Court of Justice

The applicant was charged with having a legally excessive blood alcohol concentration while having care and control of a motor vehicle.

He was arrested on September 28, 2013, with trial initially scheduled for December 11, 2014.

The trial was adjourned due to Crown failure to disclose the correct breath room videotape, and rescheduled to June 2, 2015.

The applicant brought a Charter application under sections 11(b) and 24(1) claiming the delay infringed his right to be tried without unreasonable delay.

The court found that the Crown's conduct was responsible for the adjournment and the subsequent delay, resulting in approximately 19.5 months of total delay, which exceeded the Morin guidelines.

The court granted a stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol after registering a fail on an approved screening device (ASD) at the roadside.

The Crown's case relied on breath samples obtained at the police station.

The defence argued that the ASD result was unreliable due to the presence of a throat lozenge in the accused's mouth and the officer's failure to consider the effects of certain foods and substances on the device, as outlined in an Ontario Provincial Police memorandum.

The court found that the officer could not have reasonably relied on the ASD result and that the breath samples were obtained in violation of the accused's Charter rights.

The evidence was excluded and the accused was acquitted.

The defendant pleaded guilty to possession for the purpose of trafficking in oxycodone.

The Crown sought 18-24 months incarceration, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of 12-16 months followed by probation.

The court imposed a 16-month conditional sentence followed by one year probation.

The court found that while general deterrence and denunciation are paramount in drug trafficking cases, the defendant's circumstances—including advanced age (73 years old), first offender status, small role in the trafficking scheme, motivation driven by personal oxycodone dependence, and significant pre-trial custody and house arrest—warranted a conditional sentence as a rare exception to the typical incarceration requirement.

A child protection disposition hearing following a finding that three children were in need of protection due to emotional harm resulting from parental neglect and exposure to domestic violence and substance abuse.

The mother had exposed the children to crack cocaine use, domestic violence with an abusive boyfriend, serious school absences, and neglect of medical and dental needs.

The father sought custody.

The court granted final custody to the father under section 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act, finding that the children were thriving in his care and that the mother lacked insight into the harm caused and continued to pose risks through poor judgment and manipulation during access visits.

The court ordered supervised access initially, transitioning to unsupervised weekend and holiday access.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused was found sleeping in the front passenger seat of his vehicle with the engine running in a strip club parking lot.

The Crown did not have the benefit of the presumption under section 258(1)(a) as the accused was not in the driver's seat.

The central issue was whether the elements of care or control had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, specifically whether there was a realistic risk that the vehicle could have been put in motion or a change of mind in deciding to drive while impaired.

The trial judge found the accused's evidence regarding his plans to avoid driving home to be incredible and defying common sense, and concluded there was a realistic risk the accused would drive the vehicle while impaired.

The accused was charged with driving with an excessive proportion of alcohol in his system (over 80 offence).

Following conviction and successful appeal, the matter proceeded to retrial.

The accused brought Charter applications alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that the approved screening device test was administered in violation of section 8 of the Charter due to the officer's failure to comply with mandatory police procedures and guidelines regarding device calibration, self-testing, location of testing, and in-car camera system activation.

The court excluded the evidence under section 24(2) and dismissed the charge.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three Highway Traffic Act offences.

The Crown withdrew two charges during oral argument, leaving only the charge of disobeying a sign under section 182(2) of the HTA.

The appellant's defence was that the prohibition signs at the intersection were not visible to him and he was unaware he was breaking the law.

At trial, the Justice of the Peace refused to grant an adjournment to allow the appellant to print photographs from his cell phone showing the sign placement and visibility.

The appellate court found this refusal to be an overriding and palpable error.

Upon review of the photographic evidence, the court concluded that no reasonable driver in the appellant's position would have seen the signs and allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction and substituting a finding of not guilty.

The offender was sentenced for sexually assaulting an unconscious, intoxicated friend and breaching a probation order.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the offender's prior criminal record, the extreme vulnerability of the victim, and the offender's unaddressed alcoholism.

A total sentence of 39 months' imprisonment was imposed, reduced by 19.5 months of enhanced pre-sentence custody credit, resulting in a net sentence of 19 months and 2 weeks.

The defendant was charged with assault causing bodily harm contrary to section 267 of the Criminal Code.

