Court of Justice

The defendant was charged with failing to stop at a stop sign contrary to section 136(1)(a) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The prosecution presented evidence from a police officer who observed the defendant's vehicle pass through a stop sign at approximately 5-7 km/h without coming to a complete stop.

The defendant testified that he stopped his vehicle behind the marked stop line before proceeding through the intersection.

The court found that while the offence is one of absolute liability requiring only proof of the actus reus, the prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt due to significant uncertainty regarding the officer's vantage point (possibly 50 metres or more from the intersection rather than the stated 10 metres) and the credible, consistent testimony of the defendant.

The defendant was acquitted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown proved both charges based on breath readings of 186 and 191 mg% obtained approximately 2.5 hours after the accident, expert toxicology evidence establishing the accused's BAC at the time of driving, and observations of impairment indicators by police officers at the scene.

Although the court found a Charter violation regarding the right to counsel, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) as the breach was minor, the officers acted in good faith, and the evidence was reliable and necessary.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence brought an application alleging breaches of the accused's Charter rights under sections 8 and 10(b).

The court found that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to demand an approved screening device test, constituting a violation of section 8.

Additionally, the court found a breach of section 10(b) rights to counsel, as the accused clearly expressed dissatisfaction with duty counsel but the officers failed to provide a meaningful opportunity to consult with alternative counsel.

Under section 24(2) analysis, the court excluded the breath test evidence due to the seriousness of the police conduct, the significant impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests, and the minimal nature of the offence.

The charge was dismissed.

The mother brought a motion seeking temporary custody of two children, supervised access for the father, and a restraining order.

The father brought a cross-motion seeking joint custody, equal time-sharing, and transfer of the case to Guelph.

The court found evidence of domestic violence by the father against the mother and awarded temporary custody to the mother with limited unsupervised access to the father on Saturdays.

A restraining order was granted restricting the father's contact with the mother.

The case was transferred to Guelph as the children's ordinary residence, though the mother was not required to relocate.

The accused pleaded guilty to one count of assault causing bodily harm against a seven-year-old adopted daughter contrary to Section 267(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought 45 to 60 days imprisonment plus 12 months probation.

The defence sought a conditional discharge with probation.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with 15 months probation, finding that while a discharge would be contrary to the public interest given the serious nature of the assault and the victim's age, imprisonment was not necessary given the accused's guilty plea, remorse, lack of prior record, and positive community standing.

The sentence balanced denunciation and deterrence with rehabilitation.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to commit two accused for trial on charges arising from a hostage-taking incident at the Toronto East Detention Centre.

Stanton David was charged with three counts of hostage taking, assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

Alpha Water was charged with three counts of hostage taking and one count of placing a trap with intent to cause bodily harm.

The Crown also sought committal on two counts of mischief for Water.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit both accused for trial on the hostage-taking charges and committed Water on the mischief charges, but discharged Water on the trap charge due to insufficient evidence of intent to cause bodily harm.

The applicant mother brought a motion to strike the respondent father's pleadings for failure to comply with disclosure orders and sought summary judgment for custody, access, child support, retroactive child support, and special expenses.

The parties had separated in August 2011 after a common law relationship beginning in 2000.

The father had failed to provide adequate financial disclosure despite court orders and had demonstrated an inability to communicate with the mother regarding parenting decisions.

The court struck the father's pleadings and granted summary judgment in favour of the mother, awarding her sole custody, specifying the father's access schedule, and imputing income for child support calculations.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on grounds of unreasonable trial delay.

The charge was for failing or refusing to provide a breath sample at a roadside screening device on March 8, 2012.

The total delay from the swearing of the information to the trial date was approximately 15 months.

The court conducted a detailed attribution analysis of the delay periods and found that the Crown was responsible for approximately 12 months of delay, primarily due to failure to provide crucial in-car video disclosure in a timely manner and failure to arrange a Crown pre-trial meeting.

The court found that the delay exceeded constitutional limits and that the applicant's interests in a prompt trial outweighed society's interest in a trial on the merits, resulting in a stay of proceedings.

The defendant brought a Jarvis application seeking to exclude evidence obtained through search warrants on the grounds that the CRA's audit function had improperly transitioned into a criminal investigation, thereby breaching his Charter rights under sections 7 and 8.

The defendant was charged with two counts of fraud and four counts of tax evasion related to a GST refund scheme involving a dormant company.

