Philip Perlmutter

A police constable was charged with assault with a weapon arising from his use of a police asp during the arrest of a protester at the G-20 demonstrations in Toronto on June 26, 2010.

The Crown alleged that the force used exceeded what was necessary.

The defendant testified that he used the asp to assist fellow officers in securing the arrestee's limbs.

The court found that the defendant's use of force was not proportionate, necessary, or reasonable, and that his explanation for the blows was an after-the-fact justification rather than the actual reason for them.

The defendant was found guilty.

The appellant was convicted of driving while disqualified under s. 259(4) of the Criminal Code.

At the time of the offence, he was subject to both a Criminal Code driving prohibition and a provincial licence suspension.

The Crown conceded that the notice requirements of s. 260(1) of the Code were not met for the Criminal Code prohibition, but relied solely on the provincial suspension to prove the disqualification.

The appellant argued that compliance with s. 260(1) was mandatory even when relying on a provincial suspension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 260(1) applies only to court-ordered prohibitions under the Code and is not engaged when the Crown relies on a provincial driving suspension.

A Toronto Police Service officer was charged with assault causing bodily harm against a member of the public.

The Crown alleged the officer used excessive force and made an unlawful arrest for public intoxication.

The defence argued the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the complainant was intoxicated and posed a safety risk, and that any force used was necessary to effect a lawful arrest.

The court found the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the complainant was intoxicated, that there was a risk to safety, and that arrest was necessary.

The court also found the officer was entitled to the defence of honest mistake of fact.

The charge was dismissed.

The Court considered whether 2008 Criminal Code amendments limiting evidence to challenge breath test reliability applied to a trial concerning earlier events.

A majority held the amendments affected substantive rights because they eliminated the Carter defence as an independent route to raise reasonable doubt and therefore should not apply retrospectively.

The Court restored the trial acquittal and allowed the appeal.

A dissent would have treated the provisions as procedural evidentiary rules with immediate effect.

The accused was convicted of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The Crown served a notice of intention to seek a greater penalty based on four prior drinking and driving convictions from over 15 years ago.

The trial judge found that the Crown's decision to prove the notice was unreasonable and violated the accused's rights under s. 7 of the Charter, and sentenced the accused below the mandatory minimum.

The summary conviction appeal court affirmed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a prosecutor's decision to prove the notice is not a core prosecutorial function but is reviewable under s. 7 only for abuse of process, arbitrariness, fundamental unfairness, or gross disproportionality, not for reasonableness.

The Crown's decision did not violate s. 7, and the mandatory minimum penalty applied.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court that had dismissed his appeal from conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the proposed appeal had no merit and raised no issues of significance to the administration of justice beyond the facts of the case.

The appellant appealed from a conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in his analysis of past signification by misapprehending the evidence and failing to provide clear reasons.

Furthermore, the trial judge failed to make a necessary ruling under s. 10(b) of the Charter, rendering his s. 24(2) analysis invalid.

The respondent pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and other offences.

At sentencing, she had spent 16 months in pre-sentence custody.

The sentencing judge considered this equivalent to almost three years and imposed a 14-month conditional sentence, which the Court of Appeal upheld.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that under s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code, a conditional sentence is unavailable to an offender who otherwise deserves a penitentiary term.

Time spent in pre-sentence custody cannot be used to reduce the sentence range to make a conditional sentence available.