CITATION: R. v. Kumar, 2016 ONSC 7928

COURT FILE NO.: SCR-15-1033-80

DATE: 2016 12 16

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

SUMMARY CONVICTION APPEAL COURT

B E T W E E N:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

P. Quilty, for the Respondent

Respondent

• and -

ANUP KUMAR

P. Mazurek, agent for the Appellant

Appellant

HEARD: November 22, 2016

REASONS FOR JUDGEMENT

[On Appeal from the Judgment of Maresca J. dated June 4, 2015]

Justice Thomas A. Bielby

INTRODUCTION

[1] On August 22, 2013, at 2:30 am, the Appellant while driving his motor vehicle was stopped by Police Officer Lupson. The officer approached the Appellant and determined that the Appellant had consumed alcohol. A demand was made for a roadside breath sample, to be used for a roadside screening device, pursuant to section 254(2) of the Criminal Code of Canada.

[2] The Appellant choose not provide a sample and was charged for refusing to provide a sample, contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code of Canada.

[3] On June 4, 2015, a trial was held before Maresca J. of the Ontario Court of Justice and the Appellant was found guilty.

[4] The Appellant was sentenced to 30 days jail, to be served intermittently, and his driver’s licence was suspended for three years.

[5] The Appellant appeals only the conviction, the jail sentence having been served.

[6] The Appellant, it would appear, completed his own appeal material. He retained Mr. Mazurek to argue the appeal. From counsel’s argument and the written material I categorize the grounds for appeal as follows:

1. The Appellant was deprived of his right to effective counsel at trial.

2. The trial judge in her findings of fact and credibility made overriding and palpable errors that are not supported by the evidence.

3. The trial judge erred in her finding that the appellant unequivocally refused to provide a breath sample pursuant to a demand, for the purposes of a roadside screening device.

4. The Appellant was deprived of his section 10(b) Charter Rights because he was not allowed an opportunity to consult legal counsel before being required to provide a breath sample.

[7] Section 254(2)(b) of the Code states that where an officer has reasonable grounds to suspect a person has consumed alcohol that person shall provide, forthwith, a sample of breath.

[8] The Appellant was observed by the officer driving away from a bar. The car was stopped and the officer testified that he smelled alcohol on the Appellant’s breath and that his eyes were red and bloodshot. As well, the Appellant admitted to the officer that he had been drinking.

[9] There were admittedly, reasonable grounds on which to demand the breath sample and the officer made the demand to the Appellant.

[10] The officer had in his possession a certified roadside screening device and the sample could have been provided and screened forthwith. The Appellant declined to provide a breath sample. The Appellant alleges he told the officer that he first wanted to speak to his lawyer. The trial judge, in her judgment ruled that the Appellant did not so advise the officer.

[11] The officer determined that the Appellant was refusing to provide a sample. The Appellant was then arrested and placed in the police cruiser. The officer testified that he then told the Appellant of his right to counsel. The Appellant denies or does not recall he was so advised.

WAS THE APPELLANT REPRESENTED BY INEFFECTUAL COUNSEL?

[12] The Appellant, at trial, was represented by Peter Lindsay, an experienced criminal lawyer whose practise is comprised of at least 80% drinking and driving offences.

[13] For the purposes of this appeal, Mr. Lindsay testified as did the Appellant.

[14] In February, 2015, Mr. Lindsay was provided with a letter, dated February 14, 2015, authored by Dr. Multani, the Appellant’s doctor. In the letter the doctor set out specifics in regards to the Appellant’s health. The letter can be found at Tab 5 of the Appellant’s brief, entitled, “Affidavits on Issue of Ineffective Representation”.

[15] In the physician’s letter the Appellant was said to suffer from asthma. The Appellant was prescribed Albuterol for his shortness of breath. The Appellant was a smoker and was advised of the need to stop smoking. The Appellant also was said to have nasal problems which affected his ability to breath and to sleep. At the conclusion of the letter, the doctor opined that the patient had problems exhaling.

[16] Mr. Lindsay admitted to receiving the letter. He did not rely on it as part of the defence nor did he seek out further medical evidence.

