Paul F. Lalonde

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death and failing to remain at the scene of an accident after striking a pedestrian at an intersection in Ottawa.

The accused claimed he fled in self-defence because the pedestrian was acting erratically and touching his car.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as fabricated and found his rapid acceleration and fishtailing through a busy intersection constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The court also found the accused knew he had struck the pedestrian and fled to evade liability.

The accused was found guilty on both charges.

Following a prior decision on a family law motion concerning custody and parenting arrangements, the court determined the issue of costs.

The respondent mother was found to be the successful party.

The court rejected the argument that costs should not be awarded in custody and access disputes and applied the Family Law Rules governing costs, including Rule 24(11).

After reviewing the parties’ conduct, the reasonableness of settlement offers, and the complexity and importance of the issues affecting the children, the court reduced the claimed fees to a reasonable level.

The applicant father was ordered to pay fixed costs to the respondent.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an interlocutory family law decision that imposed a new interim parenting regime.

The court considered the test for granting leave to appeal under the Courts of Justice Act and applicable procedural rules.

It found there were serious questions about whether the motion judge exceeded jurisdiction by making substantive orders not requested in the pleadings and without a full evidentiary record or opportunity for cross-examination.

The court held that the circumstances raised concerns about natural justice and procedural fairness.

Leave to appeal was granted and a temporary stay of the impugned order was issued pending the appeal.

Sentencing following convictions for multiple counts of touching a person under 16 for a sexual purpose involving elementary school students.

The offender, an occasional teacher, engaged in repeated inappropriate touching of several grade three girls in classroom settings while in a position of authority.

The court considered aggravating factors including multiple complainants, breach of trust, grooming behaviour, and psychological harm to the victims, while mitigating factors included the offender’s lack of prior record and community contributions.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for sexual offences against children, the court imposed a custodial sentence.

A global sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment followed by two years’ probation was ordered, along with ancillary prohibitions and sex offender registration.

Following a motion and cross-motion concerning amendments to a statement of claim, the court determined costs.

The moving party sought substantial indemnity costs relying on a Rule 49 offer to settle and alleging improper litigation conduct by opposing counsel.

The court found the motion unnecessary and concluded that counsel for the responding party engaged in improper conduct, including impugning opposing counsel’s integrity and taking procedural steps that lengthened the proceedings.

Applying s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rules 57.01, 57.03, and 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded substantial indemnity costs after the offer date.

Costs of $7,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST were ordered payable within 30 days.

The accused was sentenced following convictions for assault causing bodily harm and uttering a threat to cause death.

The offences arose from a violent attack in a restaurant washroom where the accused struck the complainant, banged her head against a wall, and threatened to kill her.

The court considered aggravating factors including the vulnerability of the victim, the gratuitous violence, and the offender’s significant criminal record, including prior robbery convictions, while recognizing mitigating factors such as the offender’s youth and difficult upbringing.

Applying the sentencing principles in ss. 718–718.2 of the Criminal Code, the court imposed a custodial sentence of two years for assault causing bodily harm and three months concurrent for the uttering threats offence, followed by probation.

Credit was granted for pre‑sentence custody and time spent in a residential facility, and ancillary orders including a DNA order and lifetime weapons prohibition were imposed.

Parents sought costs against a child protection agency after the agency withdrew its protection application and entered into a voluntary agreement with the family.

The parents argued the agency acted unfairly by apprehending the children without a sufficient investigation and relying on uncorroborated allegations.

The court held that costs against a children’s aid society are awarded only in exceptional circumstances where conduct is patently unfair or indefensible.

Given the agency’s reliance on multiple police reports, the family’s prior history with the agency, and the existence of a warrant authorizing the apprehension, the court found the investigation and apprehension were reasonable.

The court concluded the agency had fulfilled its statutory duty and that an ordinary observer would not view its conduct as unfair.

