Peter Scrutton

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the shooting death of his wife, who had recently left him.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting the deceased's ante mortem statements about her fear of him, in instructing the jury on eyewitness identification and gunshot residue evidence, in restricting cross-examination about third-party suspects, in allowing re-examination of an investigator, and in dismissing a mistrial application for late disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and concluding that the late disclosure did not impair the right to make full answer and defence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly grappled with the central issue of the complainant's lack of consent and reasonably accepted expert evidence regarding forced sexual intercourse.

The court concluded the reasons were sufficient and the verdict was supported by ample evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an ordained minister, appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his four-year sentence.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately correct the Crown's misstatement that a relationship of trust alone vitiates consent under s. 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions as a whole correctly required proof of an abuse of the position of trust.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed; although the trial judge misapprehended some evidence, the four-year sentence remained fit given the serious breach of trust against a vulnerable complainant.

The appellant pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm after a collision.

He was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment and a five-year driving prohibition.

He appealed the sentence, arguing for a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that a conditional sentence would not adequately address denunciation and general deterrence.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted by the trial judge due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The respondent was charged with sexual offences and the trial was delayed by a mistrial due to lack of judicial resources and a subsequent adjournment due to the illness of a key witness.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in characterizing the entirety of these delays as institutional or Crown delay.

Properly calculated, the institutional delay fell within the Morin guidelines.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, lifted the stay of proceedings, and ordered the trial to proceed.

The appellant appealed his sentence for an armed robbery committed in the victim's home during a drug deal, during which the appellant fired a gun.

At the time of the offence, the appellant was on bail for similar charges and had a significant youth record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were complete, the treatment of pre-trial custody was within the trial judge's discretion, and the sentence was fit given the significant aggravating factors.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

At trial, the central issue was whether the complainant consented.

The trial judge instructed the jury that even if the complainant consented, the appellant could be found guilty if she lacked the capacity to consent due to intoxication.

However, the trial judge refused to instruct the jury on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal held that once the trial judge introduced the issue of capacity, fairness required instructing the jury on mistaken belief in consent, especially given the substantial alcohol consumption by both parties.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision refusing to release him from custody and dismissing his application to quash an information for failing to appear.

He argued the Superior Court lost jurisdiction over him under section 485(3) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Superior Court retained jurisdiction under section 470 and that the challenge to the information should be raised as a defence at trial.

The appellant, a violent recidivist, was convicted of sexual assault with a weapon, unlawful confinement, and theft under $5,000 against a 15-year-old stranger.

He was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment, consecutive to 30 months of pre-sentence custody credited at 1.5 to 1, with an order for delayed parole.

On appeal, he argued the sentences should be concurrent, he should receive 2 for 1 credit, and the delayed parole order was tainted by bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the consecutive sentences, the reduced pre-sentence credit, or the delayed parole order.

The appellant appealed his conviction by a Superior Court of Justice judge sitting without a jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it to be essentially fact-driven and concluding that the trial judge did not err in his analysis or conclusion.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction regarding a prior altercation and by permitting cross-examination on his prior criminal record under a Corbett ruling.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no realistic danger of propensity reasoning regarding the prior altercation, which the defence had relied upon.

The Court also deferred to the trial judge's Corbett ruling, noting that clear limiting instructions were given to the jury regarding the prior convictions.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed for a massive fraud.

The Court of Appeal noted that the sentence was in accordance with a joint submission and fell within the appropriate range given the scale of the offence.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against his young child.

At trial, the Crown called an expert in child sexual abuse to testify about the child's out-of-court statements.

The expert's testimony went beyond permissible bounds by indicating his belief in the veracity of the child's foster parents and the child's disclosures, effectively usurping the jury's role in assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in admitting this testimony without requiring the use of hypothetical questions to properly confine the expert's opinion.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The young person appealed their conviction for robbery, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on a witness's prior statement to police identifying them as a participant, and in giving weight to the fact that they absconded during the trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude the witness had generally adopted the truth of the police statement, and there was no error in considering the absconding.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by the Superior Court of Justice, challenging the legality of a search.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in a brief endorsement, holding that whether viewed as a section 8 Charter issue or a search incident to arrest, the appeal could not succeed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation.

During deliberations, the jury asked a question about whether they should decide each charge strictly on the evidence presented for that charge, or if disbelief of one incident should influence their decision on another.

The trial judge restricted his answer to the question of evidence, instructing the jury not to use evidence from one charge on another, without addressing the issue of credibility.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's answer was not responsive and may have misled the jury into thinking they could not apply a credibility assessment across counts.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision granting relief to the individual respondents regarding subpoenas issued in relation to proceedings under the Trespass to Property Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to establish that the respondents had material evidence to give.

The Court also rejected allegations of Crown misconduct as a basis for a stay of proceedings, noting the Crown took no position on the subpoenas.

No costs were awarded on the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred by failing to consider whether the appellant reasonably believed the other vehicle was parked, and whether his driving amounted to a mere momentary lapse in otherwise normal driving.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed an order staying proceedings against the respondent for child pornography charges due to a 27.5-month delay between arrest and trial.

The trial judge found the delay unreasonable under s. 11(b) of the Charter, attributing it to the slow pace of Crown disclosure and institutional delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the case's complexity, the inherent time requirements, or the balancing of the respondent's prejudice against society's interest in a trial on the merits.

The Crown appealed the lenient sentence imposed on an 18-year-old offender with a minor record and solid work history.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, declining to interfere with the trial judge's assessment that leniency offered the best prospects for the protection of the public.