Patrick Mark Jaeger Quilty

The applicant sought exclusion of breath sample evidence on the basis of alleged violations of his Charter rights under sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The applicant was charged with having an excess blood alcohol concentration while driving after crashing into a tractor trailer on Highway 401.

The court found that while the applicant's section 7 and 8/9 Charter arguments failed, the applicant's section 10(b) right to counsel was violated.

Specifically, the police failed to facilitate the applicant's request to contact a police officer friend who could assist in locating counsel, and the police provided an incomplete explanation of the right to counsel.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mgs.

At trial, the judge excluded the breathalyzer evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the traffic stop was arbitrary.

In reaching this conclusion, the trial judge relied on extraneous information regarding the arresting officer's receipt of awards for apprehending impaired drivers, which was not entered into evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the trial judge erred in law by relying on this extraneous information, as it did not meet the test for judicial notice and could have affected the assessment of the officer's credibility.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown brought a certiorari application to quash a Justice of the Peace's order that quashed an information charging the respondent with speeding.

The information contained an obvious typographical error regarding the year of the offence.

The Justice of the Peace quashed the information on his own motion at the first appearance, without allowing the Crown to make submissions or considering the mandatory amendment provisions under the Provincial Offences Act.

The Superior Court held that the Justice of the Peace exceeded his jurisdiction by failing to observe natural justice and mandatory statutory provisions.

The court granted the certiorari application, extended the time for service, and issued mandamus remitting the matter back to the Provincial Offences Court.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while having an excess blood alcohol concentration.

He brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The defendant abandoned the section 8 argument during the hearing.

The sole issue was whether police failed to facilitate the defendant's right to counsel under section 10(b).

The court found that although the investigating officer was credible and his conduct was unimpeachable, the defendant established a breach of his section 10(b) Charter rights by requesting to contact his wife to arrange for specialized counsel.

The breath testing results were excluded pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, and the charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with over 80 (impaired driving) following a RIDE stop.

The Crown sought to introduce breath sample evidence.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the evidence on Charter grounds, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the accused's Charter rights were breached in three respects: (1) the manner of detention in the police cruiser for the roadside screening test was not reasonably necessary; (2) the accused was not adequately facilitated in her right to consult with counsel of her choice, as the police policy effectively channeled her toward duty counsel; and (3) the accused was subjected to an unjustified strip search.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence based on the cumulative effect of these breaches and the serious impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests.

The accused was charged with "over 80" and impaired driving following a RIDE spot check.

The defence brought a Charter motion arguing that police breached the accused's right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The accused, a Vietnamese immigrant with limited English proficiency, was not provided with an interpreter despite "special circumstances" indicating he could not meaningfully understand his rights to counsel.

The court found the police breached the accused's Charter rights by failing to obtain interpreter services through the CanTalk system.

The breath sample evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter as its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court also found the accused not guilty of impaired driving on the merits, as the evidence of impairment was insufficient.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of driving with excess alcohol.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent, finding a Certificate of Analysis unreliable due to a clerical error where it was dated a year prior to the breath samples being taken.

The appellate court, relying on R. v. Moratto, determined that such an immaterial date discrepancy did not render the Certificate inadmissible or constitute "evidence to the contrary." Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a conviction entered.

The court rejected the respondent's request for a new trial, applying the Cassidy criteria and noting that the defense had pursued other avenues at trial, making a new trial speculative.

Following a traffic stop for an unilluminated rear light, the accused brought a Charter application challenging their arrests, searches, and the seizure of firearms.

The court held that the driver was unlawfully arrested for breach of probation because the probation order plainly permitted him to be out during curfew while with the mother of his child, and the officers had reviewed that order.

The court further found the asserted marijuana-based grounds for arresting the passenger were not established, rendering that arrest a pretext and unlawful.

Applying the Grant framework, the court characterized the police conduct as very serious, found significant impact on the accuseds’ liberty and privacy interests, and excluded the two firearms as against the driver and the firearm found on the passenger.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a blood-alcohol offence, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The appellant contended that a 7.5-month adjournment, characterized as neutral time by the trial judge, was in fact Crown-caused delay due to a belated expert report on a post-driving drinking scenario.

The court applied the *Jordan* framework, finding that the total delay was 26 months and one week.

However, after attributing 9.5 months of delay to the defence (including the 7.5-month adjournment due to tactical choices and scheduling conflicts), the net delay was less than 16 months, falling below the 18-month ceiling.

The court dismissed the appeal, concluding there was no unreasonable delay.

A youth was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and breach of probation following a stabbing incident at a party.

The Crown alleged the defendant stabbed the victim unprovoked in a bedroom.

The defendant claimed self-defence, asserting she was engaged in a physical altercation with the victim both inside and outside an apartment, during which she grabbed a knife from the kitchen and used it defensively after being thrown to the ground and punched.

The trial judge found the victim's evidence largely unreliable due to his serious injuries and drug and alcohol consumption.

The defendant's account was substantially corroborated by the only eyewitness.

The court found no evidence of intent to kill for the attempted murder charge and determined the Crown failed to disprove self-defence beyond a reasonable doubt for the aggravated assault charge.

All charges were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, errors in credibility findings, and a violation of his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that trial counsel made a reasonable tactical decision not to introduce medical evidence.

The court also held that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors in assessing credibility, and confirmed that there is no right to counsel prior to complying with a forthwith roadside screening demand.

The accused was acquitted of impaired driving but convicted of refusing to provide a breath sample at trial.

Both the Crown and the accused appealed.

The accused argued the verdicts were inconsistent and the trial judge misapprehended expert evidence regarding the synergistic effects of Ativan and alcohol.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in law by finding the accused lacked the mens rea for impaired driving due to the unanticipated effects of combining alcohol and prescription medication.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed both appeals, finding no inconsistency in the verdicts, no material misapprehension of evidence, and holding that the presumption of voluntariness for impaired driving can be rebutted where impairment results from the unforeseeable combined effect of alcohol and drugs.

The accused was arrested on impaired driving charges on November 28, 2014, but no Information was sworn until February 4, 2015—over two months later.

The trial commenced almost 22 months after arrest.

The accused challenged the delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing it exceeded the 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued delay should be calculated from the swearing of the Information, not arrest.

The court held that delay must be calculated from arrest, as the accused was subject to court process through the Promise to Appear.

After subtracting defence delay, the net delay exceeded 18 months, and the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances.

The charges were stayed.

A commercial truck driver appealed his convictions for failing to maintain and carry a daily log, failing to surrender the log to police upon demand, and careless driving.

The incident involved a fatal rear-end collision on Hurontario Street in Brampton that killed two occupants of a taxi.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's application of the burden of proof regarding the log exception and the verdict on careless driving as unreasonable.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reviewable error and that the trial judge's conclusions were the only reasonable conclusions available on the evidence.

The accused, Brandon Cleland, was charged with the robbery of a taxi driver, Tahir Khan, in Mississauga.

The primary issue was the proof of identity, as the victim did not identify the accused in court.

The Crown relied on photographs from a malfunctioning in-car taxi camera system, police recognition of the accused from these images, and comparison with the accused's Facebook photos and physical appearance.

The defence challenged the occurrence of a robbery and the reliability of the identification evidence.

The court found the victim's testimony credible and, despite the camera malfunction, gave significant weight to the images due to corroborating factors.

The court concluded that the images depicted the accused, supported by police recognition, facial features, tattoos, and accessories, and found the accused guilty of robbery.

A young person was charged with sexual assault and breach of probation under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Crown alleged that the defendant sexually assaulted a 14-year-old complainant by grabbing her, pulling her to a secluded location, forcing kisses upon her, and touching her buttocks without consent.

The defence did not challenge the honesty of the complainant's evidence regarding the assault itself, but rather challenged the reliability of her identification of the defendant as the perpetrator.

The court found the complainant to be credible and honest, and determined that her identification evidence was sufficiently reliable based on her prior acquaintance with the defendant, the duration and lighting conditions of the assault, corroboration from home security video footage, and the specificity of details she provided to police.

The court also addressed the breach of probation count, determining that the defendant's identity as the person subject to the December 2013 probation order was proven through comparison of identifying information across court documents.

The defendant was found guilty on both counts.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proved that a valid traffic stop was made based on the accused's erratic driving, a valid ASD demand was made based on reasonable suspicion of alcohol consumption, and a valid breath demand was made based on reasonable and probable grounds.

The accused refused to provide a breath sample multiple times in the breath room, stating his refusal was due to anger at perceived mistreatment by the arresting officer.

The court found no Charter violations and convicted the accused of refusing to provide a breath sample, finding all elements of the offence proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with over 80 mgs of alcohol in 100 mls of blood.

He brought a motion for a stay of proceedings alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 7 and 11(b) due to unreasonable delay.

The trial was scheduled approximately 14 months after arrest.

The court applied the Morin framework to assess the reasonableness of the delay, considering the length of delay, waivers, reasons for delay (including actions of the accused, crown, and institutional resources), and prejudice to the accused.

The court found that the accused's Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time had been violated and granted the stay of proceedings.

The defendant was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown conceded it could not prove the defendant drove the vehicle.

The central issue was whether the defendant, found in the driver's seat with the engine running, was in care or control of the vehicle.

The defendant testified she was in the vehicle to smoke and continue a conversation with her boyfriend, with the engine running for heat on a cold night.

The court found the defendant rebutted the presumption of care or control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code based on her credible evidence supported by corroborating witnesses, a concrete plan to spend the night at the location, and the presence of a sober adult in the passenger seat.

The Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a realistic risk of danger existed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while the concentration of alcohol in his blood exceeded the legal limit.

The Crown sought to rely on breath test results to prove the second charge.

The accused applied to exclude the breath test results based on alleged violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that while the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and demand a breath sample, there was a violation of the accused's section 10(b) rights regarding access to counsel of choice.

The court excluded the breath test results under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was convicted on the impaired driving charge but acquitted on the excess blood alcohol charge.