Patrick Mark Jaeger Quilty

The defendant was charged with failing or refusing to provide a suitable breath sample following a roadside stop for speeding.

The Crown alleged the defendant refused to comply with a valid screening demand.

The defendant challenged both the validity of the screening demand and alleged a violation of his right to counsel.

The court found the screening demand was valid and made "forthwith" as required by the Criminal Code.

The court also found no violation of the defendant's right to counsel prior to arrest, and any post-arrest delay in providing rights to counsel was minor and did not warrant exclusion of evidence.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The central issue was whether the "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code was met when the police officer made a breath demand but did not have an approved screening device available, resulting in a 14-minute delay before the sample could be obtained.

The court found that the forthwith requirement was not met, that the accused's Charter rights were violated, and that the breath samples should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The charge was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of breaching a prohibition order by attending a municipal sports facility while children were present elsewhere in the building.

The appeal court held the trial judge erred in all three grounds for acquittal: the incorrect date in the information was surplusage and should have been addressed through submissions and possible amendment; the declaration that the words “community center” were inoperative under s. 161 required a properly noticed constitutional challenge; and the facility met the ordinary meaning of a community center within the statutory purpose of protecting children.

The court declined to enter a conviction because potential defences of due diligence, lawful excuse, and officially induced error had not been determined.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused was found in the driver's seat of a vehicle stuck in a flower bed with the engine running.

He was charged with impaired driving and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The court dismissed the accused's Charter application under ss. 10(a) and 10(b), finding he was not detained prior to his formal arrest.

The court also found the accused had care and control of the vehicle, as the vehicle was operable despite being temporarily immoveable, triggering the statutory presumption.

The accused was found guilty of the over 80 charge but acquitted of impaired driving due to a lack of expert evidence linking his blood alcohol level to impairment.

The defendant was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired and while his blood alcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit.

The defendant was found in the driver's seat of a vehicle stuck in a flower bed with a bent front axle.

The Crown sought to rely on the statutory presumption of care and control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath samples on Charter grounds and argued that the vehicle's inoperability defeated the presumption of care and control.

The court found no Charter breach, upheld the presumption of care and control, but acquitted on the impairment charge due to insufficient evidence of impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and with having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol level exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b).

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath samples and statements on Charter grounds, arguing violations of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and section 10(b) (right to counsel).

The court found that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and demand breath samples based on the single motor vehicle accident, the accused's proximity to the driver's side door, and signs of impairment.

The court also found no violation of the right to counsel.

The court admitted all evidence and found the accused guilty of both offences based on toxicological evidence establishing blood-alcohol levels well in excess of the legal limit at the time of the accident.

The defendant was charged with assault and obstructing police following an incident on Highway 400 where his vehicle was involved in a rear-end collision.

After initially resisting the officer's directive to have his vehicle towed, the defendant pushed a tow truck driver who was attempting to remove the defendant's family from the vehicle.

The court found the defendant not guilty of obstructing police due to reasonable doubt regarding whether the obstruction continued at the time of arrest, and not guilty of assault on the basis of self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code, finding the defendant had a reasonable apprehension of threat to his family and the force used was proportionate.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the respondent on charges of accessing and possessing child pornography.

The trial judge had excluded statements made by the respondent to the police, finding the Crown had not proven they were voluntary due to an incomplete and inaccurate record and the lack of credibility and reliability of the police officers' evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's determinations on voluntariness.