Patrick Mark Jaeger Quilty

The appellant appealed his conviction for an "over 80" offence, alleging a s. 9 Charter violation (arbitrary detention/overholding) and a s. 11(b) Charter violation (unreasonable delay).

The court found a s. 9 breach due to police "benign neglect" in assessing continued detention but determined that breath samples should not be excluded under s. 24(2) as the breach was too remote from the evidence gathering.

However, the court found a s. 11(b) breach, concluding that judicial deliberation time for interlocutory motions counts towards the Jordan ceiling, and the net delay of 20.5 months exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling without exceptional circumstances.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

This is a summary conviction appeal concerning the mens rea for the offence of failing or refusing to provide a breath sample.

The respondent, Roberto DeCaire, was acquitted at trial after the judge found a reasonable doubt as to whether his failure to provide a breath sample was deliberate, citing severe sciatic pain.

The Crown appealed, arguing an error in law regarding the applicable mens rea standard.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not err in law by applying a standard that required proof of intentional failure or refusal, consistent with a harmonious reading of conflicting authorities.

The accused brought a motion for a finding that his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was breached, and sought a stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" and impaired driving on October 7, 2017, with the information laid on October 17, 2017.

The third trial date was scheduled for March 4, 2020, representing a total delay of 29 months.

The court calculated the net delay at 21 months after deducting defence delay and exceptional circumstances, which exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found a breach of s. 11(b) and granted a stay of proceedings.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80) following a traffic stop on September 20, 2018.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of her arrest and detention on Charter grounds, arguing violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds to arrest for impaired driving, as the only observations were signs of alcohol consumption rather than impairment.

The court also found that the defendant's detention was unlawful as she was not brought before a justice within 24 hours as required by the Criminal Code.

The Intoxilyzer test results were excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was acquitted of both charges.

The accused was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 mg/100 ml) following a traffic stop for dangerous driving.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, alleging multiple Charter violations including arbitrary detention, failure to provide timely rights to counsel, and failure to comply with the "forthwith" requirement for the approved screening device demand.

The court found minor breaches of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Charter but admitted the evidence, finding that the breaches were inadvertent, the impact on Charter-protected interests was minimal, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits favoured admission.

The accused was found guilty.

The appellant, Suharshani Wijesuriya, appealed her conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample, alleging the trial judge erred in dismissing her s. 10(b) Charter application and in failing to address evidence regarding breathalyzer operation.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that police provided a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel, rejecting arguments for an enhanced police obligation beyond 'reasonable steps.' The court also found the trial judge's reasons regarding the breathalyzer were adequate and that no Charter breach occurred, thus rendering the s. 24(2) analysis unnecessary but confirming evidence admissibility.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" and impaired driving on November 3, 2017.

The trial was scheduled to commence on October 21, 2019, resulting in a total delay of 23 months and 19 days.

The accused brought a motion to stay the charges pursuant to s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing that the delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that approximately 9 months of delay should be attributed to the defence, bringing the net delay below the ceiling.

The court found that 3 months of delay was attributable to the defence, resulting in a net delay of 20 months and 20 days, which exceeded the presumptive ceiling.

The charges were stayed.

The defendant was arrested for impaired driving and care and control while over 80 following a police response to a domestic dispute call at a school.

The defendant challenged the arrest and breath sample seizure on Charter grounds, arguing lack of reasonable grounds, failure to comply with the "as soon as practicable" requirement, and violations of the right to counsel.

The court found breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter due to insufficient reasonable grounds for arrest, but found no breach of section 10(b).

Under the section 24(2) analysis, the evidence was admitted despite the Charter breach.

The defendant was convicted on both counts.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood).

A police officer conducting a RIDE program sobriety check stopped the defendant's vehicle and, after smelling alcohol, demanded an approved screening device (ASD) test.

The defendant failed the test and was arrested.

At the police station, Intoxilyzer tests revealed blood alcohol levels of 230 mg and 220 mg.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath samples under the Charter, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion.

The defendant also challenged the Crown's ability to rely on the presumption of identity and the accuracy of the Intoxilyzer tests.

The court dismissed all challenges and found the defendant guilty.

The defendant challenged the validity of a second information alleging impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol, arguing it was a nullity and constituted an abuse of process in violation of section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown had requested that police lay an additional impaired driving charge alongside the original over-80 charge.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the second information was valid, that the procedure followed by Peel Regional Police and the Crown Attorney's Office complied with the Criminal Code, and that no abuse of process occurred.

The court upheld the practical arrangement between police and Crown as a reasonable response to high case volumes while maintaining statutory compliance.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on an "over 80" charge, arguing the trial judge erred in the s. 24(2) Charter analysis by excluding Intoxilyzer test results.

