Mary Lou Benotto

The appellants challenged an order dismissing a certiorari application arising from a preliminary inquiry committal in a homicide prosecution.

The Court of Appeal held that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded her limited jurisdiction by choosing between competing inferences reasonably available on the evidence and by preferring the inference favourable to the appellants.

The court also rejected the argument that the evidence was incapable of placing one appellant within the scheme to do violence, holding that any relative weakness in the evidence was irrelevant at the committal stage.

The appeals were dismissed.

In a child protection appeal, the appellant mother challenged the dismissal of her appeal from an order denying leave to bring a status review application.

The court held that the applicable analysis was discretionary and required consideration of the child's best interests.

Although the mother had made positive changes in her life, the court concluded that the appeal judge properly considered the broader context, including the child's age, limited contact with the mother, and the child's wish that the adoption proceed while preserving some ability to communicate.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged a family law order concerning foreign property and child support.

The Court of Appeal held that the Family Law Act contemplates equalization of net family property rather than sale and division of individual assets, and there was no evidentiary basis for equitable relief concerning property located in China.

The court also held that the foreign property was not a matrimonial home because the parties were not ordinarily residing there on the date of separation.

The appeal from the child support findings failed, including the imputation of income and allowance of extraordinary expenses, although the parties were referred back to the trial judge to settle the amount already paid toward arrears.

The appellant appealed convictions for production of marijuana, possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, and theft under.

He argued the circumstantial evidence did not support the inference that he had the required knowledge and control of the grow operation.

The court held that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence as a whole, correctly instructed herself on circumstantial evidence, and reasonably concluded that the only reasonable inference was guilt.

The court also rejected the submission that documents seized from the appellant’s home were used improperly.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant employer appealed a summary judgment granting the respondent employee damages for wrongful dismissal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusions that an alleged amending agreement lacked evidentiary support, that 18 months' notice was appropriate, and that the employee was entitled to damages for her lost bonus.

The court also upheld the motion judge's imposition of a trust regarding mitigation income.

The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The second offence was committed while he was on release awaiting trial for the first offence.

He was sentenced to consecutive terms of 18 months and 30 months imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, emphasizing that general deterrence and denunciation must be given more significance when an accused re-offends while on release.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing her application for a declaration that she was the sole owner of a boundary tree.

She sought to cut down the tree without her neighbours' consent, arguing that under previous jurisprudence, the trunk at ground level was entirely on her property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's interpretation of section 10(2) of the Forestry Act, finding that 'trunk' should be given its ordinary dictionary meaning, encompassing the part of the tree from its roots to where it branches out, not just at ground level.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision denying her claim against her group disability insurer for benefits.

She argued the insurer had a common law duty to inform her directly of a potential claim, and that the limitation period should not run until they did so.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no such common law duty exists for group disability insurers in these circumstances, and noting the insurer had complied with the statutory notification obligations under the Insurance Act.

In a second‑degree murder prosecution involving the death of an infant following severe brain and retinal injuries, the court conducted a voir dire on the admissibility of opinion evidence from treating clinicians.

The defence argued that only forensic pathologists should be permitted to testify regarding the mechanism of injury and that clinicians lacked forensic expertise.

Applying the principles governing expert evidence, including the Mohan framework and considerations from the Goudge Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology, the court held that the treating neurosurgeon and paediatric ophthalmologist could provide opinion evidence within the limits of their specialized expertise.

The court concluded that their opinions regarding the likely causes of the brain injury and retinal haemorrhages were reliable, highly probative, and did not risk undue prejudice or confusion for the jury.

The clinicians were therefore permitted to testify regarding the likely mechanisms of the observed injuries.

The accused brought a pre‑trial motion challenging the language Crown expert witnesses could use when describing injuries to an infant in a criminal prosecution.

The defence objected to analogies describing the force required to cause the injuries, the use of the term “massive” for a subdural hematoma, descriptions of extensive bruising, evidence regarding the absence of any explanation for the injuries, and a graphic description of injuries to the child’s genitalia.

The court held that analogies explaining the magnitude of force could assist the jury in understanding scientific evidence and were permissible.

The term “massive” to describe the subdural hematoma was allowed as a medically accurate and understandable descriptor, and the Crown could lead evidence regarding the lack of explanation for the injuries as part of the medical history relied upon by clinicians.

However, the court directed that inflammatory wording describing genital injuries should be replaced with a more neutral description.

The accused applied for production of investigative records from the Special Investigations Unit arising from his arrest during the execution of a search warrant, during which he sustained serious injuries.

The application was brought to support a potential Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings under ss. 7, 12, and 24(1).

Applying the framework from R. v. O’Connor, the court balanced the accused’s right to make full answer and defence against the confidentiality interests asserted by the SIU.

The court found the SIU witness interviews and follow-up reports highly probative of the circumstances of the arrest and necessary for the accused’s Charter claims.

The privacy interests asserted by the SIU were limited because the statements related to officers performing public duties and confidentiality promises were not absolute.

Production of the reports and interviews to the defence was ordered subject to standard disclosure conditions.

The accused applied for certiorari to quash a preliminary inquiry judge’s decision committing him to stand trial on charges of dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm arising from a highway collision involving a tractor trailer.

The applicant argued the preliminary inquiry judge erred by focusing on the consequences of the driving rather than the manner of driving, and by failing to conduct a limited weighing of circumstantial evidence.

The reviewing court held the preliminary inquiry judge properly considered the evidence, including expert accident reconstruction and traffic conditions in a construction zone where lanes were merging.

The court concluded there was evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could convict.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

The accused applied under s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to exclude a police statement made during an interview following arrest for sexual assault-related offences.

Although the accused had been advised of his right to counsel at the time of arrest, he had not yet spoken with his retained lawyer when the police conducted a videotaped interview the following day.

During the interview the accused repeatedly indicated he wished his lawyer to explain matters to him and stated he had not spoken with counsel.

The court held that although the continued custody did not amount to a second detention requiring a renewed caution, the accused had not been given a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel before questioning.

The resulting statement was excluded under s. 24(2) and could not be used by the Crown, including for cross‑examination.

The applicants sought to exclude text messages obtained by police through a production order directed to a telecommunications provider, arguing that the messages constituted private communications requiring a wiretap authorization under Part VI of the Criminal Code.

The court accepted that text messages attract a reasonable expectation of privacy but held that the statutory regime governing interceptions applies only to contemporaneous surveillance of communications.

The retrieval of stored text messages from a service provider after the communication had occurred did not amount to an interception.

The court found that the use of a production order under s. 487.012 of the Criminal Code was the proper legal mechanism and did not violate s. 8 of the Charter.

In a criminal prosecution for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, the defence objected to the use of non‑accredited Korean interpreters for the complainant’s testimony given by video‑link and sought an adjournment or stay unless a conditionally accredited interpreter was available.

The court held that accreditation is not constitutionally required and that the relevant issue is interpreter competence.

After conducting a voir dire to assess qualifications, experience, and impartiality, the court found that one proposed interpreter demonstrated sufficient competence to provide accurate and impartial interpretation.

The absence of formal accreditation was not determinative, and the court retained discretion to qualify a competent interpreter where necessary to ensure a fair trial.

During a criminal jury trial, the accused brought a motion for a non-suit arguing there was no evidence upon which a jury could find that an object used during a confrontation was a real firearm rather than an imitation.

The defence contended that witness belief and the accused’s conduct were equally consistent with an imitation firearm and therefore could not support proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court held that the proper test on a directed verdict motion is whether there is some evidence upon which a reasonable jury could convict, not whether alternative explanations exist.

Evidence including witness descriptions of the gun, the accused’s threat to shoot, and the circumstances of the confrontation could support an inference that the firearm was real.

The motion for non-suit was therefore dismissed and the issue left for determination by the jury.

During a criminal trial for robbery, extortion, and firearms offences, the Crown sought to introduce a firearm seized during a search warrant executed nine months after the alleged robbery.

The Crown argued the firearm constituted circumstantial evidence permitting the jury to infer it was the same weapon used in the offence.

The defence opposed admission, arguing the firearm’s generic description and the passage of time rendered the evidence minimally probative and highly prejudicial.

The court held that although the firearm had some probative value, it was significantly weakened by the time gap and the generic description provided by witnesses.

The prejudicial risk—particularly the likelihood of propensity reasoning by the jury—outweighed its probative value, and the evidence was excluded.

The accused brought a motion seeking a stay of charges for possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime, alleging unreasonable delay contrary to s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from charge to trial approached 24 months, exceeding the guidelines established in earlier Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence.

The court examined the length of delay, waiver, explanations for delay, and alleged prejudice to the accused.

Most delay was attributed to institutional factors and inherent requirements of the case, with a small portion attributable to the defence and none to the Crown.

Balancing these factors, the court held that the delay was not sufficiently unreasonable to outweigh society’s interest in a trial on serious indictable charges.

The appellant City purchased asset-backed commercial paper notes that subsequently collapsed in value.

The City sued the respondents for negligent misrepresentation, conspiracy, and unjust enrichment more than two years after purchasing the notes but less than two years after the notes matured and defaulted.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's summary judgment dismissing the claims as statute-barred.

The Court held that for negligent misrepresentation inducing a transaction, damage occurs when the plaintiff enters into the transaction and receives something less valuable than represented, not when the full extent of the loss is monetized.

The limitation period was not suspended by a standstill agreement or by the involvement of an investors committee.

The applicant sought to quash a committal for trial on a charge of attempted murder following a preliminary inquiry.

The applicant argued the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded jurisdiction by inferring specific intent to kill from the circumstances of a violent assault involving strangulation, sexual assault, and severe beating.

The court applied the test of whether there was any evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could infer the requisite intent.

Considering the nature of the attack, the severity of the injuries, the sequence of events, and the abandonment of the complainant while unconscious and seriously injured, the court held there was sufficient evidence from which intent to kill could be inferred.

The application was dismissed and the committal for trial on attempted murder was upheld.