Publication ban

The court dismissed an application by Alain Bellefeuille for a temporary publication ban regarding information related to a Special Investigations Unit (SIU) investigation.

Bellefeuille, charged with first degree murder and attempted murder, argued that publication of the SIU report could prejudice his right to a fair trial.

The court found the risk to trial fairness was speculative and could be mitigated by jury selection and instructions.

The open court principle and freedom of expression outweighed any potential benefit of a publication ban.

The defendant, Ranjit Singh, was charged with eight counts including assault, forcible confinement, and sexual assault against the complainant, S.K. The prosecution proceeded by indictment, and the defendant elected a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainant's testimony, considering circumstantial evidence and the absence of forensic evidence.

The court found the complainant's testimony to be entirely credible, plausible, and unshaken by cross-examination, rejecting the defendant's theories of fabrication.

The defendant was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all eight counts.

The appellant, Sean Hirnam, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, raising three grounds: uneven scrutiny of evidence by the trial judge, erroneous reliance on a prior case (R. v. J.J.R.D.), and error in applying the test for communicated consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence, including the appellant's exaggerated injury and the complainant's minor inconsistencies.

The court also found that the trial judge's reference to R. v. J.J.R.D. was a passing one and not material, and that her finding of no communicated consent, based on the ambiguity of the complainant's conduct, was a call within her discretion and not subject to interference on appeal.

This is an appeal from a sexual assault conviction.

The appellant challenged the verdict, arguing the trial judge misapprehended DNA evidence, leading to an unreasonable verdict.

The complainant had no memory due to extreme intoxication.

DNA tests revealed the appellant could not be excluded as the source of DNA found on the complainant's breast, external genitalia, and vagina.

While the trial judge accepted non-sexual transfer for some DNA, she rejected the submission that there was a rational basis to explain the DNA found inside the complainant’s vagina other than direct contact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's conclusion regarding the DNA evidence and affirming the reasonableness of the verdict.

A sentence appeal was also dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing consent and credibility.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge's credibility assessment was intelligible, coherent, and based on the totality of the evidence, particularly the implausibility of the appellant's account and the plausibility of the complainant's testimony and physical state.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings.

This is an appeal from convictions for receiving a material benefit, procuring, and advertising under the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by seeking positive evidence to support the defence theory.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the trial judge's reasons contextually and found that the judge understood and correctly applied the burden of proof, accepting the complainant's evidence which supported the elements of each offence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, R.G., was charged with sexual assault with a weapon and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose against his spouse.

The trial judge found the complainant's evidence to be credible despite defence arguments regarding her memory issues stemming from a traumatic brain injury.

The defence's attempt to establish a motive to fabricate on the complainant's part, involving an alleged paramour, was rejected as contrived and self-serving.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, emphasizing that the Crown's evidence was clear, powerful, and compelling.

A pre-sentence report was ordered, and uncharged sexual assault allegations were noted as potential aggravating factors for sentencing.

The appellant, H.P., appealed his sexual assault conviction, raising three grounds: whether his s. 276 voir dire testimony was compelled and improperly used against him contrary to s. 13 of the Charter; whether the cross-examination on the voir dire was overly broad; and whether the trial judge erred in finding corroboration of the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that s. 276 voir dire evidence is not compelled, the cross-examination was not unfair given the scope of the affidavits, and the trial judge's assessment of corroborative evidence was reasonable and entitled to deference.

The appellant, J.A., appealed his convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in admitting the appellant's police statement as voluntary evidence.

The appellant contended that the trial judge, after finding an inducement, failed to adequately consider all oppressive circumstances in determining if his will was overborne.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge correctly applied the legal test for voluntariness and considered all relevant circumstances, and that the finding of voluntariness was entitled to significant appellate deference.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault, appealed his sentence of three years, six months' imprisonment.

He argued the trial judge erred in failing to give effect to mitigating factors, failing to apply the principle of restraint, and failing to give proper credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first two grounds, finding the sentence fit given the gravity of the offence.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part on the third ground, increasing the pre-sentence custody credit.

This endorsement addresses the sole remaining issue in a family law trial: whether to impose a publication ban and a sealing order on the court file, and whether to dispense with notice to the media.

The underlying proceeding was a motion to change brought by the father, involving allegations of sexual abuse against the children by a third party.

The court applied the three-prerequisite test from Sherman Estate v. Donovan to the open court principle, finding that court openness posed a serious risk to the children's privacy and dignity due to the sensitive nature of the sexual abuse details.

The court concluded that a sealing order and publication ban were necessary and proportionate, outweighing the negative effects on the open court principle.

The court also exercised its discretion to dispense with the requirement to provide notice to the media, emphasizing the children's best interests.

