Marcela Ahumada

The appellant challenged his jury conviction for sexual assault offences and a five-year penitentiary sentence, arguing the jury charge on motive was unbalanced and the sentencing judge improperly treated lack of insight or remorse as aggravating.

The court held the charge, read functionally and as a whole, accurately and sufficiently instructed the jury, including on motive to fabricate and motive to offend, and any imperfections did not create legal error.

On sentence, the court found no error in principle affecting fitness and no improper reliance on lack of remorse.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, leave to appeal sentence was granted, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellants challenged a criminal appeal judgment from the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard the appeal and delivered an oral ruling the same day.

The Court held that the appeal should be dismissed, substantially for the reasons of the majority below.

The intervener participated, but the dispositive issue was resolved by adopting the appellate majority's reasoning.

The appellant challenged a criminal appeal decision from the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court heard the appeal and delivered an oral judgment the same day.

It held that the appeal should be dismissed substantially for the reasons of the majority in the provincial appellate court.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, David Case and Celine Loyer, appealed their convictions for sexual assault, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable due to the complainant's "flashback" memory being unreliable.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's memory and the confirmatory evidence to be reasonable and not fundamentally flawed.

The dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial judge's reasoning regarding the reliability of the "sleeping flashback" was circular and illogical, and that the confirmatory evidence was overstated.

Both sentence appeals regarding a no-contact condition were also dismissed.

The appellant, Adam West, appealed his convictions for possession of child pornography and internet luring.

The appeal focused on the mens rea requirement for these offences, specifically whether recklessness as to the complainant's age was sufficient or if actual knowledge or wilful blindness was required.

The Court of Appeal, relying on its prior decision in R. v. Fox, affirmed that recklessness suffices for internet luring.

For the possession charge, the court found that the trial judge's findings of fact clearly established wilful blindness on the part of the appellant regarding the complainant's age, which is legally equivalent to actual knowledge.

The appeal was dismissed.

This decision addresses Ali Baek's Charter application to exclude evidence (10 kg of cocaine) seized from his residence, alleging breaches of his section 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

The court conducted a Garofoli review of the warrants and orders, finding that the initial tracking warrant and production orders were issued without reasonable grounds due to erroneous, speculative, and misleading information provided by the police.

The police conduct was characterized as serious, involving reckless disregard for Charter rights and a failure of full and frank disclosure.

Applying the Grant factors, the court determined that the seriousness of the police misconduct and the significant impact on Baek's privacy interests outweighed society's interest in admitting the evidence, leading to its exclusion.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges including sexual assault and robbery.

The trial judge had found reasonable doubt due to credibility issues with both the complainant and the respondent.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by relying on stereotypical reasoning about how a sexual assault victim should behave and by failing to properly consider confirmatory evidence.

These errors materially affected the assessment of the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was acquitted of second degree murder and manslaughter at trial by judge alone after applying a chokehold to the deceased, who lost consciousness and died.

The trial judge found the Crown had not established the requisite subjective mens rea for murder, and that self-defence applied to the lesser included offence of manslaughter.

The Nunavut Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding errors of law in the trial judge's analysis of mens rea for murder and application of self-defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the further appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the Crown's right to appeal an acquittal under s. 676(1)(a) of the Criminal Code is limited to questions of law alone, that the Court of Appeal failed to precisely identify any such error, and that there is no legal rule that a chokehold is always an inherently dangerous act requiring specific findings on mens rea.

The trial judge's self-defence analysis correctly applied an objective standard under each element of s. 34 of the Criminal Code.

The defendant, Gianmarco Di Luciano, was charged with refusal to provide a breath sample causing bodily harm following a motor vehicle collision.

The court, in a judge-alone trial, considered the requisite mens rea for refusal offences under s. 320.15(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that Parliament's 2018 amendment clarified the mens rea to be knowledge that a demand has been made.

The defendant was found to have known a demand was made and refused to comply, thus satisfying the mens rea for refusal simpliciter.

However, the court acquitted the defendant of the aggravated offence of refusal causing bodily harm, finding that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew or was reckless as to whether the collision resulted in bodily harm, as the risk of injury did not rise above mere speculation given the information available to him at the time of refusal.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his conviction for breach of trust and his 18-month conditional sentence.

He had been acquitted of sexual assault involving the same complainant.

The appeal challenged the conviction on grounds of insufficient reasons, unreasonable verdict, and inconsistent verdicts, and the sentence on grounds of erroneous "double counting" of aggravating factors and insufficient reasons for rejecting a suspended sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, the verdict reasonable and reconcilable, and the sentence appropriate.

