Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant challenged convictions for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence about cannabis-related perception issues, applied an improper reliability analysis, and failed to address inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence.

The court held that any alleged misapprehension was not material to the conviction reasoning and that the trial judge identified and decided the live reliability issue correctly.

It further held that trial reasons are assessed functionally and need not expressly resolve every inconsistency, particularly those not emphasized in closing submissions.

Appellate deference applied to the trial judge’s factual reliability findings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The appellant, Ivan McManus, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence imposed for seven counts of robbery.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, affirming the sentencing judge's findings that the appellant met the criteria for a dangerous offender under s. 753(1) of the Criminal Code, demonstrating a high likelihood of harmful recidivism and intractability.

The court also upheld the indeterminate sentence, finding no reasonable expectation that a lesser measure would adequately protect the public, given the appellant's extensive criminal and institutional history, psychiatric diagnoses, and consistent refusal or failure to engage in treatment programs.

The appellant, J.E., appealed his conviction for sexual interference.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made three significant legal errors in assessing the evidence of a defence witness (the complainant's mother).

These errors included applying the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to individual items of evidence, effectively reversing the burden of proof on the defence, and requiring independent corroboration for defence testimony.

The Court held that these errors were not inconsequential, as the defence witness's testimony, though peripheral, could have contributed to a reasonable doubt regarding the complainant's credibility or reliability.

Consequently, the conviction appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Robert Rouse, appealed his sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider the negative impact of his time spent on house arrest.

The Court of Appeal found that the strict conditions of house arrest, which required the appellant to be supervised by his full-time working surety, did indeed have a significant impact on his liberty and ability to carry out normal activities.

The Court concluded that this impact should have mitigated his sentence.

Leave to appeal was granted, and the appeal was allowed, resulting in a 7.5-month reduction to the appellant's sentence.

The appellant, Mustaf Yusuf, was on judicial interim release pending his appeal, with conditions including remaining in Ontario and surrendering for the appeal hearing.

His counsel advised the court that he failed to surrender because he was in prison in Somalia, breaching his release conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned, in accordance with the terms of the release order, and issued a warrant for his arrest.

Mark Sheldon Roberts appealed a 2020 Ontario Review Board disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because the 2020 disposition had been superseded by a 2021 disposition, and new criminal charges and re-admission to a secure forensic unit at CAMH had rendered the factual record stale.

The court reiterated the principle of not deciding moot cases, especially in Review Board matters where no effective remedy can be given for a spent disposition.

This appeal concerned the Ontario Review Board's refusal to order a psychiatric assessment for an accused, found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (NCRMD) for double murder, who had been designated a "high-risk accused." The accused sought the assessment to promote an application to the Superior Court to remove his high-risk designation, arguing his progress meant he no longer qualified.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the Board's decision.

The Court clarified that the "substantial likelihood" test for reviewing a high-risk designation assesses the accused's inherent risk of violence if not subject to external constraints, not their risk under current supervised conditions.

Given the accused's history and ongoing risk factors, the Board's conclusion that an assessment would not change its determination was reasonable.

The Court also noted the Board's error in applying an "onus" on the accused in inquisitorial proceedings, though found it non-prejudicial.

The applicant sought a panel review from the Court of Appeal for Ontario of a single judge's decision refusing an extension of time to appeal a summary conviction dismissal.

The applicant had been convicted of breach of undertaking and assault.

His initial summary conviction appeal was dismissed due to a lack of transcripts.

Subsequent applications for extensions of time and panel reviews were dismissed by single judges of the Court of Appeal (MacPherson J.A. and Coroza J.A.) on grounds of unexplained delay, lack of bona fide intention to appeal, and absence of apparent merit.

The panel upheld the previous decisions, finding no error of law and no justification to depart from the prior rulings.

The application for review was dismissed.

Mitchell Dubros appealed the dismissal of his certiorari application, which sought to quash his committal for trial on a charge of obstructing justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's decision, affirming that a preliminary inquiry judge's determination of evidentiary sufficiency is owed great deference.

The court held that there was "any evidence" to meet the threshold for committal, specifically evidence of threats made to dissuade witnesses, which constitutes obstruction of justice under s. 139(3) of the Criminal Code, and that the mental element of the offence was sufficiently established.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, a political worker during the 2011 federal election, was convicted under the Canada Elections Act for his role in a 'robo-calls' scheme that directed voters to false polling stations.

He was sentenced to nine months' incarceration and 12 months' probation.

Both the accused and the Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the sentencing judge properly balanced the mitigating factors of the youthful first-time offender with the need for denunciation and deterrence for an unprecedented electoral fraud offence.

The Court declined the Crown's request to establish a sentencing range of two to five years for electoral fraud.

The appellant appealed his drug convictions, arguing that evidence seized pursuant to a telewarrant should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant contended that the Information to Obtain (ITO) was insufficient and contained a false statement regarding the unavailability of a Justice of the Peace.

The Court of Appeal conducted a Grant analysis and concluded that the officer's conduct was not a serious Charter breach, as the statement, though sworn without personal knowledge, was factually true.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of its application for certiorari and mandamus after a preliminary inquiry judge discharged the respondents on first degree murder and committed them for second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that there was no evidence of planning and deliberation.

However, the Court found the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded his jurisdiction by determining whether the victim was unlawfully confined to the degree required for constructive first degree murder under s. 231(5)(e), rather than leaving that question to the jury.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the preliminary inquiry judge.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge provided inadequate reasons for rejecting his evidence and erred in finding wilful blindness regarding the acquisition and storage of material.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of fact provided a clear explanation for rejecting the appellant's evidence as incredible, and that there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for the finding of wilful blindness.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault after allegedly slashing the victim's face.

The victim gave an unsworn audio-taped statement to the police identifying the appellant as the assailant, but left the country the next day and could not be located for trial.

The trial judge admitted the statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding necessity and reliability.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in concluding that no benefit would be served by cross-examining the victim, given evidence of possible animus, unsavoury character, and suspicious departure.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence for assault causing bodily harm, an included offence of wounding.

The appellant struck the victim in the face, causing her to stumble and fall down the stairs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was entirely justified as the appellant was properly held responsible for all of the victim's injuries.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of sexual assault against a developmentally challenged adult.

At trial, the judge ruled that the complainant was not competent to testify under section 16 of the Canada Evidence Act because she could not understand the duty to speak the truth.

The trial judge also excluded the complainant's hearsay statements to her teacher and the police, finding them unreliable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's competence ruling was entitled to deference and that Parliament had intentionally created different competence standards for children under 14 and adults with developmental disabilities.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's exclusion of the hearsay statements.

The appellant appealed his conviction for breach of recognizance.

The parties agreed that the charges giving rise to the recognizance had been withdrawn prior to the alleged breach.

As a result, the appellant was not bound by a recognizance when he consumed alcohol, and the appeal was allowed.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to grant a stay of proceedings based on the Crown's failure to disclose telewarrant documents.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that a stay is a remedy of last resort and should only be granted where there is no other adequate remedy or irreparable prejudice.

The court found that any prejudice could have been remedied by an adjournment, a mistrial, or allowing the withdrawal of admissions.

The stay was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and assault causing bodily harm following a violent attack in a convenience store parking lot.

The sole issue at trial was eyewitness identification.

On appeal, the appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable and the trial judge's reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal held the verdict was not unreasonable, but allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial because the trial judge failed to properly instruct himself and analyze the inherent frailties of the eyewitness identification evidence.