Court of Appeal

The appellant was convicted of fraud-related offences arising from a large-scale internet fraud scheme operated from his home involving stolen and altered corporate cheques.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of his prior convictions for similar cheque frauds as similar act evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the similarities between the prior conduct and the alleged offences were sufficient to overcome the objective improbability of coincidence, and noting the Crown's case was formidable even without the similar act evidence.

The applicant, convicted of assault, sexual assault, and uttering a death threat, applied for an order under s. 683(1)(b) of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant (his ex-wife) in aid of a potential fresh evidence application on appeal.

The applicant sought to question her about documents obtained from Citizenship and Immigration Canada post-trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding this was not an exceptional case justifying the renewed questioning of a sexual assault complainant.

The court noted the complainant had already admitted at trial to contacting immigration to have the applicant deported, and the fresh evidence argument could be made without further cross-examination.

The appellant, an undischarged bankrupt, sought to appeal an order lifting a stay of proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act that allowed the respondents to pursue claims for pre-bankruptcy breaches of fiduciary duty.

The respondents brought a motion declaring the appellant had no right of appeal under s. 193(b), while the appellant sought leave to appeal under s. 193(e).

The Court of Appeal held that the appellant had no appeal as of right because the order was not likely to affect other cases in the bankruptcy proceeding.

The court also denied leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeal did not raise an issue of general importance and lacked prima facie merit, as settled law does not require a court to scrutinize the merits of an action when lifting a bankruptcy stay.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment enforcing a personal guarantee for a small business loan and setting aside the transfer of a matrimonial home as a fraudulent conveyance.

The appellants argued the Bank's refusal to provide information about the primary debtor's account rendered the guarantee unconscionable or breached a duty of honest performance.

The Court of Appeal found the Bank breached a contractual disclosure obligation but held this did not discharge the guarantee because the guarantor failed to prove any resulting prejudice or damages.

The court also upheld the finding that the property transfer was a fraudulent conveyance.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for arson, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering her continued detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

She argued the Board erred in finding she continued to pose a significant threat to public safety and sought an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by psychiatric evidence indicating a high risk of decompensation and violent behaviour if the appellant discontinued her medication.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision affirming his convictions for assault and assault with a weapon against his daughter.

He argued the trial judge erred in law by invoking the collateral facts rule to curtail cross-examination of the complainant regarding internet postings.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that second appeals in summary conviction proceedings are exceptional and the proposed ground of appeal did not raise a question of law of general significance or demonstrate a clear legal error.

The appellants appealed a decision finding they were in default of a vendor take back promissory note, which triggered an acceleration clause.

The application judge found that the appellants failed to make full quarterly payments and that proper written notice of default was provided.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge's interpretation of the promissory note and conclusion that notice was properly given were reasonable.

The appellant appealed the probation conditions imposed following a conviction for breach of probation, arguing that the requirements to remain in Ontario and report weekly were improper.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge properly exercised their discretion.

The conditions were necessary to monitor the appellant, particularly because the underlying breach occurred while he was outside the province, and did not unduly restrict his mobility rights since he could seek permission to travel or vary the reporting frequency.

The moving party, a declared vexatious litigant, brought a motion for an extension of time to file a supplementary notice of appeal and for case management directions.

The moving party had improperly combined appeals of three vexatious litigant declarations and a dismissed application into a single notice of appeal without obtaining the required leave for the application appeal.

The Court of Appeal struck the application appeal without prejudice for failing to obtain leave under section 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

However, recognizing the moving party's clear intention to appeal the vexatious litigant declarations, the Court granted an extension of time to file separate notices of appeal for those orders.

The request for case management was dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal judge's decision upholding his conviction.

The conviction related to a car driven to the border that was found to be subject to duties under section 159 of the Customs Act.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the lower court's decision and denied leave to appeal.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction for failing to stop a vehicle while being pursued by police.