The offender was sentenced after a jury convicted him of criminal negligence causing death, impaired driving causing death, and refusing to provide a breath sample following a fatal collision.

The offender had driven the wrong way down a downtown street after consuming alcohol and struck and killed a pedestrian.

The court considered mitigating factors including the offender’s lack of criminal record, strong employment history, remorse, and positive character references, but emphasized aggravating factors such as the fatal consequences of impaired driving, the dangerous manner of driving, and the refusal to provide a breath sample after learning of the death.

The court highlighted appellate authority indicating a rising range of custodial sentences for impaired driving causing death, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence.

A global custodial sentence was imposed along with a lengthy driving prohibition and a DNA order.

Following a four‑day simplified procedure trial concerning the removal of trees and vegetation along a ditch, the plaintiffs obtained a modest damages award slightly above the Small Claims Court monetary limit.

The plaintiffs sought over $86,000 in partial indemnity costs, asserting more than 421 hours of legal work.

The defendants argued the request was excessive and asked that costs be refused or capped.

The court emphasized that cost awards under Rule 76 simplified procedure must remain reasonable and proportionate to the amount recovered.

Exercising discretion under Rule 57.05(1), the court fixed costs at $12,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The moving party sought leave to amend a statement of claim in a defamation action after documentary discovery revealed additional allegedly defamatory emails authored by the responding party.

The responding party opposed the amendment on the basis that the communications were unrelated, privileged, and statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and the Libel and Slander Act.

The court applied Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing the presumption in favour of permitting amendments absent non-compensable prejudice.

It found the amendments merely provided further particulars of an existing defamation claim rather than advancing a new cause of action, and that any prejudice could be addressed through procedural steps.

The motion to amend was granted and the responding party’s cross‑motion to compel answers to undertakings was dismissed.

On an interim family law motion, the applicant sought sole custody, exclusive possession of the matrimonial home, and other ancillary relief following a high‑conflict separation involving allegations related to parental mental health and domestic conflict.

The court considered conflicting affidavit evidence, a report from the Children’s Aid Society confirming emotional risk to the children from exposure to parental conflict, and the respondent’s mental health treatment.

Emphasizing the best interests of the children and the need for stability, the court granted the applicant interim sole custody and interim exclusive possession of the matrimonial home.

The respondent received structured access several times per week.

The court declined to issue a restraining order and ordered each party to bear their own costs.

The Crown brought an application under s. 715 of the Criminal Code to admit preliminary inquiry testimony of an independent witness who had moved to Nicaragua and was therefore unavailable to testify at trial.

The defence argued the Crown failed to make sufficient efforts to secure the witness’s testimony through technological means such as videoconference under ss. 714.1 and 714.2 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that while efforts to obtain live testimony are a relevant factor, failure to pursue electronic testimony is not fatal to an application under s. 715.

Applying the principles in Potvin and Saleh, the judge concluded the accused had a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary inquiry and that the evidence was reliable and corroborated.

The prior testimony was therefore admitted to be read into the trial record.

In a criminal proceeding involving allegations of sexual offences against students, the accused sought to introduce evidence that he offered to take a polygraph test during a police interview.

The defence argued that the offer demonstrated consciousness of innocence and constituted admissible after-the-fact conduct.

The court reviewed the governing principles from appellate authority concerning prior consistent statements and the limited probative value of offers to take polygraph tests.

It held that such an offer, particularly where the accused had received legal advice and the results would be inadmissible, was essentially a self-serving protestation of innocence with no meaningful probative value.

The court concluded that the evidence would risk prejudicing the trial process and dismissed the application to admit it.

In a criminal prosecution involving multiple sexual offence allegations against a teacher, the defence sought to admit the accused’s out-of-court statements to police as evidence of his reaction to the accusations pursuant to the exception recognized in R. v. Edgar.

The court considered whether the statements qualified as spontaneous prior consistent statements capable of admission for credibility purposes.