This is a costs endorsement following a motion by Zurich Insurance Company Ltd. for the production of a Crown Disclosure Brief from the defendants Vasos Georgiou and John Aquino.

The original motion was adjourned sine die after the Attorney General provided key undertakings.

The parties agreed on the quantum of costs ($20,000) but not on entitlement.

The court, exercising its discretion under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57, decided that no costs should be awarded to any party.

The decision considered the novelty of the issues, the timing of the Attorney General's undertakings, and the fact that the outcome was not primarily based on the arguments presented by the defendants seeking costs.

The offenders, a police officer and an employee of the Public Guardian and Trustee, were convicted by a jury of defrauding an estate of over $830,000 using a forged will.

The employee was also convicted of breach of trust by a public official.

The court found numerous aggravating factors, including the complexity and duration of the fraud, the significant impact on the victim, and the offenders' abuse of their positions of public trust.

Both offenders were sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment.

The court also issued restitution and forfeiture orders for the full amount of the fraud.

The plaintiff in a civil rescission action sought an order compelling the defendants to produce the Crown disclosure brief they received in related criminal proceedings concerning the same alleged fraud in a hospital procurement process.

The Attorney General opposed immediate production, arguing it could taint witnesses before they testified in the criminal trial.

The court balanced the interests under the Wagg framework and adjourned the motion sine die, accepting the Attorney General's undertaking to conduct a Wagg review and produce the documents within eight weeks after a verdict in the criminal proceedings.

The defendant, Robert Konashewych, brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his s. 7 rights (solicitor-client privilege) and s. 8 rights (unreasonable search and seizure) by police.

The alleged breaches arose from police taking possession of a presumptively privileged letter and other documents provided by his former spouse.

The court found a s. 7 breach due to police inaction regarding the privileged document but determined it did not warrant a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) as the consequences were minor and did not impact trial fairness.

The court also found no s. 8 breach, as the documents were voluntarily provided by a private citizen, not obtained through state search or seizure.

The application for a stay was dismissed, but the privileged letter was ruled inadmissible unless privilege was waived.

The defence sought to exclude specific evidence related to the accused's infidelity and attempts to conceal it, arguing its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value in a circumstantial evidence case involving alleged will forgery.

The Crown contended this evidence was crucial to demonstrate the accused's motive and actions to prevent discovery of the alleged fraud.

The court dismissed the defence's application, finding the evidence highly relevant to the Crown's theory and that any prejudicial effect could be adequately mitigated by proper jury instructions.

This ruling concerns a Crown application under s. 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code for the complainant in a sexual assault trial to provide evidence via closed-circuit TV (CCTV).

The complainant, SS, an 18-year-old, expressed fear of testifying in the courtroom with the accused (M.Z.) due to anxiety and past anxiety attacks, believing it would inhibit her ability to provide a full and candid account.

The court found that credible hearsay evidence from a VWAP caseworker was admissible for this procedural motion.

Applying the "facilitate" standard, which is less stringent than "necessary," and considering factors like the nature of the offence (sexual assault), the relationship between the witness and accused (position of trust), and society's interest in encouraging reporting, the court granted the application for CCTV testimony.

The defendant, L.R., faced two charges of sexual assault.

The first count involved sexual intercourse where the complainant alleged intoxication and lack of consent, while the defendant asserted consent.

The second count involved an alleged attempt to force oral sex.

The court analyzed the complainant's capacity to consent, considering her alcohol tolerance, a pre-existing sleep disorder, and video evidence.

The court found the complainant had the capacity to consent and did, in fact, consent to the sexual activity in the first count.

The court also found the second allegation highly improbable.

Consequently, both charges were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and aggravated assault, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge improperly inferred guilt from disbelief of his testimony and that the robbery conviction was unreasonable, contending the theft was complete before the violence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reasoning regarding the rejection of testimony or the continuous transaction for robbery.

The court also found the custodial sentence imposed was fit.

The offender, an off-duty police officer, was convicted of assault for striking a young Black man in the face with a metal pipe while the victim was injured and seeking help.

The court emphasized the need for denunciation and general deterrence, noting the breach of public trust and the racialized context of the offence.

The offender was sentenced to 9 months in jail, followed by 12 months of probation, along with DNA, weapons prohibition, and non-communication orders.

Prior to the offender's sentencing, the Crown sought to file a community impact statement from the Black Action Defence Committee.

The defence objected to portions of the statement, arguing they exceeded the permissible scope under section 722.2 of the Criminal Code, and sought redactions.

The court held that while much of the statement provided necessary context regarding the impact of the offence on the Black community, two specific portions were irrelevant or inflammatory and required redaction.

The court otherwise declined to redact the statement, noting it would disregard any impermissible content.