Impaired driving

The accused was charged with being in care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The Crown established that the accused's ability to operate the vehicle was impaired, with a projected blood alcohol level between 70 to 125 mgs/100ml.

The sole issue was whether the accused was in care or control of the vehicle.

Although the accused occupied the driver's seat, triggering a statutory presumption of care or control, the court found the accused successfully rebutted this presumption.

The accused testified he sat in the driver's seat to wait for his mother to fall asleep after a family dispute, keeping the door open to smoke and avoid using the ignition.

The court accepted his evidence as logical and consistent with circumstantial evidence, finding no realistic risk of danger and no evidence of intent to set the vehicle in motion.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, driving over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood, and driving while suspended.

The defence brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of breath test results, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to stop the vehicle and make the breath demand, that the detention was not arbitrary, and that while the right to counsel issue was potentially troubling, the accused failed to exercise appropriate diligence in communicating his preference for his own counsel.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and care or control with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg/100 mL.

Following a blended voir dire and trial, the court found that the officer administering the approved screening device (ASD) did not have objectively reasonable grounds to believe the device was in proper working order, as he failed to check the calibration and accuracy check dates despite knowing their importance.

This constituted a violation of the accused's section 8 Charter rights.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The defendant sought disclosure of a drug recognition expert's rolling log in an impaired driving by drug case.

The Crown resisted disclosure, arguing that recent amendments to the Criminal Code (Bill C-46) and new statutory provisions prohibiting disclosure of drug evaluation results rendered the earlier decision in R. v. Stipo inapplicable.

The court held that the rolling log remains relevant first-party disclosure and that the statutory prohibition on disclosure does not prevent disclosure to an accused to protect their constitutional right to make full answer and defence.

The application for disclosure of a vetted/anonymized version of the DRE rolling log was granted.

The accused was charged with having care or control of a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration above the legal limit contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused occupied the driver's seat, triggering the statutory presumption of care or control.

The court found that the accused successfully rebutted the presumption.

The accused had driven to a park after a domestic argument, consumed alcohol only after arriving at the park, and then called her wife to pick her up rather than driving home.

The court found that the accused's actions demonstrated an intention to avoid driving and that the risk of danger necessary to establish culpable care or control was not present.

The charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown's case rested entirely on breath test results obtained following the accused's arrest.

The defence raised three Charter applications: (1) a section 8 breach based on the arresting officer's chemically impossible articulation of the legal BAC limit; (2) a section 8 breach for failure to "transfer grounds" to the breath technician; and (3) a section 10(b) breach regarding the implementation of the right to counsel of choice.

The court found a section 10(b) breach but admitted the evidence under section 24(2), finding the breach fell on the lower end of the seriousness spectrum despite its significant impact on the accused's protected interests.

The accused was convicted.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit, contrary to sections 253(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant's vehicle crashed into a ditch.

A civilian found him exiting the driver's side and called police.

The defendant demonstrated signs of alcohol consumption and language difficulties.

The court found two violations of the defendant's section 10(b) Charter right to counsel: the officer failed to translate the right to counsel despite clear language barriers, and failed to properly implement the right by steering the defendant to duty counsel without inquiry.

The breath samples were excluded as a remedy.

However, the court found the defendant guilty of impaired care or control based on circumstantial evidence including the unexplained accident, strong odour of alcohol, physical presentation, and vomiting.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit on March 19, 2016.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The central issues were whether the Crown established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused operated the vehicle and whether he did so within the relevant time period.

The trial judge relied on circumstantial evidence, including the location of the vehicle on streetcar tracks in a tunnel, the accused's presence at the scene, his statements and conduct, and the timing of the incident relative to police dispatch.

The court found the accused guilty based on the cumulative effect of circumstantial evidence establishing both identity and timing.

The defendant was charged with care and control of an automobile while impaired and having a blood alcohol limit exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant's vehicle was found stuck in sand on the shoulder of a deserted road near Kleinberg.

The defendant was standing in a field approximately 50-60 feet from the vehicle, stating he was waiting for a ride.

The Crown sought to prove care and control based on circumstantial evidence and the defendant's proximity to the vehicle.

The court found that while the Crown established reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, it failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in care and control of the motor vehicle at the time of police arrival.

The defendant was acquitted.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

At trial, the accused sought to exclude breath test results on the basis of alleged violations of Charter rights under sections 9 and 10(b).

The accused argued that placement in the rear of the police cruiser for the approved screening device test violated the right to be free from arbitrary detention, and that the delay in providing rights to counsel violated the right to counsel.

The court found no breach of section 9 rights, as the detention was reasonably justified by officer and public safety concerns.

