Peter Scrutton

This is a preliminary inquiry into charges of criminal negligence causing death and dangerous driving causing death against two Ontario Provincial Police officers.

The officers were engaged in a high-speed pursuit of a stolen vehicle driven by a prohibited driver that resulted in a collision with an innocent third party, causing her death.

The Crown alleged the officers failed to terminate the pursuit when the risk to public safety outweighed the benefit of apprehension, and that their driving was objectively dangerous.

The defence argued the officers' conduct was within their training and policy, and that neither supervising sergeant terminated the pursuit.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit both officers to trial on both counts.

Robert Hansen, a Detective Constable with the Hamilton Police Service, was convicted of perjury and two counts of attempt to obstruct justice for knowingly making false statements in an Information to Obtain a Search Warrant and encouraging an informant to plant a firearm.

The court considered aggravating factors, including breach of trust, planned and deliberate actions, and the intention to implicate an innocent person, and mitigating factors such as no prior record, loss of employment, and difficult protective custody.

The Crown sought a six-year sentence, while the defence sought sixteen months.

The court imposed a global sentence of five years' incarceration, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for police officers who breach public trust and undermine the administration of justice.

The accused, a police officer, was charged with perjury and attempting to obstruct justice.

The Crown alleged that the accused encouraged a confidential informant to plant a firearm at a suspect's residence and subsequently swore a false Information to Obtain a search warrant that omitted this fact and contained other misleading information.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as improbable and found that the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed perjury and attempted to obstruct justice.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on charges of sexual assault, sexual interference, and sexual exploitation of the young complainant.

The Crown argued the trial judge misapprehended forensic evidence showing the complainant's saliva on the respondent's underwear.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge misunderstood the DNA evidence and its ability to confirm the complainant's testimony.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were convicted of numerous fraud-related offences arising from a widespread credit and debit card skimming scheme operated through a storefront business.

Three of the appellants were also convicted of participating in and committing offences for the benefit of a criminal organization.

On appeal, they challenged the admission of wiretap evidence, the finding that they constituted a criminal organization, and various individual convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the wiretap authorization was properly granted and the group met the statutory definition of a criminal organization.

The sentence appeals of the two principal offenders were dismissed, while the sentences of the two lesser offenders were varied in part.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault involving two complainants.

He argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the use of similar fact evidence across counts, the assessment of similarities and differences in the evidence, the possibility of collusion, and the assessment of the complainants' credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice in the omission of an express 'bad personhood' instruction and concluding the trial judge's instructions adequately equipped the jury to perform their adjudicative function.

A criminal lawyer pleaded guilty to fraud under $5,000 for defrauding his client's sister of $1,000.

The accused falsely represented that he could obtain the dismissal of criminal charges against his client through bribery of police officers.

After the Crown decided to stay the charges, the accused continued the fraudulent scheme, threatening that the case could be reopened if payment was not made.

The court imposed a six-month custodial sentence followed by two years of probation, finding that incarceration was necessary to reflect denunciation and general deterrence given the accused's position of trust as a lawyer and the serious breach of professional integrity.

A police officer with 14 years of service pleaded guilty to breach of trust and careless storage of a firearm.

The Crown sought 12 months imprisonment plus probation, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

The court found exceptional mitigating circumstances including severe alcohol addiction, emotional abuse by a partner, unresolved grief from a parent's death, and a sleep disorder.

The officer had undergone significant rehabilitation post-arrest, including residential treatment, weekly AA attendance, and psychotherapy.

Despite the serious nature of breaching a position of trust, the court imposed a suspended sentence with three years probation and 150 hours community service, recognizing that the officer's conduct was entirely out of character and driven by addiction rather than corruption or venality.

The Crown brought a motion seeking to limit defence cross‑examination of a non‑accused witness regarding prior discreditable conduct and the underlying facts of home invasion charges for which the witness had been acquitted.

The defence opposed the limitation and sought an order preventing the witness from referring to the acquittal.

The court reviewed the broad right of an accused to cross‑examine ordinary witnesses as part of the right to make full answer and defence.

Distinguishing authorities dealing with cross‑examination of an accused, the court held that limitations applicable to accused persons do not apply to ordinary witnesses.

Balancing probative value against potential prejudice, the court permitted cross‑examination on the underlying facts of the acquitted charges and declined to prohibit the witness from mentioning the acquittal if it arose naturally.

The Crown sought to qualify an oral maxillofacial surgeon to provide expert opinion evidence on the diagnosis, mechanism, causation, direction of force, and magnitude of force of the complainant's jaw fractures in an aggravated assault trial.

Following a voir dire, the court qualified the doctor to opine on the diagnosis and mechanism of the injuries based on his extensive clinical experience.

