Rebecca Schwartz

The appellant, B.C., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's findings on consent and the defence of honest, mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion on non-consent was unassailable and that any alleged errors regarding the honest mistaken belief defence could not have affected the verdict, as the appellant failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent, particularly given the complainant's intoxicated and ill state.

This is an appeal from a 17-year period of parole ineligibility imposed following a guilty plea to second-degree murder.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred by failing to give sufficient weight to mitigating factors and by imposing a demonstrably unfit period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, emphasizing deference to the sentencing judge's weighing of factors, and concluded that the sentence was entirely fit given all circumstances, including significant aggravating factors.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal from convictions for two counts of sexual interference and two counts of sexual assault, for which he received a seven-year sentence.

The convictions related to historical sexual assaults on his niece.

The Crown opposed the application on the public interest ground, specifically concerning public confidence.

The court, applying the test from R. v. Oland, found that at least one ground of appeal regarding the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility might have merit, and that the appeal was not weak.

Considering the historical nature of the offences and the applicant's prior compliance with bail conditions, the court granted bail pending appeal with stricter terms, including provisions restricting his access to persons under the age of 16, satisfying public safety concerns.

The appellants, convicted of sexual assault, appealed their convictions.

They argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's memory gaps due to intoxication, reversing the burden of proof, and failing to consider an exculpatory statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the trial judge's analysis of consent and memory gaps was reasonable, the burden of proof was correctly applied, and the exculpatory statement lacked probative value regarding the complainant's subjective consent.

The appellant, Casey Matti Henry, appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The central issue at trial was consent.

The appeal raised three grounds: (i) the trial judge erred in dismissing an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code regarding the complainant's prior sexual activity; (ii) there was a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the trial judge due to frequent interventions; and (iii) the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the s. 276 application dismissal, no substantiation of judicial bias, and no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility findings.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge's decision was entitled to deference and no errors in principle were found.

The appellant, convicted of multiple robberies and severe assaults, appealed her dangerous offender designation and the determinate sentence of ten years (consecutive to a prior five-and-a-half-year sentence) followed by a ten-year long-term supervision order.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario reviewed the sentencing judge's findings regarding the appellant's high risk of violent recidivism and the application of the totality principle.

The Court found no error in the sentencing judge's apprehension of the evidence, analysis, or conclusion that the appellant met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation, nor in the determination of the sentence, including the rejection of a "spree" characterization for the planned offences.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Trevor Letlow, appealed his convictions for aggravated sexual assault, assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, sexual assault with a weapon, and unlawful confinement, as well as the indeterminate sentence imposed after being designated a dangerous offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility despite a lack of independent corroboration for the sexual assault, and the sentence appeal, upholding the indeterminate sentence.

The court found the trial judge provided cogent reasons for rejecting expert opinion on age attenuation and concluding that no lesser measure could adequately protect the public.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, raising multiple grounds including errors in evidence assessment, failure to give a Vetrovec warning, failure to address honest but mistaken belief in consent, and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's credibility findings and rejecting arguments based on stereotypical victim behaviour.

The court found no air of reality for the honest but mistaken belief defence and no evidence of judicial bias, concluding that the verdict was reasonable.

The appellant, N.T., appealed convictions for sexual interference and assault related to his step-daughter.

He argued the trial judge's reasons were insufficient, failing to explain the resolution of inconsistent evidence, rejection of his testimony, application of *W.(D.)*, or addressing the s. 43 Criminal Code defence.

He also claimed the sentencing reasons indicated an intent to convict for sexual assault rather than sexual interference.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, with a clear path to conviction based on accepted Crown evidence.

The court clarified that the trial judge's reference to "sexual assault" in sentencing was shorthand for sexual interference and that the acquittal on sexual assault was a patent error in law, not rendering verdicts inconsistent.

The appellant was acquitted by jury of second degree murder after shooting a man he found breaking into his truck, claiming self-defence.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury to consider the appellant's role in the incident under s. 34(2)(c) of the Criminal Code as a factor bearing on the reasonableness of his use of lethal force.

The majority held that the phrase 'the person's role in the incident' in s. 34(2)(c) captures the accused's conduct throughout the incident from beginning to end, without requiring that the conduct be unlawful, provocative or morally blameworthy.

The omission of this instruction was a material error that had a bearing on the acquittal, warranting a new trial.

