Marco Sciarra

Following a judge-alone criminal trial arising from a volatile intimate-partner relationship, the court assessed credibility, circumstantial evidence, expert fire investigation evidence, and forensic chemistry evidence concerning an apartment fire, threats, property damage, and a secretly taken nude photograph.

The court accepted the complainant's evidence notwithstanding some inconsistencies and applied the circumstantial evidence framework to determine which inferences were reasonably available.

The Crown failed to prove the specific intent to kill required for attempted murder, but proved aggravated assault, two arson counts, one count of mischief, uttering a death threat, and voyeurism.

The accused was acquitted of attempted murder and one mischief count because colour of right raised a reasonable doubt as to the cellphone.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing death, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, impaired driving causing death, impaired driving causing bodily harm, blood alcohol over legal limit causing accident resulting in death, and blood alcohol over legal limit causing accident resulting in bodily harm.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and failed to consider relevant evidence.

The primary defence theory was that the Crown failed to prove the appellant was driving the van, suggesting the appellant and a passenger could have switched positions.

The appellate court found no misapprehension of evidence and no failure to consider relevant evidence, and dismissed the appeal.

The defendant was charged with careless driving contrary to s. 130 of the Highway Traffic Act of Ontario, arising from a motor vehicle collision that resulted in a fatality.

The defence brought an abuse of process application alleging three breaches of s. 7 Charter rights: loss of evidence (destruction of the defendant's vehicle), breach of settlement privilege (disclosure of privileged pretrial discussions to the expert witness), and late disclosure of material evidence.

The court found all three breaches established and granted a stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed his sentence of eight years imprisonment for sexually assaulting his girlfriend's daughter over a period of approximately one year beginning when the victim was 12 years old.

The appellant sought leave to appeal and argued that the sentencing judge erred by failing to adequately consider his guilty plea, rehabilitative potential, and Aboriginal background under the Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge erred in requiring a causal connection between the appellant's Aboriginal background and the offences, the sentence remained fit given the gravity of the crimes and their devastating impact on the victim.

The accused, Richard Sheridan and Chad Noureddine, facing a retrial for second-degree murder, applied for severance from each other.

Noureddine argued prejudice from Sheridan's statement, potential jury misuse, and impact on his duress defence.

Sheridan argued prejudice from edits to his statement and potential prejudicial evidence from Noureddine's duress defence.

The court dismissed both applications, affirming the presumption of joint trials for co-accused in joint criminal ventures.

The court found that limiting instructions and prior edits to Sheridan's statement sufficiently mitigated prejudice, and rejected the argument that juries would be unable to follow complex instructions or that hypothetical evidence warranted severance.

An applicant convicted of two counts of first degree murder sought reconsideration of a prior decision denying his application for appointed counsel under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant argued material changes in circumstances had occurred since the initial denial.

The court found that the applicant had demonstrated material changes, including: the inmate duty counsel program's refusal to assist; provision of previously missing financial documents to Legal Aid; and evidence addressing concerns about a property foreclosure proceeding.

The court determined both criteria under s. 684(1) were satisfied: it was desirable in the interests of justice to appoint counsel given the complexity and arguability of the appeal, and the applicant lacked sufficient financial means to retain counsel.

Counsel was appointed.

Two brothers were jointly charged with possession of cocaine, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

Following a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought committal to trial based on surveillance evidence showing hand-to-hand transactions over two days and the subsequent discovery of drugs and cash at a residence where both accused were found.

The court applied the test for committal in circumstantial cases, examining whether a reasonable jury could draw inferences of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit both accused to trial on all three counts.

The applicant, convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, applied for the appointment of state-funded counsel for his appeal under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code after being denied Legal Aid.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to meet his burden of proving a lack of financial means.

The applicant had not been transparent in disclosing his financial circumstances to Legal Aid and had allowed a property to be foreclosed upon by a friend without contesting the proceedings, raising questions about his financial affairs.

The applicants, charged with break and enter, were discharged at a preliminary inquiry, terminating their bail.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari, reviving the charges.

To address the outstanding issue of bail, the Crown sought and obtained arrest warrants for the applicants.

The applicants brought an application for a stay of proceedings, alleging the Crown's conduct in seeking the warrants was an abuse of process and breached their rights under sections 7 and 9 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the applications, finding the Crown's conduct did not meet the high threshold for abuse of process and the arrests were lawful under section 507(8) of the Criminal Code.

The appellants were acquitted of first degree murder and convicted of second degree murder.

They appealed their convictions on the basis that the trial judge erred during jury selection by unilaterally ordering the use of static triers for challenges for cause, despite the appellants' requests for rotating triers and the absence of an application under s. 640(2.1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that the improper use of static triers deprived the appellants of their statutory right to rotating triers, rendering the court improperly constituted to try them.

The curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv) could not apply.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in failing to answer a jury question regarding closing arguments.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered for second degree murder.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 15.8 months on the ground that the trial judge exceeded the Crown's position of 13 to 14 months without providing notice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the 2.8-month increase was not significant enough to require notice as a matter of fairness.

Furthermore, the sentence was fit given the appellant's multiple convictions for impaired driving, breaches of court orders, and history of domestic violence.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a suitable sample into an approved instrument following a RIDE program stop.

The Crown alleged the accused deliberately failed to provide a proper breath sample during approximately 10 attempts over 12 minutes at the police station.

The accused testified she was genuinely attempting to provide a sample.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to refuse to provide a suitable sample, as the video evidence (without audio) was not conclusive and the accused's testimony raised a reasonable doubt.

The appellant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery and robbery arising out of a home invasion and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred by failing to apply the principle of parity, ignoring mitigating factors, overemphasizing denunciation and deterrence, and placing too much weight on his youth record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and holding that the sentence was fit given the serious aggravating factors, including the appellant's use of a shotgun, his extensive record, and his lack of remorse.

The Crown charged William Pav and Dylan Violo with assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm arising from an incident on College Street in Toronto on January 13, 2013, where the defendants allegedly participated in a swarming attack on Joseph Kau.

A directed verdict was granted on the assault with a weapon charge against Violo.

The trial focused on identification evidence and was corroborated by DNA evidence linking the defendants' clothing and Pav's hands to the victim's blood.

The court found both defendants guilty of assault causing bodily harm but acquitted Pav of assault with a weapon due to insufficient evidence of weapon use.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to commit the accused to trial on charges of break and enter, possession of break-in tools, and mischief arising from a sophisticated bank theft at a TD Bank in Burlington.

The accused were found hiding in a field shortly after the theft, in close proximity to admitted perpetrators and stolen property.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence including concrete dust and drywall particles found on the accused's clothing and tools in the accused Hickey's van.

The court discharged the accused on all counts, finding that the Crown's evidence was equivocal and speculative, failing to establish the essential elements of the offences beyond what a reasonable jury properly instructed could convict upon.

Following a jury trial, three accused were convicted of robbery arising from a group robbery of two complainants in a Toronto hotel room during Caribana weekend.

The sentencing judge found that although threats of violence were made by a co‑accused not before the court, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a firearm was used or that the robbery was pre‑planned.

The court assessed the offenders’ differing personal circumstances, including one offender’s extensive criminal record and the others’ relative youth and rehabilitative prospects.

Applying principles of proportionality, parity, deterrence, and rehabilitation, the court imposed distinct sentences reflecting each offender’s background and role.

Sentences included time served and probation for one offender, a short custodial sentence consecutive to an existing federal sentence for another, and a conditional sentence with probation for the third.

Following a jury conviction for robbery, the sentencing judge was required to determine whether a firearm had been used during the offence, as the jury verdict did not resolve that factual issue.

The Crown sought a finding that a real firearm had been used, which would significantly aggravate the sentence.

The court reviewed the trial evidence, including the complainants’ testimony and identification evidence, and assessed whether the Crown had proven the aggravating fact beyond a reasonable doubt under s. 724(2) of the Criminal Code.

The judge found serious credibility concerns and extensive inconsistencies in the complainants’ accounts, as well as a flawed and tainted identification process involving surveillance images, photographs, and police communications.

In the absence of reliable corroboration, the court held that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a firearm was used in the robbery.

The accused brought a pre-trial application seeking to exclude recognition evidence from a witness who had identified him in surveillance footage and a YouTube video related to a robbery investigation.

The defence argued the witness lacked sufficient familiarity with the accused to place her in a better position than the jury to identify him and that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative.

Applying the “prior acquaintance/better position” test from governing appellate authorities, the court held that the witness had known the accused for several years through extended family connections and had seen him frequently enough to possess an advantage over jurors viewing the footage for the first time.

The absence of a specific distinguishing feature underlying her recognition went to weight rather than admissibility.

The recognition evidence was therefore admitted, subject to jury instruction.

The Crown sought a ruling permitting cross‑examination of an accused using a written statement he had provided to police if he testified at trial.

A voir dire was held to determine whether the statement was voluntary.

The accused alleged the statement was written after an officer suggested he would be in a better position if he provided it and that the officer removed the statement from him despite his attempt to withhold it until speaking with counsel.

Applying the voluntariness principles from R. v. Oickle, the court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was not obtained through an inducement or other circumstances undermining voluntariness.

The Crown’s application to rely on the statement was dismissed.

The applicant, convicted of first degree murder of a police officer and attempted murder of another, sought permission under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code to have a jury consider reducing his 25‑year parole ineligibility period.

At the pre‑screening stage under s. 745.61, the court had to determine whether there was a substantial likelihood that the application would succeed.

The judge reviewed the statutory criteria in s. 745.63, including the applicant’s character, institutional conduct, the nature of the offence, victim impact, and other relevant factors such as remorse and a deportation order.

Although the applicant demonstrated some institutional progress, the court found significant concerns regarding the genuineness of his rehabilitation and emphasized the extreme seriousness of the offence.

The judge concluded that the record did not establish a substantial likelihood that a jury would reduce the parole ineligibility period.