Louise A. Botham

The accused was charged with over .08 and impaired operation following a motor vehicle collision.

The defence sought to exclude breath test results on the grounds that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds to make the breath demand and that the officer breached the accused's Charter rights by delaying the provision of rights to counsel.

The court found that the nature of the accident combined with evidence of alcohol consumption provided an objective basis for the breath demand.

The court also found that a five-minute delay in providing rights to counsel did not constitute a breach of s. 10(b) rights.

The application for Charter relief was dismissed and the breath tests were admitted as evidence.

The accused was charged with over 80 (impaired driving).

He brought a motion to stay proceedings on the grounds that his right to be tried within a constitutionally tolerable time under section 11(b) of the Charter had been breached.

The matter was arrested on July 2, 2015, with trial initially scheduled for June 16, 2016, but rescheduled to May 15, 2017 due to the defence's decision to call expert evidence regarding the approved instrument.

The total delay was 22 months and 10 days.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan and found that even after deducting periods of defence delay, the total time to trial exceeded the presumptive 18-month ceiling.

The court determined that the rescheduling was not caused solely by defence conduct and that the Crown's delayed disclosure of maintenance records contributed to the delay.

The court found a breach of section 11(b) and stayed the proceedings.

The applicant brought a motion to stay proceedings on the grounds that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms had been breached.

The applicant was arrested for impaired driving (over 80) in November 2014, with the Information sworn in December 2014.

A trial date was initially set for December 9, 2015, but was adjourned due to late disclosure issues.

The trial ultimately proceeded on June 22-23, 2016, with the 11(b) application heard on July 18, 2016.

The court applied the new framework established in R. v. Jordan and found that the total delay of 19 months and 24 days exceeded the presumptive 18-month ceiling for provincial court trials.

The court found no exceptional circumstances to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness and granted the stay of proceedings.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving (over 80).

The Crown sought to rely on breath test results taken more than two hours after driving to establish the defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of driving.

The court found that the police breached the defendant's Charter rights by failing to comply with the "as soon as practicable" requirement under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was arrested at 3:57 a.m., the breath demand was made at 3:59 a.m., but the breath samples were not taken until 6:14 a.m. and 6:31 a.m., resulting in a 90-minute unexplained delay.

The court excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was charged with possession of marijuana following a search of his vehicle.

The search was initially conducted under section 32(5) of the Ontario Liquor Licence Act after the officer observed open alcohol in the vehicle.

The officer subsequently searched the trunk and opened a shopping bag containing approximately 100 grams of marijuana.

The court found that while the initial search was lawful, the search of the shopping bag exceeded the lawful scope of the search power under the Liquor Licence Act.

Applying the three-factor test from R. v. Grant, the court excluded the evidence of the marijuana, finding that the seriousness of the Charter-infringing conduct, the significant impact on the accused's privacy interests, and the credibility concerns regarding the officer's testimony outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The accused was charged with procuring a person to become a prostitute, exercising control over a prostitute, living on the avails of prostitution, and extortion.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of the complainant, a young woman from Poland who came to Canada and engaged in sex work.

The accused testified that he provided logistical assistance to the complainant at her request, including renting hotel rooms and posting advertisements, but denied procuring her into prostitution, exercising control over her, or threatening her.

The court found significant credibility issues with the complainant's testimony, including material contradictions with her grandfather's evidence and inconsistencies regarding her knowledge of certain premises.

The court acquitted the accused on all counts, finding that the Crown had failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.