Privacy

The appellant media organisation challenged a publication ban issued by the Manitoba Court of Appeal over an affidavit filed in wrongful conviction proceedings.

The affidavit concerned the death of a witness and contained highly sensitive personal information about the witness's spouse.

Applying the three-branch test from Sherman Estate v. Donovan, 2021 SCC 25, the Court held that court openness posed a serious risk to the spouse's dignity as an important public interest, the ban was necessary and not overbroad, and the benefits of the ban significantly outweighed its minimal effect on free expression and the open court principle.

The affidavit was not admitted as evidence and played no role in determining that a wrongful conviction had occurred.

The Crown appealed the Court of Appeal for British Columbia's decision setting aside voyeurism convictions and ordering a new trial.

The accused, a hockey coach, had surreptitiously photographed two adolescent boys aged 12 to 14 in their underwear in hockey arena dressing rooms.

The central issue was whether s. 162(1)(a) of the Criminal Code contains an implicit temporal component requiring the Crown to prove that nudity was reasonably expected at the specific time the photos were taken.

The Supreme Court held, through a textual, contextual, and purposive analysis, that s. 162(1)(a) has no implicit temporal component; dressing rooms qualify as protected 'safe places' regardless of whether nudity is expected at the precise moment of observation or recording.

The Court restored the convictions, and declined to address the respondent's constitutional overbreadth argument raised for the first time on appeal.

The estates of a prominent couple who were found dead in unexplained circumstances sought sealing orders over probate files to protect the privacy and physical safety of beneficiaries and trustees.

The application judge granted the sealing orders, finding the privacy and safety interests outweighed the open court principle, but the Court of Appeal unanimously set them aside.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellants failed to establish a serious risk to an important public interest.

The Court clarified that privacy can constitute an important public interest for purposes of the Sierra Club test only insofar as it protects dignity — that is, information so sensitive it strikes at the biographical core of an individual — and found the probate file contents did not meet that standard.

The Court also held that the alleged risk of physical harm to beneficiaries and trustees was speculative rather than a proper inference from the record.

The respondent father brought a Form 14B motion seeking production orders from non-parties, including police, paramedics, Brantford Family and Children's Services, and various hospitals, for records relating to the applicant mother's substance abuse, physical health, mental health, and fitness to parent.

The applicant cross-moved to amend the application and to schedule a settlement conference.

The court dismissed the respondent's motion for production, finding that the requests were overly broad, speculative, and not sufficiently connected to the issues in the case.

The court granted the applicant's request to amend her pleadings and scheduled a settlement conference in place of the scheduled focused hearing.

Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC) sought certiorari to quash a Youth Court decision that denied TCHC access to a young person's (R.V.) criminal justice records.

TCHC intended to use these records to commence eviction proceedings against R.V. and his family at the Landlord and Tenant Board on grounds of "illegality" and "community safety." The Youth Court had denied access, prioritizing R.V.'s privacy, rehabilitation, and reintegration under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

By the time the certiorari application reached the Superior Court, R.V. had withdrawn from the proceedings, and TCHC had decided not to pursue eviction, rendering the matter moot.

The Superior Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot application, finding no persisting adversarial context, no significant public interest that would justify hearing a hypothetical case, and that the issue of "desirable in the interest of the proper administration of justice" under s.119 of the YCJA was fact-driven and best left to the Youth Court's expertise.

The accused brought a third-party records application under the O'Connor regime seeking production of medical records and clinical notes from the complainant's psychiatrist relating to her mental health treatment.

The accused argued the records were necessary to establish that the complainant suffered from psychotic episodes that could affect her credibility and reliability as a witness.

The court dismissed the application at the first stage, finding the accused failed to establish "likely relevance" and that the application relied on speculative, discriminatory, and stereotypical reasoning linking mental illness to testimonial unreliability without case-specific evidence.

The defendant challenged a telewarrant used to search his residence, alleging a Section 8 Charter violation due to an incorrect address on the warrant and a missing appendix.

The court found the warrant facially invalid due to the address error, constituting a Section 8 breach.

However, applying the R. v. Grant test, the court declined to exclude the seized evidence under Section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the police acted in good faith and the evidence was reliable and critical to the Crown's case.

The sub-facial attack on the warrant was rejected, and a judicial summary of redacted ITO portions was deemed adequate.

The appellant appealed an order sealing court files relating to the estates of Bernard and Honey Sherman, who were murdered in December 2017.

The motion judge had granted sealing orders ex parte, citing the need to protect the privacy and dignity of the victims and their loved ones, as well as concerns about the personal safety of estate beneficiaries and administrators.

The Court of Appeal set aside the sealing orders, finding that the respondents failed to meet the necessity threshold required for sealing orders.

The court held that personal privacy concerns alone cannot justify sealing, and that the evidence of risk to beneficiaries and administrators was speculative rather than based on concrete facts.

Dr. George Otto, charged with fentanyl trafficking, brought a pre-trial motion challenging the constitutionality of Criminal Code provisions (ss. 492.2 and 487.016) authorizing the seizure/production of prospective and historical transmission data.

The core issue was whether the "reasonable suspicion" standard for judicial authorization met the requirements of s. 8 of the Charter.

The court concluded that the "reasonable suspicion" standard was sufficient, finding the data obtained in this case to be minimally intrusive and not revealing core biographical information.

The motion seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality was dismissed.

The defendants, correctional officers, sought summary judgment to dismiss an action by the plaintiffs for intrusion upon seclusion and intentional/negligent infliction of emotional/economic harm.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants unlawfully accessed and disseminated confidential information about one plaintiff's criminal convictions, leading to family law disputes and public shaming.

