Sexual assault

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault arising from an incident on January 31, 2016, where he met the complainant in a bar and took her to his parents' apartment.

The complainant testified that after consensual kissing, she expressed that she did not want to have sex, but the appellant proceeded with non-consensual vaginal intercourse and anal contact.

The appellant testified that the intercourse was consensual and denied anal contact.

The trial judge convicted the appellant based on acceptance of the complainant's credibility and rejection of the appellant's evidence.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: insufficiency of reasons, improper use of prior consistent statements, and uneven scrutiny of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds and upheld the conviction.

A youthful first offender appealed a sentence of seven and one-half years (reduced from ten years on account of pre-sentence custody) imposed for incest, sexual assault, and making, possessing and distributing child pornography involving his four-year-old daughter.

The appellant sought a reduction to four and one-half years and sought to set aside the victim surcharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits but allowed it in part by setting aside the victim surcharge under R. v. Boudreault.

The appellant was convicted of invitation to sexual touching, sexual assault, and sexual interference involving his step-son, with allegations occurring when the complainant was between 8 and 13 years old.

He was acquitted of assault.

The appellant appealed on five grounds: inconsistent verdicts, admissibility of his videotaped statement to police, jury instructions on credibility across counts, jury instructions on consent, and jury instructions on prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the verdicts reconcilable, the admission of evidence proper under s. 653.1 of the Criminal Code, and the jury instructions adequate and not prejudicial.

The appellant appealed his indeterminate sentence as a dangerous offender, arguing that the sentencing judge erred by rejecting a joint sentencing submission for a determinate sentence followed by a long-term supervision order.

The appellant had pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting four children in 2004 and received a determinate sentence.

While on probation, he sexually assaulted two of his own children and breached a prohibition order.

The sentencing judge imposed an indeterminate sentence based on psychiatric evidence that the appellant's pedophilia could not be managed in the community and that he posed a danger to children.

The Court of Appeal upheld the indeterminate sentence, finding that the sentencing judge properly applied the legal test and that the evidence supported the conclusion that the appellant could not be managed in the community.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break and enter and sexual assault of a police officer, as well as his sentence of time served.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to address the appellant's apparent intoxication in the context of the specific intent offence of break and enter.

Both counsel agreed to substitute a conviction for forcible entry contrary to s. 72(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant's conviction for sexual assault was upheld as the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and credibility.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The victim fine surcharge was set aside on consent.

The applicant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to six months' imprisonment followed by eighteen months' probation.

He appealed his conviction on grounds including misapplication of the law concerning reasonable steps in ascertaining consent and insufficient reasons for judgment.

The motion judge found the appeal was not frivolous and granted bail pending appeal, noting the short sentence made the appeal vulnerable to becoming moot.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault entered by a trial judge sitting without a jury.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge erred in law by considering both parties' failure to climax as part of his credibility assessment; and second, that the trial judge failed to consider potential collusion between the complainant's family members who testified.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's assessment of the evidence against common sense understanding of human behaviour was not an error, and that collusion was neither alleged at trial nor had any air of reality.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and forcible confinement entered after a jury trial.

The appellant challenged the admissibility of evidence of a prior conviction for sexual assault as part of similar fact evidence, and also challenged the trial judge's instruction to the jury regarding the use of such evidence on the issue of consent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the prior conviction was properly admitted as part of a package of similar fact evidence and that the trial judge's charge to the jury was adequate.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, incest, and breach of probation.

The victim was his teenage daughter, from whom he had been estranged for many years before reconnecting in 2010.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility assessments and claimed the trial judge applied inconsistent standards of scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding the trial judge's conclusions were entitled to deference and were supported by ample evidence.

The appeal was dismissed, as was the abandoned sentence appeal.

The accused, an unlicensed massage therapist, was convicted of sexual assault after touching the victim's breasts and vaginal area during a massage at a wellness clinic.

The victim believed the accused was a registered massage therapist based on the clinic's website.

The Crown sought 15 months imprisonment; the defence sought a 9-month conditional sentence.

The court imposed a 6-month custodial sentence followed by 12 months probation, finding that denunciation and specific deterrence were the primary sentencing objectives.

The court rejected a conditional sentence due to the breach of trust, the victim's vulnerability, the non-momentary nature of the assault, and the accused's lack of remorse or acceptance of responsibility.

The court ruled on the admissibility of hearsay statements and conduct of a toddler (30-33 months old) as related by her mother in a trial for sexual assault and sexual interference.

The accused was charged with committing these offences against his daughter over a 98-day period.

The Crown sought to admit the child's statements and conduct under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, relying on the Khan framework.

The court found the evidence necessary and reliable, admitting it for trial.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to Section 271 of the Criminal Code.

