Richard A. Lococo

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Inquiries, Complaints, and Reports Committee (ICRC) requiring him to complete a Specified Continuing Education and Remediation Program (SCERP) following several adverse event reports at his clinic.

The applicant argued the decision was unreasonable and the process was procedurally unfair due to skewed chart selection and alleged bias by the College's assessor.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the ICRC owed a relatively low degree of procedural fairness which was met, and that its decision was reasonable, justified, and intelligible based on the evidence of poor clinical care and deficient record-keeping.

The applicant sought judicial review of an interlocutory decision by the Agricultural and Rural Affairs Tribunal dismissing a recusal motion based on an alleged apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court granted an extension of time to file the application but ultimately dismissed the judicial review as premature.

The court reaffirmed that absent exceptional circumstances, judicial review of interlocutory administrative decisions should await the completion of the underlying proceeding, and allegations of bias do not automatically bypass this rule.

The Chief Executive Officer of the Financial Services Regulatory Authority (FSRA) appealed a decision of the Financial Services Tribunal that ordered the issuance of insurance agent licences to the respondent.

The respondent had previously made false statements on his licence applications regarding his termination from a bank and had conducted unlicensed insurance activity.

The Tribunal found that despite the misconduct, the respondent was suitable to be licensed subject to strict supervision conditions and a $10,000 penalty.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the Tribunal made no errors of law or palpable and overriding errors of mixed fact and law.

The Tribunal was entitled to substitute its opinion for that of the FSRA and properly weighed the evidence, including the respondent's positive employment record and the context of his misconduct.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant mother appealed a temporary order granting the respondent father equal parenting time on a week-about basis with their 15-month-old child.

The Divisional Court granted the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in law by failing to conduct a proper analysis of the best interests of the child under section 24 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The motion judge failed to consider the child's young age, the status quo, allegations of family violence, and the AFCC-O Guidelines.

The temporary order was set aside and the matter remitted to a different judge, with an interim graduated parenting schedule put in place.

The applicant, a Black municipal councillor, alleged he was subjected to racial profiling by a police officer.

After a Police Services Act (PSA) disciplinary hearing cleared the officer of misconduct, the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) dismissed the applicant's human rights complaint under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, finding the matter had been appropriately dealt with.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court found the HRTO's decision unreasonable because it failed to apply or justify its departure from established Supreme Court of Canada and HRTO jurisprudence, which holds that it is generally unfair to use a PSA proceeding to bar a human rights complaint due to differences in purpose, standard of proof, and available remedies.

The HRTO decisions were set aside and remitted for a new hearing.

The self-represented appellant requested an adjournment of the appeal hearing and indicated an expectation that the hearing would proceed by Zoom.

The Divisional Court granted the adjournment, directing that the rescheduled hearing proceed by Zoom and be peremptory to the appellant.

Costs of the day were reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision dated July 28, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving parties to pay costs of $5,000 all-inclusive to the responding parties.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated September 25, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $2,500 to the responding party.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of J.A. Ramsay J. dated July 4, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party fixed at $4,320.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decisions of the lower court judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 all-inclusive to the responding party.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding parties.

The tenant brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside a single judge's decision dismissing her motion for leave to appeal a Landlord and Tenant Board consent eviction order.

The Divisional Court panel held that under the newly enacted Rule 62.02(1)3, leave to appeal a tribunal order requiring leave must be heard by a three-judge panel, not a single judge.

The panel set aside the single judge's decision, heard the leave motion, and granted leave to appeal the eviction order.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Emery J. dated May 26, 2025.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal a costs order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion and ordered the moving parties to pay costs of $5,000 to the corporate responding party and $5,000 to the individual responding parties.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to make an application for judicial review of an ODACC adjudicator's determination under the Construction Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion.

No costs were awarded as the responding party failed to provide a Costs Outline.

The appellant appealed a family court order dismissing her application for $745,286 in retroactive spousal support for the period of 2015 to 2022.

The parties separated in 2006 and had an informal financial arrangement until 2015.

The trial judge found the appellant's financial evidence unreliable and concluded she failed to establish an ongoing entitlement to compensatory support after 2015.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness in the trial judge's credibility assessments and confirming that the burden of proving entitlement on an initial application rests with the claimant, regardless of delay.

The moving parties brought a motion to quash the appellants' appeal of an interlocutory injunction order.

The underlying dispute involved competing oppression applications between 50/50 shareholders of a condominium project.

The Divisional Court found that the injunction order was interlocutory, not final, as it merely preserved the status quo pending the merits hearing.

The court reaffirmed that section 255 of the Business Corporations Act does not provide an appeal as of right for interlocutory orders.

Furthermore, because the standstill period had expired, the proposed appeal was moot.

The motion to quash was granted.

The applicants sought judicial review and appealed decisions of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (IPC).

The IPC had found that ransomware attacks encrypting the applicants' data containers constituted an unauthorized 'use' and 'loss' of personal information, triggering statutory duties to notify affected individuals under PHIPA and the CYFSA.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications and appeal, holding that the IPC's interpretation was reasonable and purposive.

The court found that the encryption of data, which made it temporarily unavailable, amounted to 'handling' or 'dealing with' the information, thereby constituting an unauthorized use that required notification regardless of whether the data was actually viewed or exfiltrated.

The applicant, an adjunct professor, sought judicial review of the respondent university's decision not to proceed with her complaint regarding an open letter signed by students concerning the Israel-Hamas conflict.

The university had appointed an external reviewer who concluded the students did not breach the student code of conduct.

The Divisional Court exercised its discretion to decline to hear the judicial review application, finding that adequate alternative forums, such as a grievance under the collective agreement or an application to the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, were more appropriate to address the applicant's concerns.