The trial judge found a s. 10(b) Charter violation due to police failure to ensure the respondent received legal advice despite diligence.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis, finding no error in assessing the seriousness of the breach, its impact on Charter interests, or society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court affirmed that the police's prior compliant conduct did not mitigate the breach and that the right to counsel has intrinsic value beyond discoverability.

The appellant appealed a conviction for an "over 80" offence, arguing that the certificate of a qualified breath technician under Section 258(1)(g) of the Criminal Code was inadmissible because it was unsigned.

The Superior Court of Justice, sitting as a summary conviction appeal court, dismissed the appeal.

The court held that Parliament did not explicitly require a signature for such a certificate to have evidentiary value, distinguishing it from Section 258(1)(f.1) which does.

While a signature provides an evidentiary assist, continuity between breath tests and the certificate can also be established through *viva voce* evidence or other circumstantial evidence, as was done in this case.

The accused was convicted of arson causing damage to property and mischief endangering life following a trial.

The Crown sought a sentence of 2 to 2½ years imprisonment, while the defence sought 90 days on an intermittent basis.

The court imposed 18 months concurrent imprisonment on each charge, followed by three years probation, with conditions including no contact with the victims, a 100-meter exclusion zone, weapons prohibition, DNA order, and mandatory counselling for anger management.

The court emphasized that arson convictions warrant significant sentences regardless of mitigating circumstances, and that conditional sentences are generally inappropriate in arson cases.

A boxing coach was charged with assault causing bodily harm after sparring with his 13-year-old student, who sustained a concussion.

The court examined whether the coach's conduct exceeded the student's implied consent to contact within the sport of boxing.

Despite evidence that the coach struck the student multiple times and the student suffered a concussion, the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct constituted criminal assault.

The court noted the lack of expert evidence regarding boxing rules, inconsistencies in witness testimony, and the possibility that the student's injury resulted from contact with another sparring partner.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with one count of mischief relating to tire slashing on December 26, 2016, one count of arson relating to a car fire on February 7, 2017, and two counts of mischief relating to an attempted car ignition on March 7, 2017.

The Crown relied on video evidence from a gas station and home security camera, along with similar fact evidence to establish the accused's guilt.

The court found the accused guilty of the March 7 mischief charges and the February 7 arson charge using similar fact evidence, but acquitted on the tire slashing charge due to insufficient similarities.

The defendant was charged with exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in blood following a motor vehicle stop at 2:40 a.m. outside a drinking establishment.

The Crown proved the charge through roadside screening device and qualified technician breath samples.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the initial demand and alleged violations of his right to counsel under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court rejected both challenges, finding reasonable grounds for the initial demand and that police made reasonable efforts to facilitate contact with counsel of choice before offering duty counsel.

The accused was charged following a domestic assault incident.

Police responded to a 911 call reporting an assault in progress and entered the accused's residence without a warrant to ensure the safety of occupants.

Upon locating the accused in the basement, officers did not immediately inform him of the reasons for his detention or his rights to counsel.

The accused made incriminating statements during this period.

The court found that while the warrantless entry was justified under exigent circumstances, the failure to promptly inform the accused of his Charter rights under sections 10(a) and 10(b) constituted a breach.

The incriminating statements were excluded under section 24(2) as their admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The applicant sought exclusion of breath sample evidence on the basis of alleged violations of his Charter rights under sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The applicant was charged with having an excess blood alcohol concentration while driving after crashing into a tractor trailer on Highway 401.

The court found that while the applicant's section 7 and 8/9 Charter arguments failed, the applicant's section 10(b) right to counsel was violated.

Specifically, the police failed to facilitate the applicant's request to contact a police officer friend who could assist in locating counsel, and the police provided an incomplete explanation of the right to counsel.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while having an excess blood alcohol concentration.

He brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The defendant abandoned the section 8 argument during the hearing.

The sole issue was whether police failed to facilitate the defendant's right to counsel under section 10(b).

The court found that although the investigating officer was credible and his conduct was unimpeachable, the defendant established a breach of his section 10(b) Charter rights by requesting to contact his wife to arrange for specialized counsel.

The breath testing results were excluded pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, and the charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with over 80 (impaired driving) following a RIDE stop.

The Crown sought to introduce breath sample evidence.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the evidence on Charter grounds, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the accused's Charter rights were breached in three respects: (1) the manner of detention in the police cruiser for the roadside screening test was not reasonably necessary; (2) the accused was not adequately facilitated in her right to consult with counsel of her choice, as the police policy effectively channeled her toward duty counsel; and (3) the accused was subjected to an unjustified strip search.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence based on the cumulative effect of these breaches and the serious impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests.