Michael James Morris

The applicant was arrested for drinking and driving offences on April 24, 2011, with his trial scheduled for July 24, 2012—a delay of 15 months.

The applicant brought a Charter section 11(b) application seeking a stay of proceedings based on an alleged infringement of his right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court dismissed the application, finding that after accounting for periods attributable to defence conduct, inherent time requirements, and institutional factors, the remaining delay of approximately eight months fell within the Morin guidelines for straightforward provincial court trials.

The applicant suffered minimal prejudice, and no violation of his Charter rights was established.

The respondents challenged the constitutionality of three Criminal Code provisions relating to prostitution: operating a common bawdy-house, living on the avails of prostitution, and communicating for the purpose of prostitution.

The application judge struck down all three provisions as violating section 7 of the Charter.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking down of the bawdy-house provision (suspended for 12 months) and read in an exploitation requirement to the living on the avails provision.

However, the Court of Appeal reversed the application judge's decision on the communicating provision, finding it did not violate the principles of fundamental justice and was a justified limit on freedom of expression, binding the lower court to the Supreme Court's previous decision in the Prostitution Reference.

The moving party, Maggie's: The Toronto Sex Workers' Action Project, brought a motion to intervene in an appeal concerning the constitutionality of prostitution-related offences.

The moving party sought to raise a new challenge under s. 15 of the Charter and to argue that the legislation was impermissibly driven by moral views.

The court dismissed the motion to intervene on the s. 15 issue, finding that the evidentiary record was not developed for such a challenge and that allowing it would be unfair to the parties and delay the appeal.

The court also declined to grant separate intervener status on the morality issue, as it was already being raised by others, but permitted the moving party to join an existing intervener group.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to stay the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice, which struck down several prostitution-related provisions of the Criminal Code as unconstitutional, pending appeal.

The moving party argued that the judgment created a legislative void with profound implications for the public interest.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found that there was a serious issue to be tried, the government would suffer irreparable harm to the public interest without a stay, and the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo.

The motion was granted and the judgment was stayed for a limited period to permit appellate review.

The appellants, organizations promoting traditional conceptions of morality, sought leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an application challenging the constitutionality of prostitution provisions in the Criminal Code.

The motion judge dismissed their motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred, noting the appellants had a real, substantial, and identifiable interest and an important perspective distinct from the parties.

The appeal was allowed and the motion to intervene was granted.

The appellant, a childcare worker, was sued in negligence after a child suffered a brain injury in her care.

During the civil proceedings, the police investigated the appellant criminally.

The appellant sought to prevent the disclosure of her civil discovery evidence to the police, relying on the implied undertaking rule.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the implied undertaking rule applies to discovery evidence that may disclose criminal conduct, and that parties cannot generally disclose such evidence to the police without a court order.

The Court allowed the appeal, preventing the disclosure of the discovery transcripts to the police without a proper search warrant.

The appellants applied for permanent residence in Canada under the investor and self-employed classes.

Both applications were denied because their dependent children had intellectual disabilities that medical officers concluded would cause excessive demands on Canada's social services.

The visa officers refused to consider the families' wealth and willingness to pay for private social services.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeals, holding that the legislation requires an individualized assessment.

A family's ability and willingness to attenuate the burden on the public purse are relevant factors in determining whether a disabled child might reasonably be expected to cause excessive demands on social services.

In a federal reference concerning proposed civil marriage legislation, the Court held that Parliament had jurisdiction to define civil marriage as the lawful union of two persons, but not to legislate protections for religious officials in relation to solemnization, which falls within provincial authority.

The Court further held that extending civil marriage to same-sex couples was consistent with the Charter and that freedom of religion broadly protects religious officials from state compulsion to perform marriages contrary to their beliefs.

Exercising its residual discretion under the Supreme Court Act reference jurisdiction, the Court declined to answer whether the pre-existing opposite-sex requirement for civil marriage was Charter-compliant, given the government's legislative position, the reliance interests created by lower-court rulings, and the risk of legal confusion.

Arrêt constitutionnel majeur portant sur l'exclusion des couples de même sexe de la définition du mariage aux fins de la common law.

La Cour a appliqué l'analyse du par. 15(1) de la Charte et conclu que la définition hétérosexuelle du mariage portait atteinte à la dignité et aux droits à l'égalité des couples de même sexe, sans justification au regard de l'article premier.

La Cour a rejeté les prétentions fondées sur la liberté de religion et l'égalité religieuse de l'église intervenante, concluant que l'affaire visait l'institution juridique du mariage plutôt que sa dimension religieuse.

Comme réparation, la Cour a déclaré invalide la définition existante dans la mesure où elle contenait les mots « d'un homme et d'une femme », l'a reformulée immédiatement comme l'union de deux personnes, et a ordonné la délivrance et l'enregistrement des mariages visés.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a Divisional Court decision finding that the common law definition of marriage as between 'one man and one woman' violated the equality rights of same-sex couples under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage demeaned their dignity and was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The Court allowed the cross-appeals on remedy, declaring the existing definition invalid and immediately reformulating it as 'the voluntary union for life of two persons to the exclusion of all others'.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, was arrested and detained for eight days pursuant to a provisional arrest warrant requested by Germany for extradition purposes.

He sued Germany for damages for personal injuries (mental distress, denial of liberty, damage to reputation) resulting from his arrest.

Germany claimed sovereign immunity under the State Immunity Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that Germany did not waive its immunity by initiating the extradition process, as the civil action was separate.

Furthermore, the 'personal injury' exception in s. 6(a) of the Act applies only to physical injury, not to the mental distress or loss of liberty claimed by the appellant.

The action against Germany was dismissed.

The appellant was rendered a quadriplegic in a motor vehicle accident when the impaired driver failed to negotiate a sharp curve on a rural road.

The trial judge apportioned 35% liability to the municipality for failing to post a warning sign.

The Court of Appeal overturned this finding.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's decision, holding that the trial judge's finding of negligence was a question of mixed fact and law that should not be overturned absent a palpable and overriding error.

The Court clarified the standards of review for questions of law, fact, and mixed fact and law.

The plaintiff was arrested for extradition to Germany and subsequently brought a civil action against Canada and Germany for damages for negligence and abuse of power.

The Crown successfully moved for a stay of the civil action pending the outcome of the extradition proceedings.

The plaintiff appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motions judge erred in principle by failing to apply the high threshold test requiring extraordinary or exceptional circumstances to justify a stay of civil proceedings when concurrent criminal proceedings are pending.

The plaintiff was charged under section 159 of the Criminal Code, a provision previously declared unconstitutional by the Ontario Court of Appeal.

After the charges were withdrawn, the plaintiff sued the Attorney General of Canada, alleging negligence and Charter breaches for failing to repeal the unconstitutional provision.

The Attorney General moved to strike the claim, which was initially dismissed.

On appeal, the Divisional Court allowed the appeal and struck the claim, holding that a legislative body cannot be held liable in tort for exercising or failing to exercise its legislative power, and that the claim was not justiciable.