[17] The Appellant submits that based on the letter, medical evidence ought to have been put before the judge in regards to the Appellant’s ability to provide a sample. It is submitted that by deciding not to put such evidence before the court, the Appellant’s counsel erred and the error amounts to ineffective or incompetent counsel.

[18] Mr. Lindsay testified that the letter and a possible medical defence were discussed with the Appellant. A medical defence was rejected because the Appellant, from the outset, had told Mr. Lindsay that he refused to provide a breath sample because he first wanted to talk to his lawyer. At no time did the Appellant advise Mr. Lindsay that his decision not to provide a sample had anything to do with some medical condition.

[19] Mr. Lindsay decided to limit the defence and argue that there is reasonable doubt as to whether the refusal to provide the breath sample was unequivocal. It was argued that because the Appellant wanted to speak to counsel the refusal was not an unequivocal refusal but rather a conditional or tentative refusal.

[20] There was no evidence that the Appellant could not provide a breath sample and, in that regard, it was the Appellant’s evidence that had a lawyer told him to provide a breath sample, he would have done so.

[21] In R. v. G.D.B. 2000 SCC 22, [2000] 1 S.C. R. 520, at paragraph 26, the Supreme Court of Canada noted that there is a performance component and a prejudice component in a claim for ineffective counsel. “For an appeal to succeed it must be established first, that counsel’s acts or omissions constituted incompetence and second, that a miscarriage of justice resulted.”

[22] From paragraph 27 I quote,

“Incompetence is determined by a reasonableness standard. The analysis proceeds upon a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance. The onus is on the appellant to establish the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The wisdom of hindsight has no place in this assessment.”

[23] From paragraph 34, I quote, “Where in the course of a trial, counsel makes a decision in good faith and in the best interests of his client, a court should not look behind it save only to prevent a miscarriage of justice.”

[24] In R. v. Jaonisse 1995 CanLII 3507 (ON CA), [1995] O.J. No. 2883, the Ontario Court of Appeal, stated, at paragraph 79 that the appropriate test, as set out in the American case, Strickland v. Washington is, as follows,

“The defendant must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”

[25] At paragraph 69, the court stated, “All of these factors justify a cautious approach to ineffective representation claims.”

[26] Crown counsel submits that this statement reflects a high threshold of proving ineffectual counsel.

[27] The appeal ground of incompetent counsel must fail. Mr. Lindsay, an experience lawyer, made a tactical decision. He relied on the Appellant’s testimony that he told the officer of his wish to speak to a lawyer and argued there was reasonable doubt as to whether such a refusal meets the threshold of the refusal element in section 254(2) of the Code.

[28] The suggestion on this appeal that an alternative or additional defence ought to have been argued is one made with the “wisdom of hindsight”.

[29] The decision of counsel was made in good faith and I find that it was made in the furtherance of the Appellant’s best interests.

[30] I accept the evidence of Mr. Lindsay and in my opinion the Appellant has failed his onus of establishing that counsel was incompetent.

[31] In any event, even if there was incompetence, for reasons set out below, I have determined there was no miscarriage of justice. The outcome would not have been any different.

WERE THERE ERRORS ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL JUDGE IN REGARDS TO HER FINDINGS OF CREDIBILITY AND RELIABILITY?

[32] Counsel for the Appellant takes issue with the trial judge’s finding of facts, her credibility findings and her rejection of the Appellant’s evidence.

[33] It is submitted her findings have no basis on the facts. It is submitted that her approach in accepting the evidence of the police officer over that of the Appellant was flawed and amounted to an overriding and palpable error.

[34] It is submitted that in making her findings of facts and credibility, the trial judge did not give accord to the Appellant’s presumption of innocence. Counsel noted the officer’s failure to record in his notes, certain facts to which he testified.

[35] Counsel also took issue with respect to the admitted errors in facts that were recorded in the officer’s notebook.

[36] In response, counsel for the Crown submits that, in effect, I am being asked to retry this case as there is no overriding or palpable error on the part of the trial judge.

[37] In considering a summary conviction appeal I am mindful of the decision of Fragomeni J. in R. v. Mason 2013 ONSC 478. Therein it is stated that factual findings of a trial judge can only be disturbed if there is a palpable and overriding error.

