Philip Perlmutter

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial judge failed to properly address the Long-Term Offender (LTO) question.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the medical experts were not examined on the LTO issue and the trial judge did not effectively decide the question.

The court concluded that a new hearing was necessary.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges of impaired driving and driving over 80.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge had excluded breathalyzer evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that police officers violated the accused's s. 8 rights by walking onto his driveway to investigate him.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the officers' entry onto the driveway was justified by the implied licence doctrine.

Because the accused did not ask the officers to leave, they were lawfully on the property when they made the breathalyzer demand, meaning no s. 8 violation occurred.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's order staying proceedings against the respondent for robbery due to a breach of s. 9 of the Charter.

The trial judge found the respondent was arbitrarily detained in contravention of s. 503 of the Criminal Code to obtain an inculpatory statement.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in granting a stay, as she failed to consider whether the prejudice caused by the breach would be manifested in the trial and whether a lesser remedy, such as excluding the statement, would be adequate.

The appeal was allowed, the stay set aside, and a new trial ordered with the statement excluded.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of incest involving his two half-sisters, with the abuse occurring in the 1960s when the victims were children.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the relevance of the complainants' 30-year delay in reporting the abuse.

He also appealed his four-year sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to his youth at the time of the offences and his subsequent exemplary life.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the appellant's lack of remorse meant his subsequent good character did not warrant a reduced sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Crown conceded that the sentence should be reduced because the conviction that formed the basis for the suspension was later set aside, meaning the appellant's record for similar offences was less than what was known to the trial court.

The Court of Appeal allowed the sentence appeal, reducing the fine to $2,000, and dismissed the conviction appeal as abandoned.

The accused was charged with driving over the legal limit.

At trial, he argued that the warrantless seizure of his breath violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Crown called no evidence to establish that the police officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make the breathalyzer demand.

The trial judge excluded the evidence and acquitted the accused.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the accused bore the burden of proving the seizure was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the accused's appeal and restored the acquittal, confirming that a warrantless seizure of breath is prima facie unreasonable and the burden shifts to the Crown to prove its reasonableness.

The appellants were jointly tried and convicted of robbery and aggravated assault, with one appellant also convicted of attempted murder.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in refusing to sever the trials so that one co-accused could call the other as a witness.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in principle by assessing the reliability and credibility of the proposed co-accused witness, which is a function for the jury.

The appeal of the first appellant was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appeal of the second appellant, who argued the defence of duress should have been left to the jury, was dismissed as there was no air of reality to the defence.

The appellant was convicted of sexual offences against a five-year-old child.

At trial, he relied on an alibi defence supported by an independent witness.

The Crown cross-examined the witness on her reliability, suggesting a document she claimed to have delivered to the Crown was never received.

Post-trial, the Crown discovered the document had indeed been received.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal without addressing this new evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the undisclosed evidence met the test for a new trial as it could have impacted the trial judge's credibility findings.

The accused was acquitted at trial of impaired driving and driving over 80 after the trial judge simply stated he agreed with and adopted the defence submissions.

The summary conviction appeal court allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge's reasons inadequate.

The accused appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the standard for adequate reasons for an acquittal is informed by the presumption of innocence, the trial judge's terse reasons in this case failed to explain the basis for the acquittals and prevented meaningful appellate review.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three robbery-related offences, arguing the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons.

The trial judge made only passing reference to the appellant's testimony and did not explain why it was rejected or failed to raise a reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal found this omission constituted an error of law, as the reasons did not meet the appellant's entitlement to know why he was convicted and precluded meaningful appellate review.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The respondent pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and other offences.

At sentencing, she had spent 16 months in pre-sentence custody.

The sentencing judge considered this equivalent to almost three years and imposed a 14-month conditional sentence, which the Court of Appeal upheld.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that under s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code, a conditional sentence is unavailable to an offender who otherwise deserves a penitentiary term.

Time spent in pre-sentence custody cannot be used to reduce the sentence range to make a conditional sentence available.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing a mistrial, making improper rulings on character evidence and cross-examination on criminal records, failing to leave the defence of provocation with the jury, and giving improper jury instructions on intent and a rolled-up charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion regarding the mistrial, struck an appropriate balance on character evidence, correctly concluded provocation had no air of reality, and adequately instructed the jury on intent and intoxication.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing the Board's decision to deny an absolute discharge was unreasonable, reversed the burden of proof, and breached procedural fairness by rejecting a joint submission without express notice.

The hospital's doctor had recommended an absolute discharge, which was supported by both the appellant and the Crown.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was not unreasonable given the appellant's lack of a track record of remission and programming for substance abuse.

The Court also found no reversal of the burden of proof and held that the Board's questioning provided sufficient notice of its concerns regarding the joint submission.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in preferring the opinion evidence of five Crown witnesses based on their past experience with impaired drivers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice because all opinion and observational evidence, along with the appellant's admission of drinking, supported a conclusion of impairment, and there was no defence evidence to the contrary.

The Crown appealed a non-custodial sentence imposed on a repeat drinking and driving offender with a lengthy criminal record.

The trial judge had found exceptional circumstances based on the respondent's remarkable rehabilitative strides and four years of sobriety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's decision not to incarcerate the respondent, though it clarified that general deterrence applies equally to hardened alcoholics and cautioned against automatically equating residential treatment with pre-trial custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a vicious and unprovoked assault that left the victim with serious injuries and permanent disability.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to refer to two witnesses' evidence, by accepting the identification evidence of a specific witness, and by refusing to allow proof of a prior inconsistent statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's reasons or evidentiary rulings, and upholding the sentence given the severity of the attack.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the basis that the trial judge and summary conviction appeal court judge erroneously relied on inadmissible hearsay to find that a vehicle was owned by a person known to the appellant.

The Crown conceded the error.

The Court of Appeal agreed, granted leave to appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable due to weak eyewitness identification evidence and that the trial judge made several errors in his jury charge and evidentiary rulings.

The Crown's case relied on the complainant's selection of the appellant from a photographic line-up, supported by circumstantial evidence including the appellant's residence near the park, his ownership of a dog matching the assailant's dog, and post-offence conduct evidence from his hairdresser.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict reasonable and concluding that the trial judge's instructions on eyewitness identification and his evidentiary rulings were adequate and did not render the trial unfair.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering her continued confinement in a hospital.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding an adequate evidentiary basis for the Board's conclusion that the appellant posed a significant risk of dangerousness due to her mental illness, personality disorder, and history of medication non-compliance.

However, the Court noted a lack of evidence regarding community management and medication supervision, expressing hope that these issues would be explored at the next hearing.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision setting aside the accused's conviction for driving over 80.

At trial, the accused called evidence of his alcohol consumption to rebut the presumption of accuracy of the breathalyzer certificate.

The trial judge considered the breathalyzer readings as some evidence, without the presumption of accuracy, in rejecting the accused's evidence to the contrary.

The summary conviction appeal judge held this was circular reasoning and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that under s. 258(1)(g) of the Criminal Code, the certificate is some evidence of its contents and can be weighed along with other evidence in assessing the accused's evidence to the contrary.