Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, Jennifer Pyne, appealed her convictions on several drug-related charges and sought leave to appeal her sentence, contending an error on the warrant of committal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge regarding the location of discarded drugs.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, determining that while the sentencing judge made a minor calculation error in her oral reasons, the warrant of committal accurately reflected the imposed sentence, thus requiring no rectification.

The appellant, Reshane Hayles-Wilson, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and sought leave to appeal his 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The appeal raised three grounds: improper Crown submissions regarding tailoring evidence, an erroneous two-step deliberation instruction to the jury, and improper Crown submissions on motive to lie.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred on all three grounds but concluded that these errors, individually or collectively, did not undermine the safety of the verdict given the overall fault-free trial and clear instructions on burden of proof and reasonable doubt.

The court also found no error in principle or manifest unfitness in the sentence.

Both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual offences against his wife's granddaughter.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal and proceeded only with the sentence appeal.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of six years' imprisonment.

The appellant argued the sentence was outside the appropriate range, citing the gap between his last conviction and the recent offences, and invoking the jump principle given his longest previous sentence was two years less a day.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding it was fit and that the trial judge properly balanced the relevant factors, particularly the appellant's extensive record for sexual offences and the principles of denunciation and general deterrence.

The appellant was convicted of significant fraud involving the preparation of fraudulent tax returns for 241 taxpayers claiming non-existent business losses to obtain tax refunds from the Canada Revenue Agency.

The fraud resulted in wrongful federal tax refunds exceeding $2.7 million, with the appellant receiving over $149,000 for his role.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence, raising numerous grounds of appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding no errors in the trial judge's handling of search warrant issues, Charter rights claims, jury charge, or sentencing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in finding no air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, misapprehended evidence, and improperly relied on the complainant's demeanour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly instructed himself on credibility, correctly concluded the appellant knew the complainant was not consenting, and made no reversible errors in assessing the evidence or demeanour.

The appellant appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that directed a conviction.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge erred by focusing on whether the arresting officer actually knew a test result was reliable, rather than whether the officer's belief was reasonable.

However, the Court of Appeal held that the appropriate remedy was a new trial, not a directed conviction, because a trial judge could conclude the officer's belief was unreasonable given his reliance on a rookie officer whose training was unknown.

The appeal was allowed in part, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and related offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed arguments regarding the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility and the lack of a Vetrovec caution.

However, the Court found the trial judge misapprehended evidence on one count, quashing that conviction and ordering a new trial.

Another conviction was quashed and an acquittal entered because the complainant did not meet the statutory definition of a young person.

The remaining convictions and the total five-year sentence were upheld.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking enhanced credit for pre-trial custody.

The Crown conceded the appeal, as the original sentence was imposed before the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Summers.

The Court of Appeal granted the appellant credit for 24 months of pre-trial custody at a rate of 1.5 to 1, reducing the sentence by 12 months.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible, appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board dismissing his Charter application.

He alleged that a delay in holding his annual disposition review hearing violated his rights under s. 7 of the Charter and sought costs, damages, and declaratory relief.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the minor delay did not significantly deprive the appellant of his liberty or security of the person.

The Court also held that the Board does not have the jurisdiction to grant costs, damages, or declaratory relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter, and is not required to adopt an inquisitorial approach when hearing Charter applications.

The appellant appealed his four-year penitentiary sentence for voyeurism, making child pornography, and internet luring involving two teenage victims.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by over-emphasizing consecutive sentences and unreasonably assessing aggravating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the global sentence fit given the serious aggravating features, including breach of trust, careful planning, grooming, and exploitation of a victim's poverty.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference involving a minor complainant who alleged he touched her while she slept during an overnight visit.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof in a credibility contest between the complainant and the accused.

The Court of Appeal held that although the trial judge correctly recited the W.(D.) principles, his analysis treated the case as a choice between competing versions rather than determining whether the accused’s evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

Because the reasons showed that the possibility of reasonable doubt was not properly considered, the burden of proof was misapplied.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, a military member, appealed his sexual assault conviction on the basis of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, and appealed his sentence regarding a $4,000 victim surcharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's characterization of pre-charge and post-charge delay.

The sentence appeal was allowed, and the victim surcharge was reduced to the statutory minimum of $100 because there was no inquiry into the appellant's ability to pay the elevated amount.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm-related offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence obtained during an illegal search of his apartment.

The police had executed a search warrant without reasonable and probable grounds.

The trial judge excluded drug-related evidence but admitted the firearms evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, applying the Grant framework.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the police did not act in bad faith and that there is a heightened public interest in the prosecution of firearms offences.

The appellant appealed his sentence for participating in a savage beating motivated by an animus towards homeless people.

The trial judge considered the appellant's military status, noting his conduct brought dishonour on the Canadian military.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's consideration of these aggravating factors and held that the sentence was measured and reasonable, appropriately balancing the gravity of the crimes with the appellant's youth, remorse, and prospects for rehabilitation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended material evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reasons and noting that she approached the appellant's evidence from a common sense perspective, ultimately finding parts of his story incredible.

The Court declined to revisit the trial judge's factual findings.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of production of marijuana and bribery.

The trial judge had excluded the respondent's statements to police under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding breaches of ss. 9, 10(a), and 10(b) due to the respondent's language difficulties.

The Court of Appeal upheld the exclusion of evidence for the marijuana charge.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the bribery charge, holding that the statements offering money to police constituted the actus reus of a new offence and did not flow causally from the Charter breaches.

A new trial was ordered for the bribery charge.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The summary conviction appeal court set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge gave insufficient reasons regarding the common sense inference that people consume alcohol at a normal pace.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the acquittals, holding that the trial judge had properly considered the inference but found insufficient evidence to assess its implications based on the Crown expert's report.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and that the trial judge erred in assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, the basis for rejecting the appellant's testimony was apparent from the record.

The court also held that the trial judge did not err in his credibility findings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a condition of his probation order.

The Crown conceded that condition r(8) of the probation order was not a reasonable condition.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and deleted the condition.

The Crown appealed from the dismissal of its appeal from an acquittal on a provincial offences charge under s. 84.1 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The respondent's truck lost the dual wheels, hub and axle on one side as a single unit, but the wheels themselves did not separate from their fasteners.

Applying the modern approach to statutory interpretation, the court held that s. 84.1 addresses the specific public safety concern of "flying wheels" and applies only when the wheel itself separates from the vehicle.

Because the wheel fastening mechanism did not fail and only a larger assembly detached, the acquittal was properly upheld.