The incident arose from a parking dispute in a laneway outside a Chinese food restaurant in Whitby.

After an argument and physical confrontation, the defendant punched the complainant in the face, causing him to lose two teeth and have one chipped.

The defendant claimed self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court found the defendant guilty, rejecting the self-defence claim as the defendant's actions were an unreasonable over-reaction to a minor struggle and did not constitute a proportionate response to any perceived threat.

The defendant was charged with failing or refusing to provide a suitable breath sample following a roadside stop for speeding.

The Crown alleged the defendant refused to comply with a valid screening demand.

The defendant challenged both the validity of the screening demand and alleged a violation of his right to counsel.

The court found the screening demand was valid and made "forthwith" as required by the Criminal Code.

The court also found no violation of the defendant's right to counsel prior to arrest, and any post-arrest delay in providing rights to counsel was minor and did not warrant exclusion of evidence.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with impaired care and control and over 80 care and control following a report of a potential impaired driver at an LCBO.

The Crown's case relied on observations of impairment by three police officers and breath test readings of 140 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the first breath test was completed within the two-hour statutory requirement due to uncertainty regarding the precise time of the offence.

Additionally, the court found that the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on the totality of the evidence, including inconsistencies in officer observations and the defendant's cooperative demeanor.

The defendant was acquitted on both counts.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood following an incident on March 15, 2014.

The Crown invited acquittal on the impaired driving charge due to insufficient evidence of actual impairment.

The trial focused on Charter violations: whether the arrest and breath demand were made on reasonable and probable grounds (Section 8), whether breath samples were taken as soon as practicable, and whether the accused's detention for a show cause hearing was lawful (Section 9).

The court found the arrest was made without sufficient grounds, the breath samples were obtained in violation of Section 8 rights, and the detention was unlawful and arbitrary based solely on the accused's status as a non-citizen.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under Section 24(2) and granted a stay of proceedings based on systemic police training failures regarding release provisions.

Application to dispense with the biological father's consent to the adoption of a child by the maternal grandparents.

The child has lived with the grandparents since birth and is approximately five years old.

The biological father has had minimal contact with the child, exercising almost no access over the years.

The court found it in the child's best interests to dispense with the father's consent and permit the adoption to proceed, as the child has no meaningful relationship with the father and would benefit from the permanency and security of adoption by the grandparents who have provided stable, loving care.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The defence challenged the validity of the breath demand and the timing of the breath samples, arguing they were not obtained as soon as practicable as required by the Criminal Code.

The court found that the officers acted reasonably and diligently throughout the investigation, including in administering the approved screening device, managing delays at the police station, and contacting duty counsel.

The court concluded that the crown had complied with the statutory requirements and was entitled to rely on the presumption of identity based on the breath readings.

The accused was found guilty.

A child protection society brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that a 15-year-old child was in need of protection and an order making her a Crown ward.

The child had been in the society's care since February 2013 following a crisis involving self-harm and suicidal ideation.

The child consistently refused to return to her adoptive parents' care or permit them involvement in her treatment.

The parents opposed the motion, arguing there were genuine issues requiring trial and that the child should be returned to their care.

The court granted the society's motion, finding the child was in need of protection under multiple grounds and that Crown wardship was the appropriate disposition.

The court rejected the parents' arguments regarding procedural fairness and the admissibility of evidence, and found that the child's wishes and best interests clearly supported the society's position.

This is a costs decision following a three-day Hague Convention hearing in which the court ordered the mother to return two children to their habitual residence in North Carolina and stayed the mother's custody claim.

The respondent father sought full recovery of costs totalling $38,304.87, while the mother sought no costs award.

The court awarded costs of $20,000 to the father, inclusive of fees, disbursements and HST, with payment suspended for one year to allow the mother to regularize her immigration status and stabilize her living arrangements with the children.

The court permitted enforcement against the mother's real property interests and set-off against any property settlement or division owing to her.

A stepfather brought a motion to dispense with the biological father's consent to the adoption of a child under section 138 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The biological father, who had not had contact with the child for over five years and had not provided financial support, did not appear or respond to the motion.

The court found that it was in the child's best interests to dispense with the biological father's consent, considering the child's stable family life with the stepfather, the absence of any relationship with the biological father, and the permanence and security that adoption would provide.