Privacy

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim, which alleged various torts including breach of confidence and intrusion upon seclusion, stemming from an employee's improper access to a child's file at a clinic.

The plaintiff, father of the children, brought the claim on his own behalf, not as a litigation guardian or under the Family Law Act.

The plaintiff failed to respond to a request to admit, did not comply with court-ordered timetables for filing materials, and made last-minute attempts to amend his claim and seek an adjournment, which were denied due to non-compliance and the need for orderly administration of justice.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, relying on the deemed admissions and the defendants' evidence.

The claims were dismissed as the plaintiff had no contractual relationship with the defendants, no personal confidential information was disseminated, and no provable injury was demonstrated.

The Respondent Father brought a motion seeking disclosure of the complete file from the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) to challenge its recommendations regarding decision-making responsibility and parenting time for the child.

The Applicant Mother opposed the motion, arguing privilege and privacy.

The court found that the Mother had waived any privilege or privacy interest by providing the records to the OCL and that the records were relevant and necessary for the Father to challenge the OCL's findings.

The Father's motion for disclosure was granted, and the Mother was ordered to pay costs.

This decision addresses an application for directions by the accused (B.W.) in a criminal proceeding.

The applicant sought a ruling on whether certain emails in his possession were "records" under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code and permission to use them for cross-examination of the complainant.

The court conducted an in camera review, classifying some emails as records due to their intimate and highly personal nature (e.g., marital difficulties, financial status) and others as not (mundane exchanges).

The application to use the emails deemed "records" was dismissed due to the applicant's non-compliance with procedural requirements, including late service and failure to provide detailed particulars.

The application to use the emails deemed "not records" was granted, subject to a potential s. 276 application for two specific emails and general rules of evidence.

The court also allowed the applicant to challenge the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct evidence, despite an earlier indication of no objection, emphasizing the right to a fair trial.

Both parties sought an order for anonymization (use of initials/pseudonyms) and a publication ban on identifying information, explicitly not seeking a sealing order.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for various torts including sexual assault and invasion of privacy, stemming from the defendant allegedly taking an intimate photo without consent.

The defendant did not oppose the plaintiff's motion if granted the same relief, but the plaintiff opposed the defendant's motion.

Applying the Sherman Estate test, the court granted the plaintiff's motion, finding that protecting victims of sexual misfeasance is an important public interest and anonymization was necessary and proportionate to prevent serious risk to her dignity.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, holding that reputational harm from allegations of sexual misconduct does not meet the "important public interest" threshold for anonymization under Sherman Estate, as such interests are personal and private, not affecting human dignity in the same way.

The mother (S.M.) brought a motion seeking access to and use of youth criminal justice records and Children's Aid Society (CAS) records concerning her child in ongoing child protection proceedings.

The court clarified that CAS records containing youth criminal involvement information are not Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) records and can be disclosed without a youth court order.

It also determined which specific YCJA records were relevant and necessary for use in the child protection proceedings, applying the Wagg and Bailey tests, emphasizing the paramount purpose of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA) to promote the best interests of children and the need for fulsome information before the court.

The applicant, Dean McAlpine, brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence based on alleged violations of ss. 7 (excessive force during arrest) and 10(b) (right to counsel) of the Charter.

The court found that the police used excessive force by deploying a taser drive stun after the applicant was compliant, breaching his s. 7 rights.

However, the court found no breach of s. 10(b) regarding the right to counsel, as the applicant was offered a call to duty counsel when he could not provide his chosen counsel's full details, and privacy was afforded.

The court dismissed the request for a stay of proceedings and exclusion of evidence, finding that a sentence reduction would be the appropriate remedy for the s. 7 breach.

The defendant, charged with sexual assault, brought a motion for directions regarding the admissibility of text messages exchanged with the complainant.

The defence argued these messages, which depicted a different relationship dynamic, did not engage the Criminal Code's record screening regime (sections 278.92-94) as they lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The Crown argued for caution regarding the complainant's privacy rights.

