Philip Perlmutter

The respondent was acquitted at trial of several driving offences causing death and bodily harm, with the trial judge finding reasonable doubt as to whether the respondent or his passenger was driving at the time of the fatal collision.

The Crown appealed the acquittals, arguing the trial judge made errors of law in his treatment of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge misapprehended key eyewitness testimony and failed to consider the totality of the evidence, instead applying the reasonable doubt standard in a piecemeal fashion to individual pieces of evidence.

A police constable was charged with assault with a weapon arising from his use of a police asp during the arrest of a protester at the G-20 demonstrations in Toronto on June 26, 2010.

The Crown alleged that the force used exceeded what was necessary.

The defendant testified that he used the asp to assist fellow officers in securing the arrestee's limbs.

The court found that the defendant's use of force was not proportionate, necessary, or reasonable, and that his explanation for the blows was an after-the-fact justification rather than the actual reason for them.

The defendant was found guilty.

The appellant was convicted of driving while disqualified under s. 259(4) of the Criminal Code.

At the time of the offence, he was subject to both a Criminal Code driving prohibition and a provincial licence suspension.

The Crown conceded that the notice requirements of s. 260(1) of the Code were not met for the Criminal Code prohibition, but relied solely on the provincial suspension to prove the disqualification.

The appellant argued that compliance with s. 260(1) was mandatory even when relying on a provincial suspension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 260(1) applies only to court-ordered prohibitions under the Code and is not engaged when the Crown relies on a provincial driving suspension.

A Toronto Police Service officer was charged with assault causing bodily harm against a member of the public.

The Crown alleged the officer used excessive force and made an unlawful arrest for public intoxication.

The defence argued the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the complainant was intoxicated and posed a safety risk, and that any force used was necessary to effect a lawful arrest.

The court found the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the complainant was intoxicated, that there was a risk to safety, and that arrest was necessary.

The court also found the officer was entitled to the defence of honest mistake of fact.

The charge was dismissed.

The Court considered whether 2008 Criminal Code amendments limiting evidence to challenge breath test reliability applied to a trial concerning earlier events.

A majority held the amendments affected substantive rights because they eliminated the Carter defence as an independent route to raise reasonable doubt and therefore should not apply retrospectively.

The Court restored the trial acquittal and allowed the appeal.

A dissent would have treated the provisions as procedural evidentiary rules with immediate effect.

The accused was convicted of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The Crown served a notice of intention to seek a greater penalty based on four prior drinking and driving convictions from over 15 years ago.

The trial judge found that the Crown's decision to prove the notice was unreasonable and violated the accused's rights under s. 7 of the Charter, and sentenced the accused below the mandatory minimum.

The summary conviction appeal court affirmed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a prosecutor's decision to prove the notice is not a core prosecutorial function but is reviewable under s. 7 only for abuse of process, arbitrariness, fundamental unfairness, or gross disproportionality, not for reasonableness.

The Crown's decision did not violate s. 7, and the mandatory minimum penalty applied.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court that had dismissed his appeal from conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the proposed appeal had no merit and raised no issues of significance to the administration of justice beyond the facts of the case.

The appellant appealed from a conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in his analysis of past signification by misapprehending the evidence and failing to provide clear reasons.

Furthermore, the trial judge failed to make a necessary ruling under s. 10(b) of the Charter, rendering his s. 24(2) analysis invalid.

The appellant appealed her effective five-year sentence for impaired driving causing death and impaired driving causing bodily harm.

She argued the sentencing judge overemphasized deterrence and failed to give sufficient weight to her aboriginal background and rehabilitation efforts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge carefully considered her background but appropriately weighed serious aggravating factors, including her prior record, high blood alcohol level, and lack of accepted responsibility.

The sentence was found to be fit.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for impaired driving causing death, dangerous driving causing death, and related offences following a motor vehicle collision.

He argued that urinalysis results obtained in breach of section 8 of the Charter should have been excluded under section 24(2), that the jury charge was unfair, and that the Kienapple principle precluded convictions for both impaired and dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence was properly admitted under the Grant framework, the jury charge was balanced, and Kienapple did not apply because impaired driving and dangerous driving address different legal elements.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, upholding the four-year penitentiary term as fit given the paramount need for general deterrence.

The accused was denied a bail hearing for 24 days due to a lack of systemic resources in York Region.

The trial judge found a breach of the accused's section 11(e) Charter rights, stayed the proceedings, and awarded costs against the Crown.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the finding of systemic delay and the costs award for counsel's attendances in bail court.

However, the Court set aside the stay of proceedings, finding that the trial judge erred by failing to balance the interests served by granting a stay against society's interest in a trial on the merits.

The costs awarded for the Charter argument were also set aside.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving over 80.

Before the trial concluded, the 'evidence to the contrary' provisions of s. 258(1) of the Criminal Code were amended by Bill C-2, altering the requirements for the Carter defence.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge held that the amendments did not apply retrospectively and acquitted the accused.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the amendments are essentially evidentiary in nature and do not eliminate the defence, but merely alter its evidentiary content.

Therefore, the amendments apply retrospectively to trials continuing after their enactment.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that had overturned the accused's conviction.

The appeal court had interfered with the trial judge's finding that a slight deviation from the recommended 7-day replacement schedule for the alcohol test solution did not affect the accuracy of the breath tests.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the Criminal Code does not mandate a strict 7-day replacement schedule and the trial judge's finding of fact was amply supported by the evidence.

The accused appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that had overturned her acquittal.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, set aside the summary conviction appeal court judge's order, and restored the acquittal.

The trial judge had found that the arresting officer breached the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights and implicitly found the officer stopped the accused selectively for an improper purpose.

The Court of Appeal held that the cumulative effect of these Charter breaches warranted the exclusion of the breath results.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing that a demand under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code was invalid because she was not driving or in care and control of her vehicle at a time sufficiently proximate to the demand.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the appellant drove her car within a close enough time frame to the demand to come within 'past signification'.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that had overturned the accused's conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that the appeal judge erred in law by failing to apply binding precedent.

Because the approved screening device was located nearby and customs officials administered the test within nine minutes of the original demand, the conviction was restored.

The accused was arrested for impaired driving and driving over 80.

At the police station, the accused's counsel demanded to question the breathalyzer technician about the investigation before advising the accused.

The technician refused, and the accused subsequently argued his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated.

The summary conviction appeal judge agreed and quashed the conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the technician was under no obligation to answer counsel's questions before counsel consulted with the accused, and the accused failed to prove he could not exercise his rights meaningfully.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that his trial counsel provided inadequate representation due to a conflict of interest and by entering an agreed statement of facts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no prejudice, conflict, or inadequate representation, and noting that the agreed statement of facts was a valid strategic decision to protect the appellant from cross-examination.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's rejection of a conditional sentence.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a decision of the summary conviction appeal court.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, holding that questions of law should not be decided in the abstract and that the record's findings were not sufficiently clear to permit dealing with the legal question posed.

The accused was involved in a single vehicle accident.

The police arrived approximately one hour after the accident was reported and took breath samples.

The trial judge convicted the accused of driving 'over 80', but the summary conviction appeal judge quashed the conviction, holding that the Crown failed to explain the delay by not calling evidence of police organization.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that evidence of police organization is not strictly required if other evidence, such as the arresting officer's testimony that it was a busy night, sufficiently explains the delay.

A new trial was ordered.