Applying appellate authority, the court held that the spontaneity requirement was not met where the accused had significant time to reflect, consult others, receive legal advice, and prepare a written account before speaking to police.

Because the statements were not made upon first confrontation with the allegation and were preceded by hours of deliberation, they could not be admitted under the Edgar exception.

The accused applied for a Rowbotham order seeking state-funded counsel after Legal Aid funding and subsequent appeals were denied.

The charges included more than 75 offences involving drug trafficking, weapons, and proceeds of crime, and the Crown anticipated a lengthy and complex trial.

While the court accepted that the charges were serious and complex and that Legal Aid had been refused, it found the accused failed to establish financial indigence.

The accused had not exhausted available avenues to obtain counsel, including applying for the release of seized assets under s. 462.34(4) of the Criminal Code, and failed to provide full disclosure regarding substantial precious metals purchases exceeding $134,000.

The court concluded that the accused had not demonstrated inability to fund counsel privately and dismissed the Rowbotham application.

Les demandeurs alléguaient que les défendeurs avaient empiété sur leur terrain et détruit des arbres et arbustes lors du creusage d’un fossé de drainage, réclamant des dommages-intérêts pour remplacement des arbres, perte de revenus d’érablière et dommages punitifs.

Le tribunal a conclu qu’un consentement oral avait été donné aux défendeurs pour nettoyer le fossé et semer sur une bande de terrain, mais que les défendeurs avaient agi avec négligence en élargissant excessivement le fossé et en arrachant inutilement de la végétation.

Les demandes pour empiétement, dommages punitifs et perte de revenus de sirop d’érable ont été rejetées.

Le tribunal a accordé des dommages limités pour la perte d’arbres et les coûts de replantation.

Les experts arboriculteurs présentés par les parties ont été jugés peu utiles pour établir précisément la valeur des dommages.

During a criminal trial for robbery, the court conducted a blended voir dire to determine whether statements made by the accused during a police video interview were voluntary and admissible.

The defence argued that the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of Charter rights under ss. 7, 10(a), and 10(b), including the right to remain silent and the right to counsel.

The court found that the accused had been informed of the charges, had consulted counsel, and confirmed satisfaction with that advice before the interview.

The court concluded that the accused spoke with a free and operating mind and that the police conduct did not amount to improper persistence or coercion.

The statements were ruled voluntary and admitted into evidence.

The accused was charged with attempted robbery of a bus pass and robbery of money arising from a school incident in which two younger students were led into a bathroom by a group of older students and intimidated.

The Crown alleged the accused was a party to the offences under s. 21 of the Criminal Code by aiding and abetting the principal offender.

The court considered witness testimony, surveillance stills, and the accused’s voluntary police interview admitting participation and sharing in the proceeds.

The court rejected the accused’s explanation that he was merely present and found that he knowingly participated in a coordinated intimidation designed to obtain money.

The accused was found guilty of both attempted theft and robbery as a party to the offences.

Following a successful application declaring a contingency fee agreement void and ordering repayment of funds, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful party sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $22,000.

The court held that costs awards must reflect a fair and reasonable contribution rather than an exact reimbursement of actual legal fees and considered the expectations of the unsuccessful party under r. 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Finding the claimed hourly rate, allocation of discovery time, and counsel fee for a half‑day motion excessive, the court reduced the award and fixed costs at $10,000 plus HST.

Two equal shareholder brothers in a family construction group became deadlocked after one withdrew from active management due to illness and sought to realize the value of his shares.

The court found a fundamental and irreparable deadlock in the management of the corporations under the oppression and winding‑up provisions of corporate statutes.

Competing valuation reports were rejected in part, with the court determining fair value by adjusting one report and rejecting assumptions that the operating company lacked viability.

The court ordered a forced buy‑out requiring the remaining shareholder to purchase the other’s shares at a court‑determined fair value.

Payment terms were structured to balance the retiring shareholder’s need for compensation with the company’s operational viability.