He argued the summary conviction appeal judge erred in widening the offence to include momentary movement and finding that flight on foot constitutes vehicular flight.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding the appellant misstated the record regarding the vehicular stop and that the flight on foot was properly used as evidence of mens rea, not as an element of the offence.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals for marijuana production, possession for the purpose of trafficking, and theft of electricity.

The trial judge had excluded evidence under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter, finding police lacked reasonable grounds to arrest the passenger in the respondent's car.

On appeal, the Crown argued the police had grounds for an investigative detention, a position not advanced at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it would be unfair to allow the Crown to rely on a new factual scenario and legal theory not raised before the trial judge.

The appellant appealed an order declaring him a vexatious litigant.

He argued he was denied the right to be heard when the application judge denied him standing and ejected him from the courtroom, and that the judge failed to accommodate his medical illness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge was entitled to refuse standing due to the appellant's failure to comply with a prior peremptory order.

The Court also held that the appellant's disruptive behaviour justified his ejection and further demonstrated his vexatious manner of conducting proceedings.

The appellant, a mature recidivist, appealed a 10-year penitentiary sentence imposed after pleading guilty to seven counts of bank robbery and one count of failing to stop at the scene of an accident.

The offences were committed while he was unlawfully at large.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by failing to award credit for pre-sentence custody and by misapplying the principles of proportionality and totality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant was not entitled to pre-sentence custody credit under s. 719(3) because he was serving sentences for other offences during that time, and the trial judge made no error in principle regarding proportionality and totality.

The appellant, detained in the forensic mental health system after being found not guilty by reason of insanity, appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition ordering his continued detention.

He argued the ORB erred in finding he posed a significant threat to public safety and in failing to direct the hospital regarding a sleep deprivation issue caused by hourly bed checks.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB's decision was reasonably supported by evidence of the appellant's threatening behaviour and paranoia, and that the ORB's recommendation for an independent third-party opinion on the bed check issue was appropriate.

The franchisor appealed a motion judge's decision finding it breached the duty of fair dealing under s. 3 of the Arthur Wishart Act by failing to disclose that it did not receive significant volume rebates.

The motion judge had read language into a certified common issue without notice to the parties.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by effectively amending the common issue and by concluding that the alleged non-disclosure constituted a breach of the duty of fair dealing in the performance of the franchise agreement.

The plaintiff's cross-appeal regarding the dismissal of its motion to add a new common issue was dismissed.

The appellant, an auto glass repair company, appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action against the respondent insurer for breach of contract and intentional interference with economic interests.

The appellant claimed it had obtained assignments from insureds to receive direct payments for windshield repairs at a market rate of $100, but the insurer only paid $50 per repair.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that individual contracts were formed between the repair company and the insurer for each repair at the specified $50 rate, and that the purported assignments were ineffective because the insureds had paid nothing and had no claim against the insurer to assign.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged jury convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime under $5,000.

The court rejected the submission that intercepted drug purchase calls were inadmissible hearsay, distinguishing the governing Supreme Court authority because there were multiple calls, confirmatory evidence, and practical necessity.

The court also held that the jury charge, read as a whole, adequately instructed on reasonable doubt and did not require a specific W.(D.) instruction concerning the defence witness.

The remaining complaints about credibility and demeanour instructions disclosed no material error.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to change spousal support.

He argued his income had declined and the respondent had purchased a home in France without a mortgage, constituting a material change in circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's refusal to find a material change, as the appellant's income was trending upward and he provided no evidence of the respondent's asset position at the time of the original order.

The court also rejected claims of bias and improper procedure.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received income replacement benefits until returning to work.

The insurer sent a letter discontinuing benefits and warning of a two-year limitation period to dispute the refusal.

The appellant later stopped working due to her injuries and sought reinstatement of benefits, which the insurer denied as statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissing the action, confirming that the limitation period began running upon the valid refusal of benefits, and was not delayed by the temporary return to work provision in the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.