The court granted the defence motion, finding the text messages contained "mundane information" and thus did not meet the threshold for privacy under the record screening regime, allowing their potential introduction at trial without a formal application.

The Muslim Association of Canada (MAC) brought a motion for a sealing order concerning an Administrative Fairness Letter (AFL) and its responses, central to its application alleging systemic bias and Islamophobia in a Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) audit.

The Attorney General of Canada opposed the sealing order, proposing a more tailored redaction approach.

The court, applying the Sherman Estate test, declined the full sealing order.

While acknowledging a serious risk to the physical safety and dignity of minors and peripherally involved MAC members due to personal information, the court found that a full sealing order was not necessary.

Instead, it ordered specific redactions of names of minors and peripherally involved members, personal contact information, and financial details, emphasizing the paramount importance of open courts for public debate on government conduct, especially concerning allegations of constitutional violations.

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking to limit court file access, prohibit the respondent father from publishing online information about the proceeding or file documents, and compel the removal of existing online information.

The respondent father opposed, arguing constitutional rights and stating the Facebook page was for his daughter to know he didn't abandon her.

The court found the online information provided intimate and unnecessary details about the child and mother, which was not in the child's best interests.

The motion was granted in part, prohibiting the father from publishing or keeping public information identifying the child and/or mother, both prospectively and retrospectively, under section 70(1)(b) of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The rest of the motion was dismissed, and no costs were awarded due to the limited success and insufficient submissions from the moving party.

The Crown sought directions regarding the disclosure of police records concerning a young person (M.A.) involved in an incident related to a murder charge against the accused.

The court determined that records pertaining to extrajudicial measures (EJM) taken with M.A. are presumptively non-disclosable under section 119(4) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) to protect the young person from stigmatization.

However, information about the underlying incident, such as a fight and its reason, and any animus between M.A. and the deceased, is disclosable and permissible for witness questioning, provided it does not reveal police involvement or EJM details.

The court suggested an Agreed Statement of Facts as a means to address the defence's need for full answer and defence without violating YCJA provisions.

This appeal concerns the interaction between a provincial legislative scheme governing child protection (CYFSA) and a federal legislative scheme for removing those without citizenship or immigration status from Canada (IRPA).

Specifically, it addresses a disclosure order granted to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness in a child protection status hearing.

The motion judge granted the disclosure, which was upheld by the Superior Court.

The appellants (the parent, the Children's Aid Society, and the Office of the Children's Lawyer) argued that the disclosure order improperly prioritized the Minister's interests over the children's privacy and best interests.

The Court of Appeal found that while the motion judge had jurisdiction to order disclosure, she erred by not requiring the Minister to establish a prima facie basis for the scope of submissions or the requested disclosure.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter remitted to the motion judge for reconsideration based on a new framework requiring the Minister to justify the scope of submissions and disclosure.

This decision addresses a motion and cross-motion for production of documents in a personal injury case.

The plaintiff sought production of defence medical expert files from Soma Medical Assessments and further documentation related to the defendants' surveillance evidence.

The defendants sought production of documents from the plaintiff's recently settled disability claim against Great West Life.

The court refused the request for Soma files, deeming it a fishing expedition and subject to litigation privilege.

However, it ordered the production of private investigator information, waiving litigation privilege due to significant privacy intrusion and public policy considerations.

The court also ordered the production of documents from the prior disability action, waiving the deemed undertaking rule given the similarity of issues and the insurer's non-opposition.

Costs were made costs in the cause.

The applicant, Alden Nunes, brought an application to exclude evidence (guns, fentanyl, ecstasy) obtained via a search warrant, arguing a violation of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the search warrant lacked sufficient grounds to believe evidence would be found at the searched residence (21 Redvers Street, Whitby), as the police failed to establish Mr. Moore's current residency there or investigate beyond his outdated bail conditions.

Despite the absence of police bad faith, the Charter-infringing conduct was deemed serious due to the lack of investigation and the high expectation of privacy in a dwelling.

Applying the Grant factors, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and therefore excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Respondents moved for an order to initialize the names of the parties and children in the proceeding to protect their identities.

