Peter Tensuda

The respondent mother brought a motion to vary an interim parenting time order for her two-year-old child, Isabelle, who resides with the applicant father.

The mother, now residing four hours away, sought unsupervised weekly parenting time in Sudbury or supervised by her mother/adult daughter.

The father proposed limited supervised access in Milton at a family visiting centre.

The court found material changes in circumstances, including the mother's relocation, resolution of criminal charges, and the cessation of previous supervision arrangements.

Emphasizing the child's best interests, particularly physical, emotional, and psychological safety, security, and well-being, the court deemed the father's proposal ungenerous and impractical, while the mother's request for weekly travel was excessive for a young child.

The court ordered a hybrid approach: supervised parenting time at the maternal grandmother's alcohol-free home in Sudbury once a month for a weekend, and also supervised access at the Thrive Family Visiting Centre in Milton.

Remote parenting time provisions were also established.

This is an evidentiary ruling in a custody and mobility trial.

The court determined the admissibility of out-of-court statements made to an Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) clinician by persons who did not testify at trial.

The court held that such statements are presumptively admissible as original evidence unless formally challenged by a party serving and filing a statement of dispute.

The court distinguished between OCL clinician reports under section 112 of the Courts of Justice Act and expert assessor reports under section 30 of the Children's Law Reform Act, finding that the legislative framework supports different treatment of hearsay in each context.

The parties were involved in a child custody dispute over two children.

The biological father had temporary custody, but the children's psychological father (the mother's former partner) brought a motion to change the temporary order and implement the recommendations of an Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) section 112 report, which recommended custody in his favour.

The biological father brought a cross-motion to relocate the children to a new city due to his changing housing situation.

The court found that while OCL recommendations should rarely be implemented on an interim basis, the impending relocation constituted an exceptional circumstance requiring a change.

The court granted temporary custody to the psychological father, finding he had historically been the primary caregiver and the children had a strong emotional attachment to him.

This is a costs decision following a successful motion by the respondent father under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

The father sought and obtained an order that the child be returned to New York State and that a non-removal order obtained by the mother be rescinded.

The father claimed costs at full recovery of $14,956.61.

The court awarded costs of $13,000, finding the father was entitled to costs as the successful party, but reducing the award due to the unnecessary attendance of two counsel at argument and considering the overall reasonableness of the costs incurred.

A child protection application brought by the Children's Aid Society seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection under section 37(2)(b)(i) of the Child and Family Services Act due to risk of physical harm.

The mother consented to the finding through an agreed statement of facts.

The father contested the application.

The court found overwhelming evidence that the children were at risk of physical harm while in the father's care, including: the father's misuse and abuse of prescription medications (particularly oxycodone), his involvement in a dangerous driving incident while impaired by drugs with the children in the vehicle, his pattern of "doctor shopping" to obtain controlled substances, and his physical and verbal abuse of the mother in the presence of the children.

The court made a finding that the children were in need of protection and ordered a parenting capacity assessment to proceed.

A motion for summary judgment brought by the Children's Aid Society seeking an order that three children be made Crown wards without access for the purpose of adoption.

The mother opposed the motion, seeking dismissal and arguing for a trial where she would seek custody of the children.

The court found that the Society had met its onus of establishing no genuine issue for trial.

The children had been apprehended due to emotional harm from witnessing domestic violence, parental substance abuse, and mental health issues.

Despite nearly two years of involvement and multiple opportunities for the mother to address her issues, she failed to comply with court orders, continued substance abuse, demonstrated poor parenting judgment, and was unable to provide emotional safety for the children.

The court granted the motion and made all three children Crown wards without access, though noting the Society retained discretion to permit contact if in the children's best interests.

A motion by counsel for the respondent mother to be removed as counsel of record in a child protection status review application.

The Children's Aid Society sought Crown wardship for three children (ages 11, 10, and 5) who had been in care for approximately 18 months.

Counsel sought removal because Legal Aid would only fund representation for a summary judgment motion, not for trial.

The court refused the motion, finding that the harm to the children and administration of justice from delay outweighed the unfairness to counsel.

The court emphasized the importance of timely permanency planning in child protection cases and noted that counsel could seek public funding pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in New Brunswick v. J.G.