave to file additional affidavits in support of a pending motion to amend the statement of claim and add a proposed defendant.

The refusals were based on solicitor-client privilege.

The court held that two questions seeking factual information did not infringe solicitor-client privilege and must be answered, while a third question had already effectively been answered.

Applying Rules 1.04 and 39.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court granted leave to file three additional affidavits responding to issues raised on cross-examination and addressing limitation concerns relating to the discoverability of the plaintiffs’ claims.

The plaintiff sued the defendants for damages arising from a shareholder dispute.

A motion judge granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff for the defendants' breach of an interim agreement, ordering damages and costs.

When the defendants failed to pay, a second motion judge struck their statement of defence.

The defendants appealed both orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of the summary judgment, finding the defendants had consented to the procedure and the evidence supported the breach.

However, the Court allowed the appeal of the order striking the defence, holding that such a severe sanction was disproportionate and should not be a remedy of first resort, particularly where the defendants were misled by their former counsel.

The successful plaintiffs brought a motion seeking payment of approximately $1 million held by the Accountant of the Superior Court of Justice to partially satisfy their judgment.

The defendant opposed the motion, arguing that his law firm was entitled to a priority charge on the funds for $825,000 in unpaid legal fees pursuant to s. 34(1) of the Solicitor's Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant's arguments, finding that the funds were not preserved through the instrumentality of the law firm and that the equities overwhelmingly favoured the plaintiffs.

The motion was allowed and the funds were ordered released to the plaintiffs.

The appellants appealed a decision staying their action against the respondents on the basis that the dispute was subject to an arbitration clause in a franchise agreement.

The appellants argued the franchise agreement was void ab initio, meaning the arbitration clause was not triggered.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the argument was not raised before the motion judge and was undercut by the factual record.

The Court agreed with the motion judge that the arbitration agreement was broad enough to encompass disputes regarding the validity of the franchise agreement itself.

The plaintiff brought a proposed class action against Ontario on behalf of individuals who contracted SARS during the 2003 outbreak, alleging negligence in the province's handling of the crisis.

Ontario moved to strike the statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal applied the Cooper-Anns test and concluded that no relationship of proximity existed between the plaintiff and Ontario capable of giving rise to a private law duty of care.

The court held that the government's public law duty to protect the health of residents does not translate into a private law duty owed to specific individuals.

The plaintiff's appeal was dismissed, Ontario's cross-appeal was allowed, and the claim was struck in its entirety.

The appellant lawyers represented the plaintiffs in a successful class proceeding that declared certain provisions of the Canada Pension Plan invalid, entitling class members to survivor benefits.

The lawyers sought to enforce a first charge on the monetary award for their fees under s. 32(3) of the Class Proceedings Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the award constituted a 'benefit' under the CPP, which prohibits assigning or charging benefits under s. 65(1).

The Court found that the CPP prevailed over the CPA, rendering the lawyers' charge void.

The federal government amended the Canada Pension Plan to extend survivor benefits to same-sex partners, but limited eligibility to those whose partners died on or after January 1, 1998, and precluded payments for months before July 2000.

A class action challenged these temporal limits.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the temporal limits infringed section 15(1) of the Charter and were not justified under section 1.

However, the Court denied fully retroactive relief, finding that the prior exclusion of same-sex partners was based on a reasonable understanding of the law before the Court's landmark decision in M. v. H., and that the government acted in good faith.

The Court also held that estates do not have standing to advance section 15(1) claims.

The plaintiffs sued Ontario in negligence, alleging the province failed to prevent the outbreak of West Nile Virus in 2002, resulting in the deceased contracting the virus and dying from complications.

Ontario moved to strike the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The motions judge and Divisional Court dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and struck the claim, holding that the Health Protection and Promotion Act imposes a general public law duty to protect health, but does not create a private law duty of care owed to specific individuals to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.

The applicants sought partial indemnity costs following the dismissal of their application for judicial review regarding the closure of two long-term care institutions.

Although unsuccessful on the main issue of the Minister's statutory power to close the facilities, the applicants achieved partial success on the issue of consent for relocating residents.

The Divisional Court awarded the applicants a portion of their costs, emphasizing the importance of access to justice and the applicants' role in advocating for the fundamental interests of approximately 1,000 severely disabled adults.

The applicants, litigation guardians for severely developmentally delayed adults residing in Schedule I facilities, sought judicial review of the Minister of Community and Social Services' decision to close the remaining institutions.

The applicants argued the Minister lacked statutory authority under the Developmental Services Act to close the facilities.

The Divisional Court held that the Minister's broad discretionary power to establish and maintain facilities included the power to close them.

However, the Court declared that the consent of the incapable residents' substitute decision makers is required before they can be transferred to community placements, invoking the parens patriae jurisdiction to protect their fundamental interests.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their motion to certify a class proceeding against the provincial government.

The action alleged negligence, breach of statutory duty, and misfeasance in public office arising from the government's decision to discontinue entering into Special Needs Agreements for profoundly disabled children.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in concluding it was plain and obvious the negligence claim could not succeed.

The court held that the statement of claim disclosed arguable causes of action and that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a trial judgment regarding survivor's pensions under the Canada Pension Plan.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, settling the formal order to reflect that survivors' estates have no rights under s. 15(1) of the Charter and are not exempt from s. 60(2) of the CPP.

The court also held that s. 72(1) of the CPP does not infringe s. 15(1) of the Charter, and awarded partial indemnity costs to the respondents.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a Divisional Court decision finding that the common law definition of marriage as between 'one man and one woman' violated the equality rights of same-sex couples under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage demeaned their dignity and was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The Court allowed the cross-appeals on remedy, declaring the existing definition invalid and immediately reformulating it as 'the voluntary union for life of two persons to the exclusion of all others'.