Mary Lou Benotto

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, and uttering death threats, as well as his four-year sentence.

He argued his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to oppose the admission of the deceased complainant's preliminary inquiry evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the appellant had declined the opportunity to cross-examine the complainant at the preliminary inquiry and had agreed with his counsel's advice at trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentencing judge properly considered all principles, and rehabilitation played no significant role given the appellant's lack of remorse and prior record.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in failing to exercise discretion against the designation and in finding he did not qualify as a long-term offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly assessed the appellant's high risk of violent recidivism, his extensive criminal history, and the lack of a reasonable possibility that his risk could eventually be controlled in the community.

The self-represented appellant applied to review two orders: one fixing the date for his appeals and another dismissing his application for the appointment of specific counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant had previously dismissed or refused to cooperate with three appointed counsel, leading to the appointment of amicus curiae.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the applications, finding that the appointment of amicus was appropriate to control the court's process and prevent further frustration of the proceedings, consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers' Association.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for robbery with a firearm and related offences arising from a home invasion.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, specifically DNA found on bandanas and a police baton seized from the appellant's apartment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury's verdicts were not unreasonable.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed to make a two-year sentence for weapon possession concurrent rather than consecutive, reducing the net sentence to five years and four months.

The applicant, a police officer convicted of drug offences, sought disclosure of the identity of an anonymous tipster who emailed police post-conviction alleging misconduct by the applicant's supervising officers.

The Crown provided a redacted summary but claimed confidential informer and public interest privilege over the author's identity.

The Court of Appeal held that neither privilege applied, as there was no express or implied promise of confidentiality to the unsolicited tipster, and no objective evidence to support public interest privilege.

The Court further held that the Trotta test for production in support of fresh evidence was premature, as the motion was properly characterized as one for directions on the scope of Crown disclosure.

The application for disclosure was allowed.

The appellants appealed a judgment granting the developer's application for declarations that the appellants were bound by agreements of purchase and sale for two hotel investment condominium units, and dismissing the appellants' application for a refund of deposits.

The appellants argued that changes to the building, including a reduction from 70 to 60 stories and changes to PATH access, constituted material changes under the Condominium Act, entitling them to rescission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the May 2012 disclosure statement was a revised statement under s. 74(3) of the Act and that the changes were not material changes under the objective standard in s. 74(2), as they did not reasonably affect the value of the units for investment purposes.

The young person appealed a Superior Court judgment granting the Crown's application for certiorari and mandamus, which quashed a preliminary inquiry discharge on first degree murder and directed committal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by weighing competing inferences regarding the knowledge of the likelihood of death.

The Court affirmed that mandamus was appropriate because committal for the full offence was legally inevitable given the evidence.

The appellants, vendors of a property, appealed a decision granting partial summary judgment and specific performance to the respondent purchasers.

The transaction failed to close on the extended closing date because the appellants had not provided required documents.

The motion judge found that the 'time is of the essence' clause had been waived and that the appellants were not ready to close.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's factual findings or her conclusion that there were no genuine issues requiring a trial, noting that the Supreme Court's decision in Hryniak supported the expeditious resolution.

Appeal from an application decision concerning the effect of dissolution of a two-person accounting partnership on a restrictive covenant in the partnership agreement.

The application judge held that the appellant had withdrawn, thereby triggering a capital-account reduction tied to clients transferring to the departing partner, and directed a trial on damages.

The Court of Appeal held that, on a general dissolution of a two-member firm, the firm ceased to exist and absent an express surviving contractual restraint, the parties were free to pursue their own practices.

The finding that the appellant had withdrawn so as to trigger the covenant was set aside, the impugned paragraphs of the judgment were deleted, and the cross-appeal was unnecessary to decide.

The appellant appealed an order staying its Ontario action for negligent tax advice arising from the settlement of a Quebec action.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge applied the correct forum non conveniens principles and properly concluded that Quebec was clearly the more appropriate forum.

The court rejected the submission that reliance on the retainer agreement was erroneous, because the claim was pleaded in both tort and contract.

The appeal was dismissed with agreed costs to the respondents.

Youth criminal appeal from convictions for historical sexual offences following a trial under youth legislation.

The appellant argued the trial judge gave inadequate reasons, reversed the onus, applied an improper standard to defence evidence, and improperly relied on cross-count similar fact reasoning.

The court held the reasons, read functionally and contextually, were sufficient; the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework and did not reverse the burden of proof.

The court further held that, had the issue been squarely raised, the complainants' evidence would inevitably have been admissible across counts given the striking similarities and independent disclosure.

Appeal dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order striking their negligence action against a public housing provider and a police services board.

They alleged prolonged harassment by other residents and failures by the landlord and police to respond appropriately.

The court held the pleading disclosed no reasonable cause of action because no material facts were pleaded that could make the landlord liable for harm caused by third parties or impose an actionable duty on the police to conduct a proper investigation.

The court also held that most of the alleged incidents fell outside the limitation period, dismissed the fresh evidence motion, and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The Crown appealed a jury acquittal on a charge of second degree murder arising from a fatal stabbing in a motor vehicle, arguing that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury on reflex and voluntariness.

The Court of Appeal held there was no evidentiary foundation for a defence of involuntary reflex and that the impugned instruction was erroneous.

However, applying the governing standard for Crown appeals from acquittals, the court found no reasonable basis to conclude the error materially affected the verdict in light of the defence theory, the evidence, the overall charge, and the jury questions.

The appeal was therefore dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for importing opium and possession of opium for the purpose of trafficking arising from a shipment of hydraulic jacks containing concealed narcotics.

The court accepted the respondent’s concession that the trial judge erred by admitting impermissible police opinion evidence and by failing to provide an adequate circumstantial evidence instruction on the standard of proof.

The court also held that additional police opinion evidence about the appellant’s interview demeanour was irrelevant and highly prejudicial.

Although the verdict was not unreasonable on the evidentiary record, the cumulative unfairness required the convictions to be set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant challenged an order refusing to set aside a Registrar’s administrative dismissal of the action for delay.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge applied the correct legal test and that no palpable and overriding error was shown in the exercise of discretion.

The court also found the explanation for the very significant delay in bringing the motion after the administrative dismissal to be unsatisfactory.

The appeal was dismissed with fixed costs to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for importing cocaine, arguing that the trial judge improperly admitted evidence from a border services officer explaining why the appellant was referred to secondary inspection and improperly instructed the jury on that evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the prior authority relied on by the appellant did not bar admission of an officer’s personal observations and permissible non-expert opinion evidence.

The officer’s use of the term 'indicator' was found to be merely descriptive in context and did not amount to profile evidence or impermissible opinion on knowledge.

The charge to the jury, read as a whole, did not invite the jury to treat the officer’s suspicions as proof of knowing importation.

The conviction appeal was dismissed.

In a personal injury action arising from a bicycle and motor vehicle collision allegedly caused in part by unlit streetlights on a boundary bridge, a municipal defendant appealed summary judgment dismissing its crossclaim and the action against a co-defendant utility contractor.

The appeal court held that the servicing agreement and the evidence about responsibility for identifying and maintaining boundary-road streetlights were ambiguous and contradictory.

The motion judge erred by treating the parties' common understanding as determinative despite live disputes over contractual allocation of responsibility.

The claims against the contractor were restored for trial.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a civil claim alleging that religious divorce documents had been fraudulently altered to include a waiver of rights to a marriage gift.

The court upheld the trial judge’s credibility findings and rejected arguments concerning corroboration, bias, waiver, and factual error.

The proposed fresh evidence did not relate to the central authenticity issue, could have been obtained with diligence before trial, and would not have affected the result.

The appeal was dismissed, with no appeal costs to one respondent and fixed costs awarded to another.

In a medical negligence appeal arising from a hysterectomy that resulted in ureter injury, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law in treating an alleged failure to disclose surgical risks as battery rather than informed consent governed by negligence principles.

Applying the informed consent framework from Reibl v. Hughes, the court found the reasons addressed only part of the subjective inquiry and failed entirely to consider the required objective test.

The court also held that the finding of negligent delayed diagnosis was unsupported because there was no evidence that the CT scan contemplated on July 7 would have revealed the ureter injury or that earlier diagnosis would have permitted immediate repair.

The appeal was allowed, a new trial ordered, and appeal costs fixed at $20,000.

The appellant challenged the dismissal of his action alleging misrepresentations in connection with the purchase of interests in two closely held businesses, and also challenged partial allowance of counterclaims by the respondents.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's findings were grounded in credibility, were well supported by the record, and attracted deference.

It rejected the argument that one respondent breached the share purchase agreement by selling an interest he did not own, finding both parties understood the transaction as a sale of that respondent's interest.

It also upheld a damages award reflecting another respondent's continuing ownership interest after the appellant operated and dissolved one company without accounting to that shareholder.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.