The appellant, S.R., appealed convictions for sexual assault, touching for a sexual purpose, and invitation to touching for a sexual purpose.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's assessment of the appellant's credibility, specifically alleging material misapprehensions of evidence and a failure to properly assess the evidence of another witness (the complainant's father).

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's misapprehensions of the appellant's evidence were substantial and central to the credibility assessment, leading to a miscarriage of justice.

The court also noted an error in failing to assess the credibility of the complainant's father's evidence, which contradicted the complainant's testimony in some respects and supported the appellant's.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

This is a sentencing decision for a young offender, Q.M., who pleaded guilty to sexual interference contrary to s. 151 of the Criminal Code.

The court considered the paramount sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence for child sexual offences, as mandated by s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code, while also balancing rehabilitation and restraint given the offender's youth and first-offender status.

The court reviewed the factual background, victim impact statement, and offender's background, including psychiatric assessments suggesting pedophilic disorder and a low to moderate risk of recidivism.

Despite the seriousness of the offence, the court imposed a 9-month custodial sentence, followed by 3 years of probation, along with various ancillary orders, finding it to be a proportionate sentence given the significant mitigating factors, including the guilty plea and willingness to engage in therapy.

This appeal concerned the applicability of the third-party records regime under sections 278.1-278.9 of the Criminal Code to a former police officer's anticipated testimony and a draft statement of claim in a criminal trial.

The appellants, J.R. (the former officer) and Toronto Police Service, sought to overturn a subpoena requiring J.R. to testify and to prevent the use of the draft statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower courts' findings that the third-party records regime did not apply to oral statements made by J.R. and, in the specific circumstances, did not apply to the draft statement of claim.

Furthermore, even if the regime applied to the draft statement, its production was deemed necessary in the interests of justice.

The appeal was dismissed, and an interim stay was set aside, making the lower court's unsealing and set aside orders effective.

This criminal trial concerned a single count of sexual assault against the defendant, a tutor, involving a 14-year-old complainant.

The alleged incident occurred in the complainant's basement during a tutoring session.

The court applied the principles from R. v. W.D. to assess the evidence, including the defendant's exculpatory statements to police.

The judge found that while physical contact likely occurred, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the touching was intentional and of a sexual nature.

The court rejected the Crown's reliance on prior interactions and propensity reasoning based on the complainant's clothing.

The defendant was acquitted.

The appellant, R.C., appealed convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, incest, and assault.

The primary issues on appeal were whether the trial judge's oral reasons for conviction were sufficient, and whether subsequently released "edited reasons" could be considered.

The Court of Appeal held that the edited reasons, released nearly two years after the oral reasons and after the appeal had commenced, could not be relied upon due to their substantive changes.

The court then assessed the sufficiency of the original oral reasons, finding that the trial judge adequately addressed material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and properly applied credibility principles, including those from R. v. W.(D.).

The appeal was dismissed, affirming the convictions.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision that largely struck out his pleadings for fraudulent misrepresentation, intentional infliction of mental distress, and negligent infliction of mental distress, and transferred his unjust enrichment claim to Family Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusions that the claims lacked reasonable cause of action, that no duty of care existed for negligent infliction of mental distress, and that the unjust enrichment claim was properly transferred.

The costs award on a substantial indemnity basis was also upheld.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault and failure to comply with probation.

The complainant alleged non-consensual sexual activity, while the defendant claimed consent or an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The court assessed the credibility of the complainant, who presented as highly excitable and inconsistent, and other witnesses whose testimony was found unreliable or influenced.

The court noted ambiguities in the evidence, including text messages that did not explicitly accuse sexual impropriety.

Given the inconsistencies and the complainant's demeanor, the court found that the Crown had not proven the sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt, and it was a reasonable possibility that the defendant had an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

Consequently, both charges were dismissed.

T.N. was found guilty of sexual assault.

The Crown sought 3-5 years incarceration, while the defence sought 9 months incarceration followed by 2 years probation.

The court considered sentencing principles, aggravating factors (breach of trust, psychological impact on victim, manipulation), and mitigating factors (no criminal record, youth, good character, employment history).

The judge emphasized individualization of sentence over strict adherence to ranges, noting the devastating impact on the victim and the offender's good rehabilitation prospects despite denial of guilt.

T.N. was sentenced to 1 year imprisonment, followed by 3 years probation with conditions, DNA order, 20-year SOIRA registration, and 10-year weapons prohibition.

The appellant, G.W., appealed convictions for multiple sexual offences, arguing that his work schedule and other commitments precluded him from being alone with the child victims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's rejection of this defence, noting that the trial judge had found the appellant's credibility undermined by his attempts to minimize opportunities and that ample opportunity for the offences existed.

The appellate court found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's factual findings, which were thoroughly grounded in the evidence and owed deference.

The appeal was dismissed.