Robert P. Armstrong

The appellant insured was sued for defamation after posting messages on an internet message board.

He sought a declaration that his homeowner's liability insurer had a duty to defend him in the action.

The insurer denied coverage based on an exclusion for bodily injury or property damage caused by an intentional act.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the exclusion applied.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the pleadings in the defamation action, which alleged intentional and malicious conduct, fell squarely within the intentional act exclusion, as the insured's intent to publish the statements necessarily involved an intent to injure the plaintiffs' reputation.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision which found that minutes of settlement did not contain all essential terms to constitute an enforceable agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the essential terms of the easement and licensing agreements were set out in the minutes.

The dispute over a $2,000 cost for committee of adjustment approval did not justify resiling from the agreement, as the respondents were obligated to assume this cost, or alternatively, it was a minor matter that could be resolved by a judge.

The appeal was allowed and judgment was granted in accordance with the minutes of settlement.

Following a successful appeal, the court determined the costs of the proceedings below.

The defendants had made an offer to settle for $35,000, which the plaintiffs did not accept.

Because the plaintiffs ultimately recovered less than the offered amount, Rule 49.10(2) applied.

The plaintiffs were awarded partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer, fixed at $15,000, and the defendants were awarded partial indemnity costs thereafter, fixed at $30,000.

The appellants appealed the order of Chadwick J. The Court of Appeal set aside the order without prejudice to the rights of the parties, granting them liberty to start new proceedings, including on issues not dealt with by the lower court.

Costs were fixed at $9,000 to the respondents.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of an action commenced approximately 25 years after the events in question.

The trial judge had dismissed the action as statute-barred by the Limitations Act and under the equitable doctrine of laches, noting that key documents were lost, parties dissolved, and witnesses deceased.

The Court of Appeal found no error of fact or law, concluding that the respondent had been substantially prejudiced by the passage of time, and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellant, Business Development Bank of Canada, appealed an order equally allocating a receiver's costs between itself and the respondent, Bank of Nova Scotia.

The appellant had originally supported the appointment of a receiver but later opposed it after entering into a side deal to sell its security.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the receiver was appointed for the benefit of all interested parties and that the motion judge appropriately exercised his discretion to equally allocate the costs given that the indebtedness of both secured lenders was approximately equal.

The appellants appealed from orders of the motions judge.

The parties had signed minutes of settlement regarding possession and disbursement of funds from a property sale.

The motions judge's endorsement specified that an order was to issue in terms of the minutes of settlement, but the issued order did not comply with them, and the judge refused to amend it.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders and directing an order to go in terms of the minutes of settlement.

The appellants sold a book of business and list of customers to the respondent under a share purchase agreement that included a non-competition agreement.

The trial judge found that the non-competition agreement precluded the appellant from doing business with former customers for four years.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that despite some ambiguity, the commercial sense of the transaction supported this interpretation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference arising from allegations involving an eight-year-old complainant.

The principal issue was whether evidence of two prior sexual assaults on young children was admissible as similar fact evidence.

The majority held that the trial judge set the admissibility threshold too low by framing the issue too broadly, relying on generic similarities, failing to account for significant dissimilarities and remoteness in time, and underestimating moral prejudice.

The probative value did not outweigh the prejudicial effect, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant commenced an action for false arrest, false imprisonment, and abuse of process against the respondents, including a lawyer who had allegedly urged police to arrest her.

The motions judge dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the police conducted their own independent investigation and made their own decision to arrest the appellant, meaning the action against the lawyer had no chance of success.

The appellant previously established that the respondent lawyers breached their fiduciary duty to him, but a new trial was ordered to assess his personal damages.

At the retrial, the trial judge dismissed all damage claims because the appellant failed to prove direct personal losses or a causal connection to the breach.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the damages claims, agreeing that the evidence was insufficient.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to set aside the costs award against the appellant, finding that no costs should be ordered given the respondents' serious breach of fiduciary duty.