The complainant, a 17-year-old Aboriginal woman, was hitchhiking when the accused picked her up and brought her to a house.

After providing her with alcohol, the accused kissed the complainant without her consent while she was attempting to leave.

The court found the Crown proved the case beyond a reasonable doubt, rejecting the accused's claim that the kiss was consensual and finding that the complainant's conduct demonstrated fear and lack of consent.

A young person was charged with invitation to sexual touching, sexual assault, and failing to comply with a youth court sentence.

The Crown's case rested on eyewitness testimony from a six-year-old witness and DNA evidence showing the alleged victim's saliva on the accused's underwear.

The accused testified that the DNA presence was explained by his use of a bloody tissue to clean himself after the alleged victim injured himself.

The court found the eyewitness credible and rejected the accused's explanation as illogical and contradicted by forensic evidence.

The court found the accused guilty on all three counts.

The offender was convicted of three counts of sexual assault against a vulnerable employee with a learning disability at his workplace.

The offender, aged 60 at the time of the offences, sexually assaulted the victim on a single day in December 2011.

The victim, who functioned at the level of a 12 or 13-year-old and had been placed with the offender through a supported employment program, suffered significant trauma.

The offender demonstrated no insight into his conduct, claiming curiosity and believing the victim was consenting.

The court imposed a 90-day concurrent jail sentence (to be served intermittently if requested), 2-year probation with strict conditions including no contact and counselling requirements, a 10-year SOIRA order, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and ordered a DNA sample.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference with a person under 16 years, and invitation to sexual touching involving a person under 16 years, contrary to sections 271, 151, and 252 of the Criminal Code.

The complainant, a 15-year-old girl, testified that the accused sexually assaulted her while she was in her pajamas at her mother's residence.

The court admitted similar fact evidence regarding two prior sexual assault convictions involving the accused's step-children, finding striking similarities in the context and circumstances.

Despite inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony that raised concerns about reliability, the similar fact evidence corroborated her account and established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found guilty on all three counts.

The Crown applied for a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate detention for the accused following guilty pleas to sexual assault causing bodily harm, choking with intent to commit an indictable offence, being masked with intent to commit an indictable offence, and unlawful confinement.

The accused had committed multiple serious sexual assaults against young women in Quebec and Ontario, as well as an attempted sexual assault in Florida.

The court found that the accused met the dangerous offender criteria under s.753 of the Criminal Code and that there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control of his risk in the community.

The court rejected the defence position that a long-term offender designation with a definite sentence followed by a long-term supervision order would be adequate, finding that the accused's personality disorder combined with sexual deviance, his lack of genuine insight into his problems, and his ambivalence toward treatment rendered community-based management insufficient to protect public safety.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against his daughter between September 2007 and June 2008.

The Crown proceeded summarily with the accused's consent and waiver of limitation periods.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his right to trial within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The total delay from charge to anticipated conclusion of trial was approximately 18 months and 19 days.

After deducting neutral intake time and inherent time requirements, the court determined institutional delay of 12 months, which exceeded but only slightly the 8-10 month guideline established in R. v. Morin.

The court found minimal actual prejudice to the accused, balanced against society's strong interest in having serious sexual assault charges decided on their merits.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused was charged with sexual assault against a college student intern.

After the conclusion of testimony, the defence sought to reopen the trial to introduce fresh evidence from a former college instructor regarding an alleged assault allegation the complainant had made against the instructor approximately three months prior to the incident at issue.

The defence argued this evidence was relevant to the complainant's credibility and motive to fabricate.

The court dismissed the application, finding the proposed evidence was irrelevant and collateral to the main issue, and that allowing it would interfere with the orderly conduct of the trial.

A youth was tried for sexual assault of a young child occurring between 1994 and 1996.

The complainant, who was four or five years old at the time, testified that the accused forced her to perform fellatio on multiple occasions in the basement of their family home.

The accused denied all allegations.

The court found the complainant to be truthful but harbored significant concerns about the reliability of her recollection given the passage of time, her very young age at the time of the incidents, inconsistencies in her account, and the vagueness of certain details.

The court acquitted the accused, finding that while abuse may have occurred, the evidence did not meet the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was charged with three offences against his wife: assault (July 1-31, 2008), assault causing bodily harm (August 18, 2008), and sexual assault (September-December 2008).

The trial was a credibility contest between the complainant and the defendant.

The complainant testified that the defendant assaulted her after discovering her long-standing extramarital affair, and later forced her to have non-consensual anal sex.

The defendant denied all allegations, claiming the complainant fell down stairs and that any sexual contact was consensual.

The court found the complainant credible and the defendant's evidence internally and externally inconsistent.

The defendant was convicted on all three counts.