Raymond Anthony Goddard

In an uncontested family law trial following the striking of the respondent's pleadings, the court addressed claims for support, equalization, unjust enrichment, and the tort of intrusion upon seclusion.

The added parties (the applicant's parents) were awarded a constructive trust and resulting trust over the farm property and matrimonial home due to their financial contributions.

The court imputed income to the respondent due to non-disclosure and ordered retroactive and ongoing child and spousal support at the high end of the SSAG.

The court also found the respondent liable for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion for his malicious campaign of disseminating private family court information, awarding $75,000 in general, aggravated, and punitive damages.

A restraining order and a sealing order were granted to protect the applicant's privacy.

In a highly acrimonious family law dispute, the court held a focused hearing to address the respondent father's claim to set aside several temporary separation agreements and arbitration awards, and the applicant mother's motion to strike the respondent's pleadings for failure to provide court-ordered disclosure.

The court dismissed the respondent's claims, finding no evidence of duress, unconscionability, or unfairness in the negotiation of the agreements or the arbitration process.

Conversely, the court granted the applicant's motion to strike the respondent's pleadings, finding that he willfully breached multiple disclosure orders and engaged in egregious litigation conduct, including dissipating assets to render himself judgment-proof.

The respondent was granted 60 days to fully comply with the disclosure orders before the matter could proceed as an uncontested trial.

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking the appointment of an assessor under s. 30 of the Children's Law Reform Act to assess the needs of the children and the parents' ability to meet those needs.

She argued the father's behaviour was escalating and cited inappropriate communications.

The father opposed the motion, arguing it was unnecessary, intrusive, and sought for control.

The court applied the criteria from Glick v. Cale and found that the mother failed to demonstrate that an assessment was reasonably necessary, noting the parents had previously made major decisions without court intervention and the children were not exhibiting issues requiring expert evidence.

The motion was dismissed.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the amount of $5,000.

The appellant appealed an order granting interim without prejudice spousal support as a term of adjourning a settlement conference.

The appellant argued the judge lacked authority under Rule 17(8) of the Family Law Rules to make a substantive support order without a motion or sworn income evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the judge had broad discretion to impose terms on an adjournment, particularly given the appellant's failure to provide financial disclosure and his delay tactics.

The applicant sought to set aside a separation agreement that included a spousal support waiver, claiming duress, lack of disclosure, and lack of independent legal advice under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act, as well as unconscionability under s. 33(4).

The respondent moved for summary judgment to dismiss these claims.

The court granted partial summary judgment, dismissing the s. 56(4) claims as there was no genuine issue for trial regarding the negotiation of the agreement.

However, the court found genuine issues for trial regarding whether the agreement was voided by a subsequent reconciliation and whether the spousal support waiver resulted in unconscionable circumstances, given the applicant was now living in a shelter and receiving public assistance.

The court ordered temporary spousal support of $1,800 per month pending trial.

This is a costs decision following a successful motion by the respondent father under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

The father sought and obtained an order that the child be returned to New York State and that a non-removal order obtained by the mother be rescinded.

The father claimed costs at full recovery of $14,956.61.

The court awarded costs of $13,000, finding the father was entitled to costs as the successful party, but reducing the award due to the unnecessary attendance of two counsel at argument and considering the overall reasonableness of the costs incurred.

The applicant father obtained an ex parte order for custody and the return of the children after the respondent mother moved with them to New Brunswick without his consent.

The mother brought a motion to set aside the ex parte order and for permission to relocate to New Brunswick on an interim basis.

The court set aside the ex parte order due to the father's failure to disclose material facts, specifically emails indicating the mother's intended moving date and location.

However, the court dismissed the mother's motion to relocate, finding that custody was not a foregone conclusion and a move prior to trial was not in the children's best interests.

The court ordered temporary shared custody with the parents rotating in and out of the matrimonial home.

Following a motion to change brought by the father seeking to terminate ongoing child support retroactively and to terminate an obligation to fund a registered education savings plan, the mother was wholly successful.

The court considered costs under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

Although the moving party’s conduct at trial was deficient in certain respects, it did not rise to the level of bad faith warranting substantial indemnity costs.

As the successful party had made no offer to settle, the court ordered partial recovery.

Costs were fixed at 66% of full recovery and made enforceable through the Family Responsibility Office.

The applicant brought a preliminary motion regarding disclosure during a hearing under section 68.1 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The applicant argued that key documents had not been disclosed by the respondent society.

Both parties consented to an adjournment until further disclosure took place and the applicant's complaints were more clearly specified.

The Board ordered the society to make best efforts to locate and disclose specific case notes and records, and ordered the applicant to provide a clear list of enumerated complaints.

The applicant father filed a complaint with the Child and Family Services Review Board alleging the Children's Aid Society failed to investigate his concerns regarding the abuse and parental alienation of his daughters.

The Society brought a preliminary motion arguing the Board lacked jurisdiction under section 68.1(8)(a) of the Child and Family Services Act because the matters were currently before the Court in an access dispute.

The Board dismissed the Society's motion, finding that while the Court was dealing with access and the best interests of the children, the Board's jurisdiction pertained to how the Society responded to the father's complaints, which was not a matter before the Court.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable under s. 50 of the Commercial Tenancies Act for the fraudulent removal of goods to defeat the respondent landlord's claim for rent arrears.

The trial judge awarded double the value of the removed goods, damages for the vacated premises, and solicitor-client costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the trial judge's findings of responsibility and fraudulent intent, and no basis to interfere with the damages or costs awards.

The father appealed a temporary order placing his two children in the care of their mother, with his access to be supervised at the discretion of the Children's Aid Society.

He argued the judge erred in considering dismissed assault charges and lacked jurisdiction to delegate access discretion to the Society.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in considering the factual context of the dismissed charges.

The Court also resolved conflicting lower court decisions, holding that sections 58 and 15 of the Child and Family Services Act give the court authority to order access at the discretion of the Society to allow for necessary day-to-day flexibility.

The applicant, a union steward, filed a duty of fair representation complaint against her union after it withdrew her grievances concerning a shift transfer and subsequent lay-off.

The applicant alleged the union failed to adequately consult her or keep her informed.

The Board dismissed the application, finding that the union properly investigated the transfer, consulted senior officials and legal counsel, and came to a bona fide conclusion that the collective agreement did not protect the applicant from the transfer.

The Board held that the union's conduct was not arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.