Philip Perlmutter

The appellant was acquitted at trial of an impaired driving-related offence after the trial judge excluded evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the officer lacked reasonable grounds for a breath demand.

The summary conviction appeal court overturned the acquittal, concluding the trial judge analyzed the evidence piecemeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal.

The majority held that the trial judge properly considered the totality of the evidence and his conclusion that the officer lacked reasonable grounds was not unreasonable.

The trial judge's application of the Collins factors to exclude the evidence was also upheld.

The appellant, an inmate, was convicted of attempting to obstruct justice after asking a fellow prisoner to intimidate a witness who had previously testified against him at a dangerous offender hearing.

The appellant appealed, arguing that since the witness could not testify at the upcoming dangerous offender appeal, the offence could not be made out.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the offence of attempting to obstruct justice is complete upon the wilful attempt, regardless of whether it has the potential for success.

The court also found no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The Crown appealed the 12-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for an offence involving drinking and driving and fleeing the scene.

The Crown argued the trial judge displayed bias during the sentencing hearing and that a conditional sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's comments inappropriate but not indicative of prejudgment.

Considering the fresh evidence that the respondent had complied with her sentence, abstained from alcohol, and completed rehabilitation, the Court held the conditional sentence was within the appropriate range and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for extortion, having been acquitted of related assault charges arising from the same incident.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misdirected the jury by providing a generic instruction on extortion that included 'threats', which could have led the jury to convict based on words alone, despite the Crown's case requiring proof of physical assault.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge carefully reviewed all appropriate factors and the sentence was not manifestly unfit nor did it reflect any error in principle.

The court noted that the appellant's rehabilitation efforts were a matter for parole authorities.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that ordered a new trial after the trial judge acquitted him of impaired driving.

The trial judge had excluded breathalyzer results, finding the police officer arbitrarily detained the appellant by approaching his parked vehicle without legal justification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the summary conviction appeal court that the officer needed no legal authority to approach and speak to the appellant in a public parking area, and no detention occurred.

The Crown appealed an order quashing the respondent's committal for trial on charges related to a street racing accident.

The application judge had quashed the committal on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to prove the respondent was the driver of the second car.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in law by weighing the evidence against the committal standard rather than determining if there was any evidentiary basis upon which the committing justice could form the opinion that the evidence justified a committal.

The order committing the respondent for trial was restored.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by admitting his statement to the police in violation of his s. 10(b) Charter rights and by failing to give a limiting instruction to the jury regarding his statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant unequivocally waived his right to counsel.

The Court also held that a limiting instruction was not required as a matter of law, and even if it were, the proviso would apply given the overwhelming case against the appellant.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for aggravated assault and other offences.

The sentencing judge had credited the respondent's 16 months of pre-sentence custody as equivalent to almost three years, reducing the appropriate sentence to 14 months, which was then ordered to be served conditionally.

The Crown argued that pre-sentence custody cannot be used to reduce a penitentiary-range sentence to under two years to make a conditional sentence available.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under s. 719(3) of the Criminal Code, a sentencing judge may take pre-sentence custody into account when determining the appropriate range of sentence for the purposes of the conditional sentencing regime.

The appellant was convicted of weapons trafficking and transferring a prohibited firearm, but acquitted of possession for the purpose of transferring and possession for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

He appealed, arguing the verdicts were inconsistent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the possession charges required an additional element of purpose, which the jury may have had a reasonable doubt about, thus explaining the different verdicts.

The appellant pleaded guilty to theft over $5000 for stealing telephones and equipment from his employer, Bell Canada, to fund a gambling addiction.

He was sentenced to six months' imprisonment, 18 months' probation, 240 hours of community service, and ordered to pay $90,000 in restitution.

The appellant appealed the sentence, arguing for a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's conclusion that denunciation and general deterrence required a custodial sentence given the magnitude, duration, and breach of trust involved in the offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting the evidence of several witnesses, including an expert who testified that the complainant suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that defence counsel at trial had not objected to the evidence and that it was admissible to respond to the defence's attack on the complainant's credibility regarding delayed disclosure.

The court also found the jury charge on credibility to be sufficient.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for criminal negligence causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The respondent, while under the influence of alcohol, struck and killed a pedestrian at high speed, then fled the scene and failed to seek assistance.

The Court of Appeal held that the conditional sentence was manifestly unfit as it failed to reflect the gravity of the offences and the principles of denunciation and general deterrence.

The appeal was allowed and a sentence of 20 months' imprisonment was imposed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for indecent assault and gross indecency, arguing errors in the jury charge, improper cross-examination by the Crown, and the improper admission of expert evidence regarding delayed disclosure.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge departed from the Lifchus standard, failed to adequately relate the defence's position, and failed to caution against propensity reasoning.

The Court also found the Crown's cross-examination improper and the expert evidence inadmissible under the necessity requirement.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant pleaded guilty to sexual interference involving his granddaughter and subsequently appealed to withdraw his plea.

He argued that he did not understand that his plea constituted an admission of touching for a 'sexual purpose'.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant met the onus of demonstrating his plea was not informed, as the proceedings and counsel's submissions focused on 'inappropriate' touching without acknowledging a sexual purpose.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of importing and possessing restricted and prohibited weapons after purchasing firearms in Florida that were subsequently sold by an associate to undercover officers in Canada.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in admitting co-conspirator hearsay statements, relying on a suspect witness, and dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding sufficient independent evidence of his participation in the common design, proper corroboration of the witness, and reasonable explanations for the delay.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the four-year term was fit for a front-line principal in a firearms trafficking enterprise.

The appellant pleaded guilty to frauds involving credit card information that resulted in losses of $317,000 to banks and $2,121 to Future Shop.

The trial judge imposed a conditional sentence and probation, along with a restitution order of $52,121.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the restitution order.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's consideration of the relevant factors, including the appellant's role, ability to pay, and the total loss suffered, and dismissed the sentence appeal.

The appellant was convicted of indecent assault and gross indecency against his step-daughter for historical offences.

He appealed his convictions on grounds including improper cross-examination regarding his character, failure to give a propensity warning regarding his lifestyle, failure to give a warning regarding the lapse of time before charges were laid, and failure to stay a conviction under the Kienapple principle.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing for a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions or the Crown's cross-examination.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly emphasized general deterrence and denunciation.

The appellant sought to challenge a single judge's denial of leave to appeal from the dismissal of a summary conviction appeal.

The court held that no statutory right of appeal or review exists from a decision granting or denying leave under s. 839(1) of the Criminal Code.

It further held that neither the Criminal Appeal Rules nor the Rules of Civil Procedure can create such a substantive right by incorporation, and that s. 7(5) of the Courts of Justice Act does not apply because s. 7(3) expressly excludes motions for leave to appeal from the category of motions reviewable under that provision.

The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed his convictions and three-year sentence for four arson-related charges.

He argued that his section 8 Charter rights were violated when police obtained fire marshal samples without a warrant, that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence would not have been excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter even if a breach occurred, the trial judge's comments did not reverse the burden of proof, and there was no miscarriage of justice resulting from trial counsel's performance.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.