Patrick Mark Jaeger Quilty

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent, Moses Odemi, on a charge of refusing to comply with a breath demand under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had excluded evidence (ASD test result and refusal) under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to an unlawful ASD demand (s. 8 Charter breach) and a s. 10(b) Charter breach.

The appeal court upheld the exclusion of evidence, finding the police officer's embellishment of grounds for the ASD demand to be a serious Charter breach, which outweighed other factors in the Grant analysis.

The appeal was dismissed, and the acquittal stood.

The accused, Brady Robertson, brought a constitutional challenge against sections 320.14(1)(c) and 320.14(3) of the Criminal Code and section 2 of SOR/2018-148, which establish a per se limit of 5 ng/ml of THC in blood for drivers.

The challenge argued that the per se limit violated section 7 of the Charter by being arbitrary and overbroad, particularly for frequent and chronic cannabis users who might have residual THC levels above the limit without being impaired.

The Crown argued the legislation was a precautionary measure to deter impaired driving.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the legislation's objective was to strengthen impaired driving laws and deter cannabis users from driving when they pose a risk.

The court concluded that the 5 ng/ml per se limit was neither arbitrary nor overbroad, as it was rationally connected to the legislative objectives and did not criminalize harmless conduct in a manner inconsistent with fundamental justice principles.

The applicant defendant challenged a search of his person and vehicle under the Cannabis Control Act, 2017, arguing violations of Charter sections 8 and 9.

The court found that the police officer lacked objective and subjective reasonable grounds for the search, as the smell of marijuana and a marijuana stem were insufficient to establish current possession of unpackaged cannabis.

The officer's testimony regarding the stem and residue was found to lack veracity due to circumstantial evidence.

Applying the Grant factors, the court determined that the serious state misconduct (bad faith, deliberate disregard for rights, misleading testimony) and significant impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

Consequently, the seized handgun, cannabis, and hashish were excluded from evidence, leading to an acquittal on the firearm charge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The offence occurred before the enactment of Bill C-46, but the trial took place after the amendments came into effect.

The appellant argued that the presumption of identity in former s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code was no longer available in transitional cases and that the Crown was required to present expert evidence relating the breath test results back to the time of driving.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, following binding precedent that the presumption of identity remains available in transitional cases.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay drinking and driving charges against the respondent due to a breach of her right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The appeal judge found that the trial judge erred in failing to attribute certain scheduling delays—specifically the time taken to schedule a Crown pre-trial and a judicial pre-trial—to the defence.

When these periods of defence delay were deducted from the total delay, the remaining time fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The appeal was allowed, the stay of proceedings was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and "exceed 79".

The trial focused on whether a qualified technician's certificate, stating that an alcohol standard was certified by an analyst, was sufficient proof for the presumption of accuracy under section 320.31 of the Criminal Code, or if direct analyst evidence was required.

The court also addressed the principle of stare decisis, specifically whether a lower court could revisit a settled legal issue based on a new interpretation or analysis from a non-binding higher court decision.

The court found that it was bound by existing Ontario Superior Court precedents and that a new interpretation alone does not permit departure from binding authority.

The defendant was found guilty.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him, and in failing to exclude evidence after finding a breach of his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's factual findings regarding impairment were entitled to deference.

The court further held that the trial judge actually erred in finding a s. 10(b) breach, as the police properly offered duty counsel when the appellant's counsel of choice was unavailable, and that police observations made during the hold-off period are admissible.

The accused was arrested for impaired care and control after police responded to a call about individuals drinking and smashing bottles in a parking lot.

A search incident to arrest revealed a loaded firearm.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging multiple breaches of his rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b), seeking to exclude the firearm and his refusal to provide a breath sample under s. 24(2).

The court found minor breaches of ss. 10(a) and 10(b) but concluded the evidence was either not obtained in a manner that infringed the Charter or should not be excluded under the Grant framework.

The Crown's application to admit the accused's statements regarding his identity was granted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

He argued that the second information, which added an impaired driving charge, was a nullity because the swearing officer relied solely on a presumption of good faith from the Crown's request rather than objective facts.

The Superior Court found that while the officer inadvertently swore a false oath, binding jurisprudence dictates the information is not a nullity.

Although the practice breached section 7 of the Charter and warranted a stay of the impaired driving charge, the remedy was moot as the appellant had been acquitted of that charge at trial.

The appeal against the over 80 conviction was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of failing to comply with a breath demand.

The trial judge had found the approved screening device (ASD) demand unlawful, concluding the officer lacked reasonable suspicion and failed to make the demand immediately.

