Marco Sciarra

Two brothers were jointly charged with possession of cocaine, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

Following a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought committal to trial based on surveillance evidence showing hand-to-hand transactions over two days and the subsequent discovery of drugs and cash at a residence where both accused were found.

The court applied the test for committal in circumstantial cases, examining whether a reasonable jury could draw inferences of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit both accused to trial on all three counts.

The applicants, charged with break and enter, were discharged at a preliminary inquiry, terminating their bail.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari, reviving the charges.

To address the outstanding issue of bail, the Crown sought and obtained arrest warrants for the applicants.

The applicants brought an application for a stay of proceedings, alleging the Crown's conduct in seeking the warrants was an abuse of process and breached their rights under sections 7 and 9 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the applications, finding the Crown's conduct did not meet the high threshold for abuse of process and the arrests were lawful under section 507(8) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a suitable sample into an approved instrument following a RIDE program stop.

The Crown alleged the accused deliberately failed to provide a proper breath sample during approximately 10 attempts over 12 minutes at the police station.

The accused testified she was genuinely attempting to provide a sample.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to refuse to provide a suitable sample, as the video evidence (without audio) was not conclusive and the accused's testimony raised a reasonable doubt.

The Crown charged William Pav and Dylan Violo with assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm arising from an incident on College Street in Toronto on January 13, 2013, where the defendants allegedly participated in a swarming attack on Joseph Kau.

A directed verdict was granted on the assault with a weapon charge against Violo.

The trial focused on identification evidence and was corroborated by DNA evidence linking the defendants' clothing and Pav's hands to the victim's blood.

The court found both defendants guilty of assault causing bodily harm but acquitted Pav of assault with a weapon due to insufficient evidence of weapon use.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to commit the accused to trial on charges of break and enter, possession of break-in tools, and mischief arising from a sophisticated bank theft at a TD Bank in Burlington.

The accused were found hiding in a field shortly after the theft, in close proximity to admitted perpetrators and stolen property.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence including concrete dust and drywall particles found on the accused's clothing and tools in the accused Hickey's van.

The court discharged the accused on all counts, finding that the Crown's evidence was equivocal and speculative, failing to establish the essential elements of the offences beyond what a reasonable jury properly instructed could convict upon.

Following a jury trial, three accused were convicted of robbery arising from a group robbery of two complainants in a Toronto hotel room during Caribana weekend.

The sentencing judge found that although threats of violence were made by a co‑accused not before the court, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a firearm was used or that the robbery was pre‑planned.

The court assessed the offenders’ differing personal circumstances, including one offender’s extensive criminal record and the others’ relative youth and rehabilitative prospects.

Applying principles of proportionality, parity, deterrence, and rehabilitation, the court imposed distinct sentences reflecting each offender’s background and role.

Sentences included time served and probation for one offender, a short custodial sentence consecutive to an existing federal sentence for another, and a conditional sentence with probation for the third.

Following a jury conviction for robbery, the sentencing judge was required to determine whether a firearm had been used during the offence, as the jury verdict did not resolve that factual issue.

The Crown sought a finding that a real firearm had been used, which would significantly aggravate the sentence.

The court reviewed the trial evidence, including the complainants’ testimony and identification evidence, and assessed whether the Crown had proven the aggravating fact beyond a reasonable doubt under s. 724(2) of the Criminal Code.

The judge found serious credibility concerns and extensive inconsistencies in the complainants’ accounts, as well as a flawed and tainted identification process involving surveillance images, photographs, and police communications.

In the absence of reliable corroboration, the court held that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a firearm was used in the robbery.

The accused brought a pre-trial application seeking to exclude recognition evidence from a witness who had identified him in surveillance footage and a YouTube video related to a robbery investigation.

The defence argued the witness lacked sufficient familiarity with the accused to place her in a better position than the jury to identify him and that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative.

Applying the “prior acquaintance/better position” test from governing appellate authorities, the court held that the witness had known the accused for several years through extended family connections and had seen him frequently enough to possess an advantage over jurors viewing the footage for the first time.

The absence of a specific distinguishing feature underlying her recognition went to weight rather than admissibility.

The recognition evidence was therefore admitted, subject to jury instruction.

The Crown sought a ruling permitting cross‑examination of an accused using a written statement he had provided to police if he testified at trial.

A voir dire was held to determine whether the statement was voluntary.

The accused alleged the statement was written after an officer suggested he would be in a better position if he provided it and that the officer removed the statement from him despite his attempt to withhold it until speaking with counsel.

Applying the voluntariness principles from R. v. Oickle, the court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was not obtained through an inducement or other circumstances undermining voluntariness.

The Crown’s application to rely on the statement was dismissed.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample on December 29, 2010.

The Crown alleged that a police officer made a lawful demand for a breath sample under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code, which the accused refused.

The key issues were whether the Crown must prove actual care or control of the vehicle to establish a valid demand, whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to make the demand, and whether the accused possessed the necessary mens rea to commit the offence.

The court found that following 2008 amendments to section 254(2), the officer's reasonable suspicion of care or control is sufficient, not proof of actual care or control.

The officer had reasonable suspicion based on the tow truck driver's identification and the circumstances.

The accused clearly understood the demand and intentionally refused to comply.

The accused was found guilty.

The three accused were charged with 32 armed robberies of gas stations and convenience stores.

Following their arrest after a foot pursuit, they were held for several hours before giving videotaped confessions.

The accused sought a stay of proceedings alleging police brutality, and challenged the admissibility of their statements and physical evidence seized.

The court dismissed the stay application, finding no evidence of police brutality, and upheld the lawfulness of the arrests and search warrants.

However, the court ruled the statements inadmissible because the Crown failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, largely due to the police's failure to video-record the critical 'pre-interviews' where the accused allegedly waived their right to counsel and agreed to confess.