Patrick Mark Jaeger Quilty

The appellant, Suharshani Wijesuriya, appealed her conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample, alleging the trial judge erred in dismissing her s. 10(b) Charter application and in failing to address evidence regarding breathalyzer operation.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that police provided a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel, rejecting arguments for an enhanced police obligation beyond 'reasonable steps.' The court also found the trial judge's reasons regarding the breathalyzer were adequate and that no Charter breach occurred, thus rendering the s. 24(2) analysis unnecessary but confirming evidence admissibility.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The trial judge had found a section 9 Charter breach due to a lack of reasonable grounds for arrest and excluded the breath samples under section 24(2).

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal on the over 80 charge, finding the trial judge's reasons were insufficient to explain why the officer lacked reasonable grounds or why the evidence was excluded, thereby foreclosing appellate review.

A new trial was ordered for the over 80 charge, while the acquittal for impaired driving was upheld.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" and impaired driving on November 3, 2017.

The trial was scheduled to commence on October 21, 2019, resulting in a total delay of 23 months and 19 days.

The accused brought a motion to stay the charges pursuant to s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing that the delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that approximately 9 months of delay should be attributed to the defence, bringing the net delay below the ceiling.

The court found that 3 months of delay was attributable to the defence, resulting in a net delay of 20 months and 20 days, which exceeded the presumptive ceiling.

The charges were stayed.

The defendant was arrested for impaired driving and care and control while over 80 following a police response to a domestic dispute call at a school.

The defendant challenged the arrest and breath sample seizure on Charter grounds, arguing lack of reasonable grounds, failure to comply with the "as soon as practicable" requirement, and violations of the right to counsel.

The court found breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter due to insufficient reasonable grounds for arrest, but found no breach of section 10(b).

Under the section 24(2) analysis, the evidence was admitted despite the Charter breach.

The defendant was convicted on both counts.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood).

A police officer conducting a RIDE program sobriety check stopped the defendant's vehicle and, after smelling alcohol, demanded an approved screening device (ASD) test.

The defendant failed the test and was arrested.

At the police station, Intoxilyzer tests revealed blood alcohol levels of 230 mg and 220 mg.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath samples under the Charter, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion.

The defendant also challenged the Crown's ability to rely on the presumption of identity and the accuracy of the Intoxilyzer tests.

The court dismissed all challenges and found the defendant guilty.

The defendant challenged the validity of a second information alleging impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol, arguing it was a nullity and constituted an abuse of process in violation of section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown had requested that police lay an additional impaired driving charge alongside the original over-80 charge.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the second information was valid, that the procedure followed by Peel Regional Police and the Crown Attorney's Office complied with the Criminal Code, and that no abuse of process occurred.

The court upheld the practical arrangement between police and Crown as a reasonable response to high case volumes while maintaining statutory compliance.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on an "over 80" charge, arguing the trial judge erred in the s. 24(2) Charter analysis by excluding Intoxilyzer test results.

The trial judge found a s. 10(b) Charter violation due to police failure to ensure the respondent received legal advice despite diligence.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, finding no error in assessing the seriousness of the breach, its impact on Charter interests, or society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court affirmed that the police's prior compliant conduct did not mitigate the breach and that the right to counsel has intrinsic value beyond discoverability.

The applicant applied for a stay of proceedings, arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated.

The total delay was over 21 months.

After deducting defence delay and delay caused by a discrete event (the complainant's failure to attend the first trial date and the time reasonably required to set a new date), the remaining delay fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to demonstrate meaningful and sustained steps to expedite the proceedings.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal for an 'over 80' offence.

The trial judge had excluded breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding two breaches of s. 10(b) because the police did not allow the respondent to call a police officer friend to get a lawyer's name, and because the police told him he could call his own lawyer, duty counsel, or no lawyer.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found the trial judge erred in law.

The police had no obligation to facilitate a call to a third party when the detainee did not explain the reason, and the information provided about the right to counsel was not misleading.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a conviction entered.

The appellant appealed a conviction for an "over 80" offence, arguing that the certificate of a qualified breath technician under Section 258(1)(g) of the Criminal Code was inadmissible because it was unsigned.

The Superior Court of Justice, sitting as a summary conviction appeal court, dismissed the appeal.

The court held that Parliament did not explicitly require a signature for such a certificate to have evidentiary value, distinguishing it from Section 258(1)(f.1) which does.

While a signature provides an evidentiary assist, continuity between breath tests and the certificate can also be established through *viva voce* evidence or other circumstantial evidence, as was done in this case.