The court also found no breach of section 10(b) rights, as the four-minute delay between arrest and provision of rights to counsel was justified by necessary safety precautions and operational requirements.

The breath test results were admitted and the accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and while her blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit, contrary to sections 253.1(a) and 253.1(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence raised a Charter application challenging whether provincial offence officers were acting as peace officers and whether there were breaches of the right to counsel and the "as soon as practicable" requirement for breath sample demands.

The court found that the provincial offence officers were not peace officers for Charter purposes, that there was no breach of the right to counsel, and that the breath sample demand was made as soon as practicable.

The court convicted the accused on both charges based on the totality of evidence demonstrating impairment.

The accused was charged with "over 80" (impaired driving with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit).

The trial focused on whether police breached the accused's Charter rights during the breath testing procedure.

The court found that a police officer assaulted the accused while he was in custody and handcuffed to a bench, attempting to force him to speak to his girlfriend.

The court determined this constituted a serious breach of the accused's section 7 Charter rights (security of the person).

The court further found that the police failed to properly investigate or report the allegation of assault.

Consequently, the court excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following a traffic stop on Leslie Street in Richmond Hill.

The defendant admitted to consuming multiple glasses of red wine, providing reasonable suspicion for an approved screening device (ASD) demand.

However, the arresting officer delayed making the ASD demand for 16 minutes and 29 seconds while conducting vehicle registration and background checks.

The defendant applied to exclude the breath sample evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9.

The court found that the delay violated the "forthwith" requirement established in case law, constituting unlawful detention and unreasonable seizure.

Applying the Grant test, the court excluded the evidence and dismissed the charge.

The accused was charged with impaired driving following a roadside stop initiated by a citizen complaint about erratic driving.

A constable made an Approved Screening Device demand based on observations including the accused's glassy eyes, presence of beer in the vehicle, erratic driving report, and the accused's persistent smoking despite police instruction to stop.

The sole issue at trial was whether the officer had the required reasonable suspicion under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code to make the demand.

The court found that the totality of circumstances provided an objectively reasonable basis for the officer's suspicion and that the demand was lawful.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with driving a motor vehicle with over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to Section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown withdrew the impaired driving charge and proceeded on the over .08 charge only.

Following a trial, the court found that the Crown proved all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was convicted of driving over .08.

A First Nations woman pleaded guilty to multiple drinking and driving offences and related charges.

The court found that Ontario's failure to proclaim the curative discharge provision violated the equality rights of Indigenous offenders under the Charter.

The court applied a remedial approach under s. 24(1) of the Charter and granted curative discharges on the impaired driving counts, finding that intensive culturally-based treatment through an accredited NNADAP facility was in the public interest.

The decision emphasizes the intergenerational trauma stemming from residential schools and the need for a realistic, progressive approach to assessing treatment success for Indigenous offenders.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level above the legal limit following a multi-vehicle collision in Toronto.

The trial was blended with a Charter voir dire addressing numerous constitutional and procedural issues.

The court found that while the Crown proved the defendant was the driver of the vehicle involved, it failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

Additionally, the court found breaches of the defendant's Charter rights regarding the right to counsel and the timing of breath sample demands.

The breath test evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter due to serious breaches of the right to counsel.

Both charges were dismissed and the defendant was acquitted.

The appellant appealed convictions for drive under suspension and drive with a licence issued in another jurisdiction while under suspension in Ontario.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the originating process was defective or that there was no power to amend the tickets; and second, that the verdict was unreasonable.

The court dismissed both grounds, finding that the appellant had been properly arraigned on a Part III information after attorning to jurisdiction, and that the Justice of the Peace's findings were reasonable based on the evidence.

The appellant had been previously convicted of impaired driving, failed to pay the fine, and subsequently drove while suspended, claiming he had been misled by a Ministry of Transportation counter clerk.

The defendant was charged with impaired care or control and over 80 care or control after being found asleep in his vehicle with the engine running in a parking lot.

The defendant claimed he had no intention to drive because he had called a friend to pick him up and fell asleep while waiting.

The Crown relied on the statutory presumption under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the defendant's evidence regarding his plan was not credible and that he failed to rebut the presumption on a balance of probabilities.

Even if the presumption had been rebutted, the court found the Crown proved actual care or control beyond a reasonable doubt based on the realistic risk the defendant could change his mind and drive while impaired.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The charges arose from an alleged impaired driving incident on January 16, 2010.

The matter had a complex procedural history, including an initial stay granted by a trial judge in September 2011, which was subsequently overturned on Crown appeal in May 2012.

The court considered the length of delay, reasons for delay, and prejudice to the accused.

The application was dismissed, finding no unreasonable delay attributable to the Crown or institutional factors, and no sufficient actual prejudice to warrant Charter relief.