The Applicant consented to initializing the children's names but opposed initializing the parties' names.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test and considering s. 70 of the Children's Law Reform Act, the court found that initializing both the parties' and children's names was necessary to prevent serious emotional harm to the children due to the sensitive and unique facts of the case, which involved a long-term deception regarding parentage.

The court determined that the salutary effects of the order outweighed the deleterious effects on the open court principle, especially given the limited nature of the order (initials only, no sealing or publication ban).

The motion was granted, and costs were awarded to the Respondents on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff in a certified class action moved for an order approving the condensed, short-form, and long-form notices of certification, the plan for their dissemination, and related matters including the appointment of a notice administrator and the production of class member information by the defendants.

The defendants did not oppose the relief sought.

The court granted the order, approving the notices and notice plan, appointing RicePoint Administration Inc. as the Notice Administrator, and compelling the defendants to provide vehicle identification numbers and class member contact information for notice purposes, while also addressing privacy concerns and opt-out procedures.

The plaintiff moved to amend a judgment to replace initials with full names, arguing that the use of initials prevented discussion and enforcement.

The court had previously ruled that subsection 87(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, which prohibits identifying a child or their family, applied.

The court found it was not functus officio as no order had been entered.

It determined that using full names would pose a high risk of violating the Act, especially given prior related decisions that had used names.

The court dismissed the request to use full names in the public judgment but ordered that a new, sealed court file be created with the parties' full names for enforcement purposes, granting judgment of $25,000 against the defendants.

It also ordered that all related public decisions be amended to use letters (AA, BB, CC) instead of names or initials.

The defendant in a sexual assault case brought a motion for directions under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code to determine the admissibility of Facebook messages exchanged with the complainant.

The court had to decide if the messages contained personal information for which the complainant had a reasonable expectation of privacy, making them presumptively inadmissible.

The court found that two of the three sets of messages met this definition, while one mundane chat did not.

The ruling clarified the factors for assessing privacy expectation, rejecting the relevance of the current adversarial relationship and broad policy implications at the initial definitional stage.

Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC) sought certiorari to quash a Youth Court decision that denied TCHC access to a young person's (R.V.) criminal justice records.

TCHC intended to use these records to commence eviction proceedings against R.V. and his family at the Landlord and Tenant Board on grounds of "illegality" and "community safety." The Youth Court had denied access, prioritizing R.V.'s privacy, rehabilitation, and reintegration under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

By the time the certiorari application reached the Superior Court, R.V. had withdrawn from the proceedings, and TCHC had decided not to pursue eviction, rendering the matter moot.

The Superior Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot application, finding no persisting adversarial context, no significant public interest that would justify hearing a hypothetical case, and that the issue of "desirable in the interest of the proper administration of justice" under s.119 of the YCJA was fact-driven and best left to the Youth Court's expertise.

Dr. George Otto, charged with fentanyl trafficking, brought a pre-trial motion challenging the constitutionality of Criminal Code provisions (ss. 492.2 and 487.016) authorizing the seizure/production of prospective and historical transmission data.

The core issue was whether the "reasonable suspicion" standard for judicial authorization met the requirements of s. 8 of the Charter.

The court concluded that the "reasonable suspicion" standard was sufficient, finding the data obtained in this case to be minimally intrusive and not revealing core biographical information.

The motion seeking a declaration of unconstitutionality was dismissed.

The defendants moved to compel the plaintiffs to produce unredacted banking records and additional documentation to trace the source of funds.

The plaintiffs had redacted portions of bank statements, asserting irrelevance and privacy, and resisted requests for further documentation.

The court allowed the motion for unredacted bank statements, finding the plaintiffs failed to meet the high threshold for redaction, which requires both clear irrelevance and a "good reason" for non-disclosure (e.g., significant harm or public interest infringement).

However, the court denied the motion for additional documentation to trace the source of funds, as the defendants did not establish its relevance beyond an improper fishing expedition.

The court also addressed the procedure for filing sealed documents, granting a temporary sealing order to allow the plaintiffs to formally apply for a sealing order.