Mitchell Chernovsky

The appellants, David Hui and Musab Saboon, appealed their convictions for kidnapping and first-degree murder of Lee Chiodo, as well as Hui's sentence for kidnapping.

Both were convicted after a trial by judge alone and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's credibility and reliability analysis of Marshall Hardy-Fox, a Vetrovec witness whose evidence was key to the convictions.

The appellants also argued the trial judge failed to apply the proper legal test for assessing credibility and provided insufficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of Hardy-Fox's evidence, proper application of the credibility test, and adequate reasons.

The court also dismissed Hui's sentence appeal based on the parity principle.

The accused pleaded guilty to importing a Schedule 1 substance (ketamine) pursuant to s. 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The accused arrived at Toronto Pearson Airport from Frankfurt, Germany on March 7, 2025, with 7.985 kg of ketamine concealed in his suitcase.

The Crown sought an eight-year custodial sentence, while the defence sought four years with enhanced pre-sentence custody credit.

The court imposed a six-year custodial sentence, reduced by 315 days of Summers credit and 194 days of Duncan credit for harsh detention conditions, resulting in a net sentence of four years and seven months.

Ancillary orders included a mandatory 10-year weapons prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture order.

Jahlando Sinclair, aged 22, faced charges related to the robbery of two pharmacies.

The central issue was the identification of Sinclair as one of the robbers, specifically the one wearing a grey Roots hoodie.

The Crown relied heavily on high-quality video surveillance, physical resemblance, matching clothing and accessories (shoes, underwear, mask), temporal proximity to other identified robbers, and the location of his arrest near discarded robbery clothing.

The court applied principles of video identification and circumstantial evidence, finding that the cumulative effect of the evidence led to the only reasonable inference of guilt, rejecting the defence's "series of coincidences" argument.

Sinclair was found guilty of robbery, masked with intent, and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

A charge of possession of a loaded restricted firearm was reduced to a lesser included offence.

The defendants applied to exclude evidence (a gun and their clothing) obtained following their detention and arrest, alleging breaches of their Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found the initial investigative detention lawful, but identified breaches of s. 10(b) due to the police's failure to promptly advise of the right to counsel upon detention and for subsequent delays in facilitating access to counsel at the police station.

However, the court found no s. 8 breach regarding the gun seizure, concluding the accused had no privacy expectation, had abandoned the gun, and the search was conducted with valid consent.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant test, the court weighed the moderate seriousness of the Charter breaches against their minimal impact on the accused's rights and society's strong interest in adjudicating serious armed robbery cases on their merits.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed, and all evidence was found admissible.

The Crown sought summary dismissal of two pre-trial motions brought by the accused, Barrington Brooks: one alleging abuse of process under the Charter and the other alleging infringement of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court, exercising its case management powers, summarily dismissed both motions.

For the abuse of process motion, the court found no reasonable prospect of success as the allegations were not capable of constituting abuse in the current proceeding and lacked evidentiary support.

For the s. 11(b) motion, the court calculated the net delay, attributing significant periods to defence delay (due to discharging counsel) and exceptional circumstances (COVID-19 pandemic), concluding that the total delay fell below the 30-month Jordan ceiling and was not otherwise unreasonable.

This is a judicial interim release (bail) hearing where the Crown sought the detention of the accused on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court considered the accused's lengthy and violent criminal record, including previous convictions for assault and probation breaches, and current allegations of attempted murder and criminal harassment.

The proposed release plan, involving the Toronto Bail Program and electronic monitoring, was deemed insufficient to mitigate public safety concerns given the gravity of the alleged offences and the accused's history.

The court also considered the accused's status as a member of a vulnerable population under s. 493.2 of the Criminal Code but found that the Crown had met its onus for detention on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The accused applied for a bail review after being detained on charges of possessing two loaded handguns while bound by a firearms prohibition.

The reviewing judge found that the addition of a new surety and clarification of the sureties' financial assets constituted a material change in circumstances, and that the original justice of the peace erred in law by concluding the sureties had no reasonably recoverable assets.

However, upon conducting a full review, the judge dismissed the application.

The judge found that the circumstantial evidence strongly suggested the accused was involved in drug trafficking, which elevated the risk to the public.

The proposed supervision plan, while better than most, was deemed insufficient to mitigate the secondary ground risks associated with the combination of drugs and loaded firearms.

The offender was convicted of possessing a loaded prohibited firearm, overcapacity magazines, and crack cocaine.

At sentencing, the defence introduced a social history report detailing the offender's experiences with systemic anti-Black racism, poverty, and trauma, including the murder of his brother.

The court accepted that these systemic factors and the offender's likely PTSD reduced his moral culpability.

However, emphasizing the paramount principles of denunciation and deterrence for firearms offences, the court declined to impose a conditional sentence.

The offender was sentenced to 24 months' incarceration, reduced by credit for pre-trial custody and strict house arrest bail, resulting in a net sentence of 10 months and 18 days.

The accused was charged with multiple firearm-related offences arising from the discharge of a handgun into a crowded lane in downtown Toronto in the early morning of October 14, 2017.

The Crown's case was based on circumstantial evidence of identity, as eyewitness identification was insufficient.

The trial judge found the accused guilty based on the totality of evidence, including surveillance video footage, forensic ballistics evidence, DNA analysis, and the consistency of the accused's appearance and clothing with that of the shooter.