[38] At paragraph 49, Fragomeni J. sets out the standard of review on a Summary Conviction Appeal as, whether based on the evidence the decision made by the trial judge was a finding that could have been reasonably reached. The appeal should only be allowed if the decision of the trial judge:

1. cannot be supported by the evidence; or

2. is clearly wrong in law; or

3. is clearly unreasonable; or

4. there has been a miscarriage of justice.

[39] R. v. A.A. 2015 ONCA 558, [2015] O.J. No. 4016, is a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in which the Court discusses the governing principles in regards to a review of a trial judge’s reasons and findings.

[40] Starting at paragraph 116 I quote,

“Several basic principles govern our review of the sufficiency of the reasons delivered at the conclusion of proceeding in which the credibility and reliability of the testimony of the principal witnesses is the focal point.

First, our approach is functional. An appeal based on a claim of insufficient reasons will fail unless the reasons are so deficient that they foreclose meaningful appellate review.

Second, credibility determinations attract a high degree of deference on appellate review.

Third, to determine the sufficiency of reasons, we are to read those reasons in the context of the evidence adduced and the arguments and positions advanced at trial.

Fourth, in composing reasons for judgment a trial judge is not required to discuss all the evidence or to answer every argument advanced by counsel.

Fifth, we accord significant deference to a trial judge’s appreciation of the evidence adduced at trial, as well as his or her findings on the credibility of witnesses and the reliability of their testimony. Absent palpable and overriding error, determinations of credibility and reliability made by the trial judge are to be respected on appeal.”

[41] A trial judge’s determination on both the issues of credibility and reliability are entitled to substantial deference (para.123).

[42] In R. v. Dinardo 2008 SCC 24, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 788, paragraph 26, the court stated, “Where a case turns largely on determinations of credibility, the sufficiency of the reasons should be considered in light of the deference afforded to trial judges on credibility findings. Rarely will the deficiencies in the trial judge’s credibility analysis, as expressed in the reasons for judgment merit intervention on appeal. Nevertheless, failure to sufficiently articulate how credibility concerns were resolved may constitute reversible error.”

[43] R. v. J.J.R.D. 2006 CanLII 40088 (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 4749 is a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal. From paragraph 53, I quote,

“An outright rejection of an accused’s evidence based on considered and reasoned acceptance beyond a reasonable doubt of the truth of the truth of conflicting credible evidence is as much an explanation for the rejection of an accused’s evidence as is a rejections based on a problem identified with the way the accused testified or the substance of the accused’s evidence.”

[44] In her oral decision the trial judge reviewed the evidence of Officer Lupson and the Appellant.

[45] The officer saw the Appellant drive his car out of the parking lot of the Castle Sports Bar in Brampton. At 2:30 am the officer did a rear traffic stop of the Appellant’s car. Upon approaching the driver’s window the officer detected an odour of alcohol on the Appellant’s breath and testified that he noticed the Appellant’s eyes were bloodshot, watery, and red-rimmed. The Appellant admitted to the officer that he had been drinking.

[46] The officer then, at 2:31 am read to the Appellant an approved screening device demand. The officer testified that before he had finished the demand the Appellant told him he was not blowing and also said, I refuse to blow.

[47] The Appellant, after a brief conversation concerning the consequences of not providing a sample, was arrested at 2:34 am and the officer testified that at that time he gave the Appellant his rights to counsel.

[48] The Appellant testified that the officer asked him to get out of the car to do a breathalyzer test and that he, the Appellant, responded that he was not going to say a word until he spoke to his lawyer.

[49] The trial judge noted that it was her job to determine whether the Appellant had unequivocally refused to provide a breath sample.

[50] The trial judge then turned her attention to the dicta in R. v. W.(D.) 1991 CanLII 93 (SCC), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742 and the steps to be taken in assessing the evidence.

[51] The trial judge expressed her concerns about the credibility and reliability of the Appellant’s testimony. She called his evidence in chief, a fairly bare bones indication of what happened that evening. She noted that the Appellant did not reference at all whether he refused to provide a breath sample.

[52] The trial judge noted that in cross-examination the Appellant when asked about his conversation with the officer, provided little detail and stated repeatedly, whatever he asked me, I answered.