The accused was convicted of arson causing damage to property and mischief endangering life following a trial.

The Crown sought a sentence of 2 to 2½ years imprisonment, while the defence sought 90 days on an intermittent basis.

The court imposed 18 months concurrent imprisonment on each charge, followed by three years probation, with conditions including no contact with the victims, a 100-meter exclusion zone, weapons prohibition, DNA order, and mandatory counselling for anger management.

The court emphasized that arson convictions warrant significant sentences regardless of mitigating circumstances, and that conditional sentences are generally inappropriate in arson cases.

A boxing coach was charged with assault causing bodily harm after sparring with his 13-year-old student, who sustained a concussion.

The court examined whether the coach's conduct exceeded the student's implied consent to contact within the sport of boxing.

Despite evidence that the coach struck the student multiple times and the student suffered a concussion, the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct constituted criminal assault.

The court noted the lack of expert evidence regarding boxing rules, inconsistencies in witness testimony, and the possibility that the student's injury resulted from contact with another sparring partner.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with one count of mischief relating to tire slashing on December 26, 2016, one count of arson relating to a car fire on February 7, 2017, and two counts of mischief relating to an attempted car ignition on March 7, 2017.

The Crown relied on video evidence from a gas station and home security camera, along with similar fact evidence to establish the accused's guilt.

The court found the accused guilty of the March 7 mischief charges and the February 7 arson charge using similar fact evidence, but acquitted on the tire slashing charge due to insufficient similarities.

The defendant was charged with exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in blood following a motor vehicle stop at 2:40 a.m. outside a drinking establishment.

The Crown proved the charge through roadside screening device and qualified technician breath samples.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the initial demand and alleged violations of his right to counsel under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court rejected both challenges, finding reasonable grounds for the initial demand and that police made reasonable efforts to facilitate contact with counsel of choice before offering duty counsel.

The accused was charged with robbery following a home invasion where three individuals stole electronics and a wallet.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, specifically a single partial fingerprint found on a solarium door frame that matched the accused.

None of the victims or co-accused could identify the accused.

Applying the principles of circumstantial evidence, the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused left the fingerprint during the robbery, as there were other plausible explanations for its presence.

The accused was found not guilty.

The accused was charged following a domestic assault incident.

Police responded to a 911 call reporting an assault in progress and entered the accused's residence without a warrant to ensure the safety of occupants.

Upon locating the accused in the basement, officers did not immediately inform him of the reasons for his detention or his rights to counsel.

The accused made incriminating statements during this period.

The court found that while the warrantless entry was justified under exigent circumstances, the failure to promptly inform the accused of his Charter rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b) constituted a breach.

The incriminating statements were excluded under section 24(2) as their admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The applicant sought exclusion of breath sample evidence on the basis of alleged violations of his Charter rights under sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The applicant was charged with having an excess blood alcohol concentration while driving after crashing into a tractor trailer on Highway 401.

The court found that while the applicant's section 7 and 8/9 Charter arguments failed, the applicant's section 10(b) right to counsel was violated.

Specifically, the police failed to facilitate the applicant's request to contact a police officer friend who could assist in locating counsel, and the police provided an incomplete explanation of the right to counsel.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mgs.

At trial, the judge excluded the breathalyzer evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the traffic stop was arbitrary.

In reaching this conclusion, the trial judge relied on extraneous information regarding the arresting officer's receipt of awards for apprehending impaired drivers, which was not entered into evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the trial judge erred in law by relying on this extraneous information, as it did not meet the test for judicial notice and could have affected the assessment of the officer's credibility.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown brought a certiorari application to quash a Justice of the Peace's order that quashed an information charging the respondent with speeding.

The information contained an obvious typographical error regarding the year of the offence.

The Justice of the Peace quashed the information on his own motion at the first appearance, without allowing the Crown to make submissions or considering the mandatory amendment provisions under the Provincial Offences Act.

The Superior Court held that the Justice of the Peace exceeded his jurisdiction by failing to observe natural justice and mandatory statutory provisions.

The court granted the certiorari application, extended the time for service, and issued mandamus remitting the matter back to the Provincial Offences Court.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while having an excess blood alcohol concentration.

He brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The defendant abandoned the section 8 argument during the hearing.

The sole issue was whether police failed to facilitate the defendant's right to counsel under section 10(b).

The court found that although the investigating officer was credible and his conduct was unimpeachable, the defendant established a breach of his section 10(b) Charter rights by requesting to contact his wife to arrange for specialized counsel.

The breath testing results were excluded pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, and the charge was dismissed.