The appellants appealed a finding of liability in a medical malpractice case, seeking to introduce fresh evidence that the respondent's trial expert witness had subsequently pleaded no contest to professional misconduct.

The Court of Appeal declined to decide whether to admit the fresh evidence, finding that even without the expert's testimony, the other evidence on record—including the respondent's own testimony and other medical evidence—supported the trial judge's conclusions on causation and informed consent.

The appellants called no evidence at trial to refute this.

The court also upheld the quantum of damages and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellants were investors who signed agreements to purchase condominium units, paying the balance of the purchase price by delivery of promissory notes to the vendor.

The vendor assigned the notes to the respondent bank, which had no knowledge that the vendor would be unable to convey title.

When title was not conveyed, the investors stopped making payments, and the bank sued to enforce the notes.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the notes were unconditional promises to pay within the meaning of s. 176(1) of the Bills of Exchange Act, distinguishing the case from Range v. Belvedere Finance Corp., and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant father appealed an order varying a trial judgment that had removed the child from the respondent mother's home.

The trial judge had transferred custody to the father due to the mother's unwarranted interference with his access rights.

The appeal judge found the trial judge erred in principle by focusing excessively on the mother's conduct rather than the best interests of the child, and varied the order to award joint custody while allowing the child to remain in his lifelong home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the father's appeal, agreeing that the trial judge failed to consider the impact of removing the child from his residence and siblings.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its action for delay.

The Court of Appeal found that the motions judge erred in principle in finding prejudice due to inexcusable delay, as the prejudice alleged was general in nature and there was no evidence of missing or incapacitated witnesses.

The appeal was allowed and the order set aside, but without prejudice to the respondent to move again if the appellant failed to answer undertakings within thirty days.

Costs of the appeal and motion were awarded to the respondent.

The Liquidator of the Christian Brothers of Ireland in Canada appealed a motions judge's refusal to approve a $495,495 premium on the legal fees of its counsel, WeirFoulds LLP.

The law firm had acted on a contingency-like basis when the estate became insolvent, successfully recovering $19 million for the estate to compensate victims of child abuse.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motions judge erred by failing to consider the significant financial risk assumed by the law firm, the Liquidator's business decision to approve the premium, and the non-opposition of the victims' representative counsel.

The premium was deemed reasonable and approved in full.

The appellant appealed a spousal support order, arguing the trial judge relied on an erroneous income figure from a Support Mate calculation entered on consent.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the error patent on the face of the record, as the appellant's actual employment income was $10,026 per year, not $16,500.

The court varied the spousal support to $400 a month to equalize the parties' net disposable income, declining to depart from the equalization approach due to an inadequate evidentiary basis.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for partition and sale of lands held in trust for a partnership among four brothers, and the granting of the respondents' counter-application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the applications judge's finding of a partnership and his exercise of discretion in denying partition, noting the partners' interest was not possessory.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal costs, finding the award of substantial indemnity costs unduly harsh given the history of acrimony, and varied the costs below to $10,000.

The appellant appealed an order regarding his activities in a condominium unit, arguing that the respondent's affidavit evidence was inadmissible for non-compliance with Rule 39.01(5).

The Court of Appeal reviewed the trial judge's order and found that each paragraph was reasonably supported by admissible evidence based on the personal knowledge set forth in the affidavit.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's reduction of a fine imposed on the respondent for insider trading.

The respondent had traded shares of a junior mining company while possessing undisclosed material facts, avoiding significant losses.

The Court of Appeal held that the phrase 'by reason of the contravention' in s. 122(4) of the Securities Act does not require the Crown to prove the direct effect of the non-disclosure on the market price, but simply means the loss was avoided by virtue of the insider engaging in the impugned trading.

The Court also held that shares not beneficially owned by the respondent should not be included in the loss avoided calculation.

Despite correcting the legal interpretation, the Court upheld the $2,000,000 fine imposed by the appeal judge.