Mitchell Chernovsky

The offender, a first-time offender, was found guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a 21-month custodial sentence, while the offender proposed a conditional sentence of 18 months to two years less a day.

The court imposed a 20-month conditional sentence, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence while recognizing the offender's strong rehabilitation prospects and low risk of reoffending.

The sentence included strict house arrest conditions, a DNA order, and a 10-year weapons prohibition, followed by 12 months of probation.

The accused, Phillip Joseph (P.J.), was convicted of second-degree murder and faced a sentencing hearing to determine whether an adult or youth sentence was appropriate.

P.J. was 17 at the time of the offence.

The court considered the seriousness of the offence, the accused's role, age, maturity, mental disorders (Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Major Depressive Disorder, Cannabis Use Disorder), and progress in custody.

Despite some positive developments in custody, the court found that the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness was rebutted and that a youth sentence would not be of sufficient length to hold the young person accountable or ensure public protection and rehabilitation, given the severity of the crime and the uncertainty of treatment success.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, arguing his right to a trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) was infringed.

The total delay from charge to the third trial date was 43 months.

The court analyzed the delay periods, attributing significant portions to inherent time requirements, including the illness of Crown counsel and the unavailability of co-accused's counsel.

The court found the institutional delay was 15 months and 18 days, which fell within the Morin guidelines.

Finding no significant prejudice caused by the delay itself, the court dismissed the application.

In a murder trial involving a young person, the defence brought a Scopelliti motion seeking to introduce images recovered from the deceased’s cellphone memory card to suggest a violent disposition and support a claim of self‑defence.

The proposed evidence consisted of photographs of firearms, knives, cash, marijuana, and aggressive slogans whose origin and authorship were unknown.

The court applied the governing principles from Scopelliti and subsequent authorities and concluded that the images had minimal probative value and did not demonstrate prior acts of violence or a disposition to carry weapons.

Any limited probative value was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effect, risk of improper reasoning about the deceased’s character, and the potential to distract the jury with collateral issues.

The evidence was therefore ruled inadmissible.

The accused, a young person charged with first degree murder, challenged the admissibility of a videotaped police statement on a voir dire.

The court considered whether the police were required to comply with s. 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act and whether the statement was voluntary under the common law confessions rule.

The court held that s. 146 was not triggered because the accused was neither arrested nor detained and the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to believe he had committed the offence at the time of the interview.

The interview circumstances did not involve inducements, oppression, lack of an operating mind, or improper trickery, and the rudimentary cautions given were sufficient in the circumstances.

The Crown proved voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt and the statement was ruled admissible at trial.

The accused was charged with firearm offences after an unloaded 9mm handgun was found in the pocket of a jacket in a closet of an apartment he shared with his girlfriend.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the presence of the accused's personal papers in the same jacket pocket.

The accused testified and denied any knowledge of the firearm, suggesting the jacket belonged to his brother and he had only worn it once.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework and concluded that while it was more likely the firearm belonged to the accused, a reasonable inference could be drawn that it belonged to his girlfriend, who also had a motive to hide it.

The accused's evidence raised a reasonable doubt, resulting in an acquittal.

The Crown sought to admit a videotaped prior inconsistent statement of a witness identifying the accused as responsible for several bank robberies.

The witness recanted or claimed memory loss during testimony, raising issues about the reliability and voluntariness of the prior statement.

Applying the framework from R. v. B.(K.G.) and R. v. Khelawon, the court examined whether the statement met the requirements of necessity and threshold reliability.

The court found that the witness’s evasive and contradictory testimony prevented meaningful cross‑examination and that the police had not adequately recorded critical interactions preceding the statement.

Despite some corroborating circumstances, the court held that the Crown failed to establish reliability on a balance of probabilities and refused to admit the statement for the truth of its contents.

A young person charged with first-degree murder in the stabbing death of a 20-year-old victim sought release pending trial.

The Crown opposed release on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found that the Crown established a substantial likelihood that the young person would commit a serious offence if released, based on the extreme and unexplained brutality of the murder.

The court also found exceptional circumstances warranting detention to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The young person's parents, though willing to act as sureties, demonstrated insufficient knowledge of and control over their son.

The court ordered detention pending trial.

The applicant brought a Garofoli application to set aside a search warrant and exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained material non-disclosures and inaccuracies, particularly regarding a flawed photo line-up and the police's failure to investigate the applicant's alibi.

After excising the erroneous information, the court concluded there was insufficient reliable evidence to support the warrant, resulting in a s. 8 Charter breach.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence, finding that the police's lack of diligence and the serious impact on the applicant's privacy interests meant admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused applied under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for a stay of proceedings, alleging a violation of their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The court assessed delay under the framework from R. v. Morin, allocating periods between inherent time requirements, Crown delay, and institutional delay.

Crown and institutional delay totalled approximately 19 months, modestly exceeding the Morin guideline range of 14–18 months.

While much of the claimed prejudice was typical of criminal charges, one accused demonstrated significant personal, financial, and health-related prejudice arising from the delay.

Balancing the factors, including prejudice and the seriousness of the charges, the court found the delay unreasonable and ordered a stay of proceedings.

The Crown sought judicial review by certiorari of a preliminary inquiry decision discharging multiple accused charged with murder, manslaughter, and attempted murder arising from a fatal shooting outside a nightclub.

The preliminary inquiry judge concluded there was insufficient evidence connecting the accused to the handgun used in the shooting and discharged all accused.

The reviewing court held that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded jurisdiction by choosing between competing inferences and weighing the evidence beyond the permissible “limited weighing” required for circumstantial cases under R. v. Arcuri.

The evidence supported reasonable inferences of motive, means, opportunity, and a joint enterprise to ambush the victims, and the judge improperly preferred an inference favourable to the accused.

The discharges were therefore quashed and the accused were ordered committed to stand trial.

During a second degree murder trial, the accused sought to admit the contents of an anonymous 911 call identifying another individual as the person who stabbed the victim.

The proposed evidence was hearsay and did not fall within a traditional exception, so admissibility depended on the principled approach requiring necessity and threshold reliability.

Although necessity was established because the anonymous caller could not be identified or cross‑examined, the court found the circumstances of the call lacked sufficient indicia of reliability.

Unlike emergency 911 calls made contemporaneously with ongoing events, the call occurred more than two hours after the incident and the caller deliberately avoided accountability.

The court held that admitting the evidence would effectively abandon the threshold reliability requirement for hearsay and therefore ruled the call inadmissible.