The court found that the defendant lacked standing to bring the application, as he had no legitimate privacy interest in the mail box or bank account that were the subject of the search warrants, having fraudulently misappropriated the identity of the company.

Alternatively, the court found no breach of the Jarvis doctrine, as the predominant purpose of the inquiry remained audit-focused until after November 4, 2005, when the bank requirement revealed the connection between the defendant and the fraudulent refunds.

The court admitted all evidence.

The defendant, a registered vehicle owner, was charged with permitting a motor vehicle to be operated without insurance contrary to section 2(1)(b) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The defendant's brother was driving the defendant's Mazda 3 when stopped by police on January 12, 2012.

The insurance policy had been cancelled effective January 5, 2012, but the defendant claimed he did not receive the cancellation notice because it was sent to his former address in Ajax after he had moved to Toronto.

The court found the actus reus proven but accepted the defendant's due diligence defence based on a reasonable mistake of fact, resulting in an acquittal.

A motion to change a final custody and restraining order made in 2005.

The respondent, who had been convicted of sexual assault and served a sentence, sought to remove a restraining order prohibiting contact with the applicant (mother) and children in order to obtain access.

The respondent claimed a material change in circumstances based on completion of treatment at a correctional facility and gender transition.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no material change warranting modification and that access was not in the children's best interests given the respondent's history of sexual violence, ongoing risky lifestyle choices, eight-year gap in contact, and the children's stability in their current home.

The defendant was charged with failing to comply with a Property Standards Order issued under the Building Code Act, 1992.

The defendant brought a motion for non-suit arguing that: (1) the enforcement officer failed to re-inspect the property before issuing the order; (2) the order was defective because it did not specify a final appeal date and lacked authority for the appeal fee; and (3) the order was not properly served.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there was no legal requirement to re-inspect before issuing the order, that the order adequately indicated the appeal deadline, that the municipality had authority to impose the appeal fee, and that service by registered mail to the defendant's last known address was proper despite the defendant's deliberate refusal to accept delivery.

A 14-year-old youth pleaded guilty to 16 counts of sexual assault and one count of touching for a sexual purpose against a five-year-old victim on a school bus over a seven-month period.

The offender was a school bus monitor who groomed the victim through friendship and trust.

The court determined that the offences constituted violent offences under section 39(1)(a) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act based on the psychological harm caused to the victim.

The court imposed a deferred custody and supervision order of four months in custody and two months supervision, followed by one year of probation, rather than immediate incarceration, based on the offender's youth, supportive family environment, positive response to rehabilitation, and the availability of intensive monitoring and treatment programs.

The accused brought a constitutional challenge to the summary conviction provisions of sections 151 and 152 of the Criminal Code, arguing that mandatory minimum jail sentences of 14 days violate the right to trial by jury under section 11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The accused was charged with sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching of minors.

The court dismissed the application, holding that section 11(f) protects the right to jury trial only where the maximum punishment for an offence is imprisonment for five years or more, and that mandatory minimum sentences do not trigger this protection.

Sentencing decision for invitation to sexual touching contrary to s. 152 of the Criminal Code.

The offender, a 22-year-old skate guard, engaged in sexually explicit communications with a 13-year-old girl and sent her an explicit image.

The defence challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum 14-day sentence under s. 152, arguing it constituted cruel and unusual punishment.

The court rejected the Charter challenge and imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of 14 days incarceration, followed by 12 months probation with conditions including no contact, distance restrictions, and counselling requirements.

A DNA order and 10-year SOIRA order were also imposed.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a suitable breath sample following a roadside stop.

The Crown alleged the accused unlawfully feigned numerous attempts to provide a suitable sample.

The court found that the accused understood the breath demand despite claiming language difficulties, and that he was deliberately feigning his efforts to avoid registering a true result.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as self-serving and found him guilty of the offence, establishing both the actus reus and mens rea elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

The respondent brought a motion to change seeking to reduce his child support obligation and fix arrears at a nominal amount, claiming he had made direct cash payments to the applicant and that two letters signed by the applicant forgave accumulated arrears.

The applicant opposed the motion, claiming she never received direct payments and that the letters were signed under pressure without intent to forgive arrears.

The court found that the two letters dated May 28, 2006 and November 13, 2009 did forgive arrears for the period from March 1, 2005 to November 30, 2009.

However, the court rejected the respondent's claim of direct cash payments for the subsequent period, finding insufficient corroboration.

The court fixed arrears at $7,036.29 and varied ongoing child support from $605.00 to $496.00 per month based on a demonstrated change in the respondent's income.