The summary conviction appeal court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by rejecting the defence's concession on reasonable suspicion without explanation and by ignoring objective facts such as the odour of alcohol and the respondent's admission to drinking.

The appeal court also held the trial judge erred by interpreting 'immediately' as 'instantaneously', finding the two-to-four minute delay was reasonably necessary.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The accused was tried on charges of aggravated assault and attempted murder arising from a stabbing in a residential complex.

The central issue was identity, with the Crown relying primarily on the complainant’s recognition evidence, related phone-call evidence, and observations by civilian witnesses after the stabbing.

The court rejected the accused’s evidence as not credible, but held that this did not resolve the burden on the Crown under the W.(D.) framework.

Given serious credibility concerns with the complainant, weaknesses in the recognition evidence, and significant evidentiary gaps including the absence of cell phone records and further identification procedures, the Crown failed to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

During a trial for attempted murder and aggravated assault, the Crown applied to admit a statement made by the victim to a bystander shortly after being stabbed.

The victim, bleeding and seeking help, told the bystander that his assailant was his girlfriend's boyfriend.

The court found the statement met the criteria for the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, as it was made contemporaneously with the startling event and before there was time to fabricate.

The application was granted and the statement was admitted into evidence.

During a trial for attempted murder and aggravated assault, the accused testified and provided an alibi involving a visit to his doctor's office on the morning of the stabbing.

The Crown applied to call reply evidence to rebut this testimony.

The accused objected, arguing it amounted to the Crown splitting its case and that the doctor's visit was a collateral fact.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that the accused's whereabouts prior to the stabbing related to an integral and essential issue, and the Crown could not have reasonably anticipated the specific alibi evidence.

The defendant applied under section 11(b) of the Charter to stay charges of impaired driving and exceed 80, alleging unreasonable delay.

The court assumed the total delay was 21 months and 2 days, exceeding the presumptive ceiling.

The central issue was whether the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an exceptional circumstance.

The court found that the pandemic directly impacted the case by preventing the Crown's proactive efforts to secure earlier trial dates and by burdening the court system with a massive backlog, thereby preventing rescheduling.

The period of delay attributable to the pandemic was sufficient to bring the case below the presumptive ceiling.

The appellant appealed his conviction for an "over 80" offence, alleging a s. 9 Charter violation (arbitrary detention/overholding) and a s. 11(b) Charter violation (unreasonable delay).

The court found a s. 9 breach due to police "benign neglect" in assessing continued detention but determined that breath samples should not be excluded under s. 24(2) as the breach was too remote from the evidence gathering.

However, the court found a s. 11(b) breach, concluding that judicial deliberation time for interlocutory motions counts towards the Jordan ceiling, and the net delay of 20.5 months exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling without exceptional circumstances.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

This is a summary conviction appeal concerning the mens rea for the offence of failing or refusing to provide a breath sample.

The respondent, Roberto DeCaire, was acquitted at trial after the judge found a reasonable doubt as to whether his failure to provide a breath sample was deliberate, citing severe sciatic pain.

The Crown appealed, arguing an error in law regarding the applicable mens rea standard.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not err in law by applying a standard that required proof of intentional failure or refusal, consistent with a harmonious reading of conflicting authorities.

The accused brought a motion for a finding that his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was breached, and sought a stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" and impaired driving on October 7, 2017, with the information laid on October 17, 2017.

The third trial date was scheduled for March 4, 2020, representing a total delay of 29 months.

The court calculated the net delay at 21 months after deducting defence delay and exceptional circumstances, which exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found a breach of s. 11(b) and granted a stay of proceedings.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80) following a traffic stop on September 20, 2018.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of her arrest and detention on Charter grounds, arguing violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds to arrest for impaired driving, as the only observations were signs of alcohol consumption rather than impairment.

The court also found that the defendant's detention was unlawful as she was not brought before a justice within 24 hours as required by the Criminal Code.

The Intoxilyzer test results were excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was acquitted of both charges.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 mg/100 ml) following a traffic stop for dangerous driving.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, alleging multiple Charter violations including arbitrary detention, failure to provide timely rights to counsel, and failure to comply with the "forthwith" requirement for the approved screening device demand.

The court found minor breaches of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Charter but admitted the evidence, finding that the breaches were inadvertent, the impact on Charter-protected interests was minimal, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits favoured admission.

The accused was found guilty.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of excess blood alcohol.

The trial judge had ruled that the qualified technician's viva voce evidence regarding the certification of the alcohol standard solution was hearsay and inadmissible without a Certificate of Analyst.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law.

The court held that the presumption of accuracy under s. 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code can be proven by the viva voce evidence of an intoxilizer technician without the need to tender a certificate of an analyst.

A finding of guilt was entered.