[53] The Appellant did admit that he told the officer that he fucked up, and that his mother was in the hospital, when those specific comments were put to the Appellant and he was asked if he made them.

[54] The Appellant admitted that he told the officer, “You do what you have to do and I’ll do what I have to do”.

[55] The trial judge found that the Appellant’s answers were prevaricating and evasive. In her opinion, his evidence stretched credulity. She stated the Appellant’s memory is not to be relied on and was unreliable and that the Appellant was emotionally upset over his mother’s hospitalization.

[56] The trial judge determined that she could not put any weight on the evidence of the Appellant as it lacked credibility and was unreliable. She did not believe it.

[57] She then determined that the Appellant’s evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt.

[58] Finally, the trial judge stated that she looked at the totality of the evidence. She found that the evidence of the officer was given in a forthright manner. She noted the errors in filing out the form in which he checked off a number of errors including the wrong offence and a failure to provide a breathalyzer sample. He checked off a finding of impairment when he had never formed that conclusion.

[59] In his notes the officer recorded that the Appellant, when asked to provide a breath sample, stated, “I refuse”. In another place in his notes recorded, “I’m not blowing into that, I refuse”.

[60] The trial judge ruled that these and other errors or inconsistencies did not detract from the officer’s credibility. They were minor and did not go to the heart of the issue.

[61] While much of the officer’s evidence was not in his notes, the trial judge accepted that the officer had an independent recollection of the encounter because the unequivocal refusal stood out in his mind.

[62] The trial judge concluded that the Crown had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the Appellant unequivocally and clearly refused to provide a breath sample.

[63] The trial judge specifically rejected the Appellant’s evidence that he asked at any time directly to speak to counsel.

[64] Taking in to account the high level of deference to be accorded to the trial judge, I cannot find any real and palpable error on the part of the trial judge. She listened to and observed the evidence of the officer and the Appellant. She applied the W. D. approach to her review of the evidence.

[65] The trial judge expressed reasons for not believing the Appellant, specifically in regard to his credibility and reliability. She ruled that his evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt. The trial judge then looked at the totality of the evidence and accepted the testimony of the police officer who provided the only other evidence.

[66] The trial judge determined that there was an unequivocal refusal, and that was the only real issue only issue before her.

[67] I also note that the testimony perceived through a transcript is often much different than the perceptions of a trial judge when listening to the testimony and watching a witness give testimony. The judge is not only taking into account the answers but how the answers are given. A reading of the transcripts does not provide the flavour of the testimony at trial. This is another reason for the high degree of deference.

[68] The findings of the trial judge and her reasons thereof do not give rise to an overriding and palpable error. Her reasons are not so insufficient as to fail.

[69] This ground of appeal must fail.

DID THE TRIAL JUDGE ERROR IN HER FINDING THAT THERE WAS AN UNEQUIVOCAL REFUSAL TO PROVIDE A BREATH SAMPLE?

WAS THERE A VIOLATION OF THE APPELLANT’S SECTION 10(b) CHARTER OF RIGHTS?

[70] On the basis of her findings of fact and credibility, as noted, the trial judge’s found that the refusal to provide a breath sample was unequivocal and that the Appellant did not qualify his refusal by saying he first wanted to speak to counsel.

[71] However, for the purposes of the appeal in considering these grounds of appeal I will assume that the Appellant did advise the officer that he refused to provide a breath sample until he had an opportunity to speak to his lawyer.

[72] I think it prudent to discuss both these grounds for appeal together. Both grounds relate to the issue of a person’s right to counsel. Further, if there was no right to consult counsel prior to providing a breath sample, could the appellant’s mistaken belief that he had a right to counsel, raise a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the refusal was unequivocal?

[73] The appellant is relying on section 10(b) of the Charter of Rights.

[74] Counsel for the Appellant submitted that while the law would suggest there is no right to counsel prior to a roadside demand for a sample, there is an overriding practicality issue. While it is acknowledged that section 254(2)(b) of the Code requires the sample be provided “forthwith”, counsel submits that the time it would take to make the call to a lawyer, would not offend the section.

[75] Further, counsel submits that the officer wrongly interpreted the request to speak to a lawyer as an outright refusal and, in doing so, decided to charge the Appellant.