However, applying the Mohan and Abbey frameworks, the court held the doctor was not properly qualified to opine on causation, direction, or magnitude of force, as he lacked specialized training, research, or prior qualification in those specific forensic areas.

During a criminal proceeding, the defence sought to qualify a forensic odontologist as an expert on the diagnosis, causation, and assessment of oral maxillofacial trauma.

The court applied the admissibility framework for expert evidence and concluded the proposed expert possessed sufficient expertise to testify about diagnosis of mandible injuries and the mechanism and pattern of jaw fractures.

However, the court found the expert lacked specialized education, research, and practical experience regarding causation, direction of force, or magnitude of force relating to jaw fractures.

Applying the gatekeeping function for expert evidence, the court also held that permitting opinions on causation would risk intruding on the ultimate issue for the jury and could improperly influence fact‑finding.

The expert was therefore limited to opinion evidence concerning diagnosis and injury patterns.

The applicant sought to re-litigate an abuse of process stay application after the original judge, who had dismissed the application but not yet provided reasons, was elevated to the Court of Appeal.

The applicant argued that only the trial judge has jurisdiction to hear a stay application.

The court held that a judge other than the trial judge has jurisdiction to hear a stay application under s. 24(1) of the Charter and Rule 27 of the Criminal Proceedings Rules.

The court also found that it had jurisdiction to continue the proceedings under s. 669.2(1) of the Criminal Code and that it was not in the interests of justice to re-litigate the identical application on the same record.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused police officer was charged with assault causing bodily harm and assault with a weapon arising from injuries sustained by an individual during a G20 demonstration at Queen’s Park.

The Crown alleged the officer struck the individual with a shield and baton or used excessive force while moving him.

The court considered three theories of liability based on eyewitness testimony and video evidence.

The judge found significant reliability and credibility issues with the key identification witness and concluded the video evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused struck the individual or used excessive force.

The Crown failed to establish any theory of liability beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed convictions for theft and possession of a truck and its contents.

The Court of Appeal upheld the theft convictions, finding overwhelming evidence and a proper basis to infer knowledge of the trailer's contents.

However, the court applied the Kienapple principle to stay the conviction for possession of the truck, as the appellant was already convicted of its theft.

The appeal was allowed to that extent, and the total fine was reduced by $1,250.

The appellant appealed her sentence, arguing it was harsh and excessive.

The sentencing judge had imposed a custodial sentence and a lifetime driving prohibition.

The Court of Appeal found that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the appellant's appalling record for related offences and the danger she posed to the public.

However, the Court held that under s. 259(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, the driving prohibition had to be limited to three years.

The appeal was allowed in part to reduce the driving prohibition to three years, and dismissed in all other respects.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting the identification evidence of a police officer who identified him from a store video.

The officer had interacted with the appellant on the night of his arrest, taking photos and paying attention to his features.

The Court of Appeal found no error, holding that the officer's prior acquaintance with the appellant, though not lengthy, was sufficient for admissibility, with its duration going to weight.

The court also found no unfairness regarding the photos and noted that minor inconsistencies in the officers' evidence were matters for the jury.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a six-year sentence imposed following convictions on 32 counts arising from prolonged domestic violence and sexual assaults against an intimate partner and children.

Applying the deferential sentence appeal standard, the court held that the sentence was manifestly unfit given the number of offences, the duration and escalation of the abuse, the use of weapons, the vulnerability of the victims, and the severe impact on them.

The court compared the case to prior appellate authorities involving severe spousal abuse and sexual violence, while emphasizing the additional aggravating feature of multiple child victims.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to a global sentence of 12 years' imprisonment.

The accused, a parking enforcement officer, was charged with assault contrary to section 266 of the Criminal Code.

The accused was struck and knocked to the ground on Ossington Avenue, sustaining a mild concussion.

Approximately one hour later, at a police station, the accused assaulted the person who had attacked him.

The defence raised the common law defence of non-insane automatism, arguing the accused's actions were involuntary due to impaired consciousness from the concussion.

The Crown argued the accused acted voluntarily.

The trial judge found the defence had not established a proper evidentiary foundation for automatism and convicted the accused.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and disguise with intent after a convenience store was robbed by a man wearing a balaclava.

The sole issue at trial was identity.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider exculpatory evidence, including DNA from a balaclava found near the scene that did not match the appellant, and discrepancies in the robber's height.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge erred in law by failing to address this exculpatory evidence.

The Court also noted serious flaws in the voice identification procedure used by police.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after it offered no further evidence following a ruling on a Charter motion.

The Court of Appeal stayed the appeal, finding the Crown failed to demonstrate that the Charter ruling was sufficiently important to prevent the prosecution from continuing.

The Court noted that other evidence, including a co-accused's accident report and testimony, was potentially available.

Allowing the appeal on such a sparse record would constitute an impermissible interlocutory appeal and an abuse of process.