The court dismissed the action, finding no genuine issue for trial, as the information accessed was publicly available, the defendants' actions were not "highly offensive," and no economic harm or sufficient mental suffering was proven.

Andre Evans, an adult offender, sought orders of prohibition and certiorari to prevent the Crown from using his youth records as an aggravating factor in his sentencing hearing.

The Crown had previously obtained an order from a youth court justice under s. 123 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act to access these records after the prescribed access period expired.

Evans argued that the youth court justice exceeded jurisdiction by granting access and that using the records would compromise his right to a fair trial due to principles of privacy and rehabilitation for young persons.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the youth court justice acted within jurisdiction and that society's interest in truth-seeking and public safety outweighed Evans' privacy interest, which could be protected by a publication ban.

The accused, charged with sexual offences, sought access to psychiatric reports about the complainant, which were unsealed exhibits in earlier, unrelated criminal proceedings.

The Ontario Court of Justice denied access, requiring a production application under s. 278.3(1) of the Criminal Code, finding the complainant retained a privacy interest.

The accused applied for certiorari to quash this order.

The Superior Court found that the complainant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the reports, given they were discussed in open court and filed as unsealed exhibits.

The court held that the Dagenais/Mentuck standard for access to court records applied, not the s. 278.1 regime, and granted the certiorari application, ordering the release of the reports to the accused.

The defendant in a civil action for sexual assault brought a motion seeking a declaration that he had not breached the deemed undertaking rule (Rule 30.1.01) or, alternatively, an order to exempt certain documents from it.

The defendant's civil counsel had provided the plaintiff's compelled documentary productions, including sensitive medical and counselling records, to his criminal defence counsel for use in parallel criminal proceedings to impeach the plaintiff's credibility, without prior notice or court directions.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the impeachment exception in Rule 30.1.01(6) is not automatic and requires parties to seek directions from the civil court, ordinarily on notice to the producing party, before using discovery evidence for impeachment in another proceeding.

The court found that the defendant had breached the deemed undertaking.

This is an appeal from a Master's order concerning two issues: security for costs and solicitor-client privilege over certain emails.

The security for costs issue was resolved by agreement during the appeal.

The primary issue remaining was whether emails sent by the plaintiff to his solicitor using a corporate email account were protected by solicitor-client privilege.

The court upheld the Master's decision, finding that the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy and that solicitor-client privilege, being a fundamental and substantive principle in Canadian law, was not waived despite the inadvertent disclosure of the emails.

The court distinguished solicitor-client privilege from general privacy expectations and rejected the application of American jurisprudence due to its narrower interpretation of privilege.

The Applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude call detail records obtained via search warrants, arguing violations of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Applicant contended that the Informations to Obtain (ITOs) contained inaccuracies, lacked reasonable grounds to believe the records would afford evidence, and that police failed to file Reports to Justice as required by s. 489.1 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while there were minor inaccuracies in the ITOs, they were made in good faith and, once excised, sufficient grounds remained for the warrants.

The court also found that the police's failure to file Reports to Justice constituted a s. 8 Charter breach but, following established jurisprudence, determined that this technical breach did not warrant the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, especially given the serious nature of the charge.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

Tristen Mignot brought an application to exclude evidence (gun, ammunition, and drugs) obtained during a search, alleging violations of his s. 8 Charter rights due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds for the search warrant and improper execution.

The court found that the Information to Obtain a Warrant (ITO) contained significant errors and omissions, failing to establish reasonable grounds for the search of the residence at 1 Celestial Crescent.

Consequently, a s. 8 Charter violation occurred.

While the execution of the warrant itself was deemed reasonable, the court balanced the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct against the impact on the accused's privacy interests and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court concluded that the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute by admitting the evidence, thus excluding it.

The plaintiff moved to compel the defendant to produce three categories of documents: employment applications of successful candidates, assessment notes for successful applicants, and remuneration details for successful applicants.

The defendant resisted on grounds of relevance, privacy, and proportionality.

The court found the documents relevant to the plaintiff's claim of being blacklisted and wrongfully denied re-employment.

While acknowledging privacy concerns, the court ordered production of application packages and assessment documents for successful candidates, subject to the deemed undertaking and potential confidentiality orders.

However, the court limited the production of remuneration documents to aggregated benefit information, finding individual payroll histories disproportionate.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving, exceeding 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood, and resisting arrest following a motor vehicle stop on June 5, 2014.

The Crown presented evidence of erratic driving, physical signs of impairment, breath test results of 180 mg/100 ml, and expert toxicology evidence.

The defence raised multiple Charter arguments and challenged the sufficiency of evidence.

The court found the defendant guilty of impaired driving but acquitted him of resisting arrest due to language barriers and lack of clarity regarding directions.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and operation with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b).

The Crown conceded the impaired charge.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging a breach of s. 10(b) rights regarding the right to counsel, arguing the accused was not afforded privacy during her telephone consultation with duty counsel in a hospital emergency room.

The defence also argued the first breath sample was obtained after two hours had elapsed from the time of driving, contrary to s. 258(1)(c)(ii).

The court found no breach of s. 10(b) rights and that the breath samples were obtained within the statutory time limit.

The accused was convicted of the over 80 charge.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood following a traffic stop on May 11, 2012.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of evidence on three grounds: (1) that video surveillance of his consultation with duty counsel violated his Charter right to private consultation; (2) that there was insufficient evidence the breath samples were taken pursuant to a demand under section 254(3); and (3) that there were insufficient grounds for arrest and the breath demand.

The court found no Charter violation regarding the video surveillance, rejected the demand argument, and found reasonable grounds for the arrest.

However, the court concluded that while the evidence supported conviction on the exceed 80 charge, it fell short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the impaired driving charge.