[76] Counsel submits that the Appellant’s intent was not to refuse but rather to defer providing a sample until he spoke to counsel. It is argued that the Appellant was unaware of his legal rights in the circumstances of a roadside demand.

[77] Counsel for the Appellant referred to the decision of P. H. Reinhardt J. of the Ontario Court of Justice, in R. v. De Chiara 2013 ONCJ 234. Mr. Chiara, the accused, was operating a vehicle and was stopped by a police officer who made a demand for a roadside breath sample. The officer had to request that the roadside screening device be brought to the scene of the traffic stop so there was a delay in being able to take a breath sample.

[78] The accused alleged various breaches of his Charter Rights. He argued the roadside screening device was not administered forthwith, in violation of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter. He further argued that he was not read his rights to counsel, nor given a chance to consult counsel while waiting for the device to arrive in violation of s. 10(b) of the Charter.

[79] In his ruling the trial judge referred to the Supreme Court of Canada decision, R. v. Thomsen 1988 CanLII 73 (SCC), [1988] S.C.J. No. 31. Therein Justice Gerald Le Dain held that the roadside demand for a sample is a breach of the Charter’s section 10(b) right to retain and instruct counsel without delay but was justified under section 1 of the Charter, as a reasonable limit prescribed by law where the demand and taking of the sample comply with the forthwith requirement of the section.

[80] Consideration was given to R. v. Grant 1991 CanLII 38 (SCC), [1991] S.C.J. No. 78, in which Chief Justice Lamer, at paragraph 20 stated, “The context of s. 238(2) (now section 254(2)) indicates no basis for departing from the ordinary, dictionary meaning of the word “forthwith” which suggest the breath sample is to provided immediately.” In the Grant case the roadside screening device did not arrive until 30 minutes. The trial judge’s decision that the “forthwith” requirement was violated was upheld and Mr. Grant was acquitted.

[81] In De Chiara Justice Reinhart, at paragraph 61, also took note of R. v. Woods 2005 SCC 42, [2005] S.C.J. 42, wherein Justice Fish, at paragraph 30, stated, in relation to roadside screening devices,

“They necessarily interfere with the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, but only in a manner that is reasonably necessary to protect the public’s interest in keeping impaired drivers off the road.”

[82] Justice Fish in the Woods decision referenced R. v. Cote 1992 CanLII 2778 (ON CA), [1992] O.J. No. 7, a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal. Speaking for the court, Arbour J. A., in Cote, stated, at paragraph 35,

“If the accused must be taken to the detachment, where contact with counsel could more easily be accommodated that at the side of the road, a large component of the rationale in Thomsen disappears. In other words if the police officer is not in a position to require that a breath sample be provided by the accused before any realistic opportunity to counsel, then the officer’s demand is not a demand made under section 238(2) (now section 254(2)).”

[83] Counsel for the Appellant in the matter before me suggests these authorities stand for the proposition that there are circumstances in which an accused has a right to retain and instruct counsel before providing a roadside sample.

[84] In my opinion these authorities also stand for the proposition that if the demand is made forthwith and if the breath sample can be provided and taken forthwith, there is no right to counsel.

[85] The facts of both the De Chiara case and the Cote case are significantly different from the matter before me. In the appeal before me it cannot be said that the requirement of “forthwith” was violated.

[86] Officer Lupson made the demand to the Appellant within a minute of forming his suspicion in regards to the consumption of alcohol and made his demand forthwith. The breath sample could have been taken immediately.

[87] The case of R. v. McCann [2015] O. J. No. 1653 is a decision of W. B. Hopkins J. of the Ontario Court of Justice and is an authority relied on by the Appellant.

[88] At paragraph 18, the judge notes that the law well-settled that the abridgement of the s. 10(b) right to counsel during the roadside screening process is a reasonable limit under s. 1 of the Charter. He notes that the suspension of the right to counsel is a practical matter otherwise it would tend to defeat the forthwith nature of the process.

[89] In the McCann case, the accused was said to be operating under a mistake of law that she had the right to refuse the roadside breath demand until she had spoken to a lawyer. Horkins J. was of the opinion that had the accused received legal advice that she was obligated to provide the breath sample she would have done so.

