Roy Douglas Elliott

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a trial judgment regarding survivor's pensions under the Canada Pension Plan.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, settling the formal order to reflect that survivors' estates have no rights under s. 15(1) of the Charter and are not exempt from s. 60(2) of the CPP.

The court also held that s. 72(1) of the CPP does not infringe s. 15(1) of the Charter, and awarded partial indemnity costs to the respondents.

Arrêt constitutionnel majeur portant sur l'exclusion des couples de même sexe de la définition du mariage aux fins de la common law.

La Cour a appliqué l'analyse du par. 15(1) de la Charte et conclu que la définition hétérosexuelle du mariage portait atteinte à la dignité et aux droits à l'égalité des couples de même sexe, sans justification au regard de l'article premier.

La Cour a rejeté les prétentions fondées sur la liberté de religion et l'égalité religieuse de l'église intervenante, concluant que l'affaire visait l'institution juridique du mariage plutôt que sa dimension religieuse.

Comme réparation, la Cour a déclaré invalide la définition existante dans la mesure où elle contenait les mots « d'un homme et d'une femme », l'a reformulée immédiatement comme l'union de deux personnes, et a ordonné la délivrance et l'enregistrement des mariages visés.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a Divisional Court decision finding that the common law definition of marriage as between 'one man and one woman' violated the equality rights of same-sex couples under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage demeaned their dignity and was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The Court allowed the cross-appeals on remedy, declaring the existing definition invalid and immediately reformulating it as 'the voluntary union for life of two persons to the exclusion of all others'.

This was an appeal, with leave, from a costs order arising out of summary judgment and related motions in ongoing litigation involving a counterclaim.

The court declined to interfere with the motions judge’s award of solicitor-and-client costs and with the allocation of costs, finding those determinations were within the judge’s discretion and supported by the record.

However, the court varied the order respecting the costs of the action by holding that two respondents whose litigation with the appellant remained ongoing should not receive those costs immediately, while another respondent was entitled to its costs of the action subject to careful assessment to avoid double-counting.

The court also held that costs payable to the appellant should be payable now on a party-and-party basis rather than in the cause.