Mark A.B. Donald

The Centre for Free Expression (CFE) sought leave to intervene as a friend of the court in a civil appeal arising from the dismissal of a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (Ontario) in a defamation action.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario, per Roberts J.A., dismissed the motion for intervention, finding that while CFE had a clear mandate and interest in freedom of expression issues, its proposed submissions would not provide a distinct or useful contribution beyond those of the parties.

The court emphasized that intervention is to be granted sparingly, particularly in private disputes, and that the issues raised by CFE were already adequately addressed by the parties.

The appellant, Tony Sfeir, appealed his convictions and sentence for two counts of sexual assault.

The incidents involved deception of two complainants, JR and BG, who believed they were engaging in sexual activity with a woman, but were in fact deceived by the appellant.

The appeal alleged errors in the trial judge’s credibility analysis, application of the burden of proof, and sentence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no reversible error in the trial judge’s reasoning or application of the law.

The defendant, Ontario Power Generation Inc. (OPG), brought a motion to strike four causes of action from the plaintiff M.P.'s Amended Amended Statement of Claim: negligent investigation, intrusion upon seclusion by way of vicarious liability, breach of fiduciary duty, and harassment.

The court granted OPG's motion, finding that the claims for negligent investigation and breach of fiduciary duty failed to meet the established legal tests, the claim for vicarious liability for intrusion upon seclusion lacked sufficient connection to employment, and there is no recognized common law tort of harassment applicable to the facts pleaded.

Costs were awarded to the defendant.

Both parties sought an order for anonymization (use of initials/pseudonyms) and a publication ban on identifying information, explicitly not seeking a sealing order.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for various torts including sexual assault and invasion of privacy, stemming from the defendant allegedly taking an intimate photo without consent.

The defendant did not oppose the plaintiff's motion if granted the same relief, but the plaintiff opposed the defendant's motion.

Applying the Sherman Estate test, the court granted the plaintiff's motion, finding that protecting victims of sexual misfeasance is an important public interest and anonymization was necessary and proportionate to prevent serious risk to her dignity.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, holding that reputational harm from allegations of sexual misconduct does not meet the "important public interest" threshold for anonymization under Sherman Estate, as such interests are personal and private, not affecting human dignity in the same way.

The defendant brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).

The dispute arose from the defendant's social media posts concerning alleged financial improprieties and political partiality of a Hindu temple towards the Sri Lankan government.

The court found that the defendant's expressions related to matters of public interest.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the action had substantial merit or that the defendant had no valid defence (justification for financial allegations, fair comment for cultural allegations).

The court also found no serious harm to the plaintiff and a strong public interest in protecting the defendant's expression.

The motion was granted, the action dismissed, and full indemnity costs were awarded to the defendant.

The Estate Trustee, Cynthia Stren, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss Morrissa Amsel's claim against the Estate, arguing it was statute-barred under the Limitations Act and/or the Trustee Act.

Morrissa claimed a trust and contractual interest in a property, asserting her claim was an equitable claim in land subject to the Real Property Limitations Act's 10-year period, and that she lacked capacity to bring the claim earlier.

The court found Morrissa's claim was contractual, not equitable, and was statute-barred under both the Limitations Act and the Trustee Act.

Her evidence of incapacity was deemed insufficient.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing Morrissa's claim.

The defendant brought a motion for a nunc pro tunc order to retroactively authorize communication with his counsel during cross-examination, which was in contravention of a direct court order.

The plaintiffs opposed, denying they had consented to such communication.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding that no consent was proven and, more importantly, that leave of the court was required regardless of any alleged consent, especially given the explicit court order.

The court determined that the breach would be considered when assessing the weight of the defendant's evidence, particularly concerning the alleged unlawful appropriation of gold.

The plaintiffs, comprising the estate of Tai-Kiu Mak and three of her sons, brought a motion for summary judgment against the fourth son, Kenny Chi-Keung Mak.

The plaintiffs sought an accounting for various assets, including a security account, term deposits, a joint account, and gold, which Kenny claimed were gifts from his mother.

Kenny asserted his mother intended to benefit him due to his lesser financial standing compared to his brothers.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding that the voluminous evidence (over 30 affidavits and hundreds of documents) and serious credibility issues between the parties made it impossible to reach a fair and just determination on the merits without a full trial.

The judge emphasized that such complex cases, particularly those involving family disputes and intentions of a deceased person, are unsuitable for summary judgment.

The applicant sought damages for breach of contract, tracing orders, constructive trust, equitable lien, and piercing the corporate veil against the corporate and individual respondents.

The court dismissed the application, finding that service was not properly effected under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the application was not a suitable vehicle for the claims as the contract was not founded on an "instrument" as required by Rule 14.05(3)(d), and the claims against the individual respondent for independent tort required an action and possibly a trial, not an application.

The court also declined to grant execution remedies without proper service and an opportunity for the respondents to participate.