[90] Horkins J. opines, at paragraph 30,

“While there is no right to access counsel before taking a roadside screening test, an accused’s request to speak to counsel in that context may raise a reasonable doubt that the accused has a settled intention to refuse.”

[91] Horkins J. in fact ruled found that he had a reasonable doubt on the facts whether the accused had formed a final intent to unequivocally refuse the roadside test. He accepted her evidence that she would have provided a sample had she received legal advice to do so (para. 31).

[92] In my opinion this conclusion cannot be supported by the case law.

[93] At paragraph 19 Horkins J. notes that the accused before him was operating under a mistake in law and that such a mistake is no defence. Yet he uses her mistake in law as a defence, that is to say, a ground for a finding of reasonable doubt.

[94] Returning to R. v. Woods 2005 SCC 42, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 205, Fish J., majority wrote , at paragraph 45,

“Drivers upon whom ASD demands are made are bound by section 254(2) to comply immediately – and not later, at a time of their choosing, when they have decided to stop refusing.

[95] The Crown counsel also provided me with the decision of L. Ricchetti J. in R. v. Pociurko [2016] O.J. No. 5544, on appeal from a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice. At the scene of a single car accident Mr. Pociurko refused to give a breath sample into a roadside screening device within minutes of the officer forming the suspicion of alcohol consumption. He claimed he was not the driver and that his wife was the driver.

[96] Mr. Pociurko was arrested and placed in the back of a police cruiser. He attempted to call his lawyer using his cell phone but the phone was taken away from him.

[97] The Ontario Court of Justice trial judge concluded there was no breach of Mr. Pociurko’s Charter Rights as the offence of refusing to provide a sample had been completed by the time his phone call was interrupted. He was convicted of the offence.

[98] On appeal Mr. Pociurko’s lawyer argued that while his client’s assertion he was not the driver and his request to speak to a lawyer are not a reasonable excuse not to provide a sample, his client may have provided such a sample if he had known that neither excuse was a basis for refusing to provide a breath sample promptly. Counsel submitted that the refusal was therefore not unequivocal.

[99] At paragraph 21, Justice Ricchetti wrote, “The difficulty with this circuitous argument is that the breath sample must be provided promptly. Mr. Pociurko made it clear he would not provide his breath sample promptly for two reasons, neither of which are a reasonable excuse in law for non-compliance.”

[100] From paragraph 22, I quote,

“The learned trial judge, found that ‘On the evidence before me, I am satisfied that Mr. Pociurko had a settled intention not to comply with the demand until after he had spoken to his lawyer. His actions and words amount to an unequivocal refusal.’ There was ample evidence to support the trial judge’s finding of fact that Mr. Pociurko’s refusal was unequivocal.”

[101] Ricchetti J. dismissed the appeal finding that there was ample evidence to support the learned trial judge’s finding that the request for a breath sample was made forthwith, and therefore there was no Charter Right breach.

[102] I find that, in the matter before me, the Appellant had no right to speak to counsel before he provided the roadside sample. Further, an incorrect assumption that he had such a right (a mistake in law) does not and cannot give rise to a reasonable doubt as to whether the refusal was unequivocal.

[103] Therefore, in this appeal, in the event the trial judge erred in finding that the Appellant did not directly tell the officer he wished to speak to a lawyer, the refusal by the Appellant to give a breath sample was still unequivocal, a refusal as referenced in section 254(2) of the Criminal Code. There was no miscarriage of justice.

[104] This argument also goes to the argument of ineffective counsel. To be successful on the ground of ineffective counsel the Appellant must prove that had counsel not been incompetent and ineffective the result would have likely been different. In my opinion, the result would not have been different.

[105] The final two grounds of appeal fail.

[106] The appeal of the judgment of Maresca J., dated June 4, 2015 is dismissed.

Bielby J.

Released: December 16, 2016

CITATION: R. v. Kumar, 2016 ONSC 7928

COURT FILE NO.: SCR-15-1033-80

DATE: 2016 12 16

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

B E T W E E N:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

Respondent

– and –

ANUP KUMAR

Appellant

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Bielby J.

Released: December 16, 2016