The accused was charged with 24 offences including possession for the purpose of trafficking of prohibited substances (heroin, cocaine, crack cocaine, and crystal methamphetamine), firearms offences relating to possession and careless storage of a handgun and ammunition, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The preliminary inquiry judge assessed whether the Crown had adduced sufficient evidence to establish the essential elements of possession—knowledge and control—through circumstantial evidence.

The judge found that the Crown's proposed inferences were speculative and did not logically flow from the established facts.

The accused was discharged on all counts.

James Garthwaite pleaded guilty to manslaughter for the shooting death of Dana Camber during a planned drug robbery.

The court considered aggravating factors including the use of a loaded sawed-off shotgun, the planned ruse, the pursuit of the victim, the invasion of a home, the fact that the victim was an innocent bystander, and the offender's extensive criminal record, parole status, and firearms prohibition.

Mitigating factors included the early guilty plea, expression of remorse, relatively young age, difficult childhood, and efforts to further education in prison.

The court sentenced Garthwaite to 10 years in penitentiary, less 495 days for pre-sentence custody, resulting in 8 years, 7 months, and 15 days remaining.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, a lifetime firearms prohibition (s. 109), a non-communication order, and forfeiture of the firearm.

The accused was charged with sexual assault against the complainant.

The Crown called only the complainant as a witness, and the accused called no evidence.

The trial began as a preliminary inquiry but was converted to a trial by judge alone after the complainant's evidence in chief.

The sole issue was whether the complainant's testimony proved the alleged offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The judge found the complainant's credibility and reliability to be seriously compromised by inconsistencies between her trial testimony and her police statement, particularly regarding alleged threats from the accused, her history of dishonesty in dealings with the criminal justice system, and concerns about the reliability of her memory given her drug use at the time of the alleged incident.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking, brought a pre-trial application challenging the constitutional validity of section 184.1 of the Criminal Code, which permits state agents to intercept private communications to prevent bodily harm.

During an undercover drug purchase, the police used an Officer Protection Device to monitor, but not record, the conversation between the undercover officer and the applicant.

The applicant argued that the failure to record the conversation and the statutory requirement to destroy such recordings violated his rights under sections 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that section 184.1 contains adequate safeguards and strikes an appropriate balance between state interests and individual privacy rights, rendering it constitutionally valid.

The accused was found guilty of kidnapping with intent to hold for ransom and conspiracy to commit kidnapping.

The victim was violently abducted, confined for a week, and tortured by co-conspirators.

The accused was arrested while attempting to collect the $500,000 ransom.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to stay the unlawful confinement charge.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court determined a fit sentence was 7 years imprisonment.

After applying 1.5:1 credit for pre-sentence custody and additional credit for harsh lockdown conditions, the accused was sentenced to 2 years and 2.5 months in the penitentiary.

The accused, charged with kidnapping and related offences, brought a pre-trial Charter application to exclude evidence obtained from his seized cell phone.

The police conducted an initial cursory search of the phone upon his arrest to locate the kidnapped victim, followed by a comprehensive warrantless search of the downloaded data 12 days later.

The court held that the initial search was justified by exigent circumstances and did not violate s. 8 of the Charter.

However, the subsequent comprehensive search violated s. 8 because exigent circumstances no longer existed and it was not a valid search incident to arrest.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the police acted with reckless disregard for the accused's privacy rights and abused the search warrant process by seeking a second warrant on the eve of trial.

The accused was charged with kidnapping, unlawful confinement, extortion, assault causing bodily harm, and conspiracy after a complainant was abducted, tortured, and held for ransom.

The accused was arrested while attempting to collect the ransom money, and text messages on his phone linked him to the ongoing kidnapping enterprise.

The court found the accused guilty of unlawful confinement, kidnapping, and conspiracy, holding that he intentionally joined the continuing kidnapping offence and the existing conspiracy.

The accused was acquitted of extortion and assault causing bodily harm, as the extortion was completed before his involvement and there was no evidence he participated in the torture.

The offender was convicted of second degree murder by a jury for the manual strangulation of a disabled drug dealer.

The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of 12 to 15 years, while the defence sought the statutory minimum of 10 years.

The court considered the aggravating factors, including the breach of trust, the victim's vulnerability, and the theft of drugs and money.

The court also considered the offender's Indigenous background and the Gladue factors, which contributed to his substance abuse issues.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with a parole ineligibility period of 11 years, reducing it from 12 years to reflect the Gladue factors.

The applicant, charged with kidnapping and forcible confinement, brought an application alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from arrest to the anticipated end of the trial was approximately 34.25 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court found that the delay was justified by transitional exceptional circumstances, noting the complexity of the case, which involved multiple co-accused, a large police investigation, and voluminous disclosure.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, facing charges including robbery and use of an imitation firearm, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to a 33-month delay from arrest to the anticipated end of trial.

The court applied the Jordan framework and found that after deducting defence delays and discrete events, the net delay was 26.9 months, which fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court also conducted a transitional analysis under the Morin framework, concluding that the delay was not unreasonable given the complexity of the preliminary hearing and the applicant's tactical decisions.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Crown conceded that an error was made in the calculation of pre-sentence custody credit.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the appeal was allowed.

The pre-sentence custody credit was recalculated at a 1.5 to 1 ratio, resulting in a reduction of the sentence from 10 years 290 days to 9 years 251 days, with pre-trial custody credited as 3 years 114 days instead of 2 years 75 days.