The appeal was dismissed with Côté J. dissenting on the question of materiality.

Michael Theriault appealed his conviction for common assault and his nine-month sentence, stemming from an altercation where he, an off-duty police officer, and his brother assaulted Dafonte Miller, a young Black man, after catching him stealing from their truck.

The trial judge had acquitted the brothers of aggravated assault and obstruction of justice but convicted Michael of common assault for striking Miller with a pipe when Miller was retreating.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Michael Theriault's appeal, upholding the conviction and sentence.

The Crown's cross-appeal against the acquittals was also dismissed without addressing its merits, as the Crown had indicated they would not pursue a new trial if Michael Theriault's common assault conviction was upheld.

The appellant G.C. appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation involving three complainants.

The appeal raised issues regarding the trial judge's application of the rule in R. v. W.(D.), the rejection of the appellant's evidence without sufficient reasoning, and reliance on the absence of a proven motive for fabrication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge correctly applied the legal principles, including the W.(D.) rule, and provided reasoned explanations for credibility assessments, demonstrating proper deference to the trial judge's findings.

The appellant, Todd Howley, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, challenging the trial judge's admission of internet search evidence ("nail gun" searches) and the appropriateness of the Crown's closing submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction.

The court found the internet search evidence relevant to planning and deliberation, and that the trial judge's timely curative instructions adequately addressed any impropriety in the Crown's closing, thus not warranting a mistrial or a stay of proceedings for abuse of process.

Matthew Bilodeau appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that continued his conditional discharge but reduced his reporting obligation, seeking an absolute discharge.

He argued the Board's finding that he continued to pose a significant threat to public safety was unreasonable and speculative.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion reasonable and grounded in evidence, particularly concerning the severity of the index offence, the need for active monitoring due to his mental disorder, and the risks associated with medication non-compliance and the transition to a new therapeutic team.

The accused, J.M., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's improper use of judicial notice, including drawing on personal experience as counsel and relying on external social science research (a magazine article and parallels to battered woman syndrome from *R. v. Lavallee*), to assess the complainant's credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge exceeded the proper boundaries of judicial notice and violated procedural fairness by relying on information not put into evidence or subject to submissions.

The errors materially infected the credibility findings, which were central to the trial.

The curative proviso was not applicable due to the procedural unfairness.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder on the grounds of Crown non-disclosure.

The Crown failed to disclose medical records relating to the appellant's mother's health until partway through the appellant's cross-examination.

These records were relevant to the appellant's defence that his mother, rather than the appellant, killed the victim.

The trial judge initially dismissed the mistrial application, expecting that expert evidence would neutralize any prejudice.

However, the expert changed his evidence at trial.

The Court of Appeal found a reasonable possibility that the non-disclosure affected the overall fairness of the trial process and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition ordering his detention at the General Forensic Unit of the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible on impaired driving and assault charges and was diagnosed with Bipolar Affective Disorder and Substance Use Disorders.

The Board issued conflicting reasons: initially a detention order, then reasons supporting a conditional discharge, and finally amended reasons supporting detention.

The Court of Appeal found the conflicting and unexplained reasons rendered the disposition untenable and allowed the appeal, ordering a new hearing before a differently constituted panel within three weeks.

The appellant appealed his conviction on two counts of sexual assault against his step-granddaughter.

The trial judge found that the appellant sexually assaulted the complainant on multiple visits over a nine-year period, characterizing the assaults as part of an ongoing course of conduct.

The complainant acquiesced to the appellant's demands out of fear and therefore did not consent.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by drawing a negative inference from the absence of medical evidence regarding the appellant's physical capability, and that the trial judge failed to apply the third step of the W.(D) test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds and upheld the conviction.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a conviction for impaired driving from the Superior Court's dismissal of his summary conviction appeal.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the proposed appeal and dismissed the application for leave to appeal.

The court determined that the case had no significance for the general administration of justice and denied the request for costs.

The appellant sought bail pending appeal following his fourth conviction for sexual assault, for which he received a four-year sentence.

The Crown opposed the application on the grounds that detention was necessary in the public interest and that the grounds of appeal were frivolous.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the appellant failed to meet his burden of establishing that detention was not necessary in the public interest under section 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the grounds of appeal to be very weak, the offence to be serious, and evidence of above-average risk to reoffend in a sexual manner.