Sarah De Filippis

A 16-year-old youth pleaded guilty to aggravated assault after shooting and partially paralyzing a victim in downtown Toronto.

The Crown sought an adult sentence of 8-10 years, while the defence sought a youth sentence with time served.

The court applied the two-stage test under s. 72(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA).

At stage one, the court found the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness was not rebutted beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the youth's significant trauma, intergenerational Indigenous trauma, impulsive nature of the offence, substance abuse issues, and remarkable rehabilitation progress during 3 years 9.5 months of pre-trial custody.

At stage two, the court found a youth sentence would hold the youth accountable.

The court imposed a two-year probation order with intensive conditions including the Intensive Support and Supervision Program (ISSP), curfew, counselling, community service, and ancillary orders including a lifetime weapons prohibition.

This decision addresses the constitutionality of routine strip searches of young persons in pre-trial custody, focusing on four Black adolescent female applicants charged in the high-profile homicide of Kenneth Lee.

The court found that routine strip searches, conducted without individualized grounds or prior authorization and involving complete nudity, violated sections 7 and 8 of the Charter.

The court declined to grant a stay of proceedings, instead holding that the appropriate remedy was a reduction in sentence for any applicant found guilty, to reflect the Charter breach.

The ruling provides detailed analysis of the legal and regulatory framework, the psychological impact of strip searches, and the evolving standards for custodial searches in youth justice settings.

An application was brought by eight young persons to vary a previous court order to explicitly prevent media from disseminating their identifying information, including through private social media messages, in relation to charges of second-degree murder.

The court found that a reporter's actions of contacting individuals on social media and disclosing a young person's name and charges contravened the spirit of the Youth Criminal Justice Act's publication ban under section 110, even if not an intentional breach of the specific prior order.

The court clarified that "publication" under the YCJA includes indiscriminate communication on social media that risks making information known to the general public.

This judgment follows a Zoom trial for sexual assault under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Crown alleged the accused sexually assaulted the complainant between September and October 2019.

Key evidence included the complainant's video statement and text message screenshots, which contained the accused's apologies.

The defence argued these apologies were not admissions of guilt but attempts to placate the complainant.

The court found the accused's explanations for his apologies incredible, accepted the complainant's testimony despite minor inconsistencies, and convicted the accused, finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

J.J., a young person, was found guilty of sexual assault with a weapon and being a party to sexual assault.

The court considered sentencing principles under the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA), including the diminished moral blameworthiness of young persons and the goal of rehabilitation.

Despite J.J. turning 20 and thus serving any custodial sentence in an adult facility, which presented challenges for programming and rehabilitation, the court imposed a 12-month custody and supervision order followed by 12 months of probation.

The court emphasized that the adult facility must adhere to YCJA principles and set a future sentence review date to monitor J.J.'s rehabilitation progress, acknowledging the potential for collateral consequences due to adult incarceration and the COVID-19 pandemic.

A young person was found guilty of aggravated assault following a trial.

The Crown sought a 9-month custody and supervision order followed by 14 months of probation.

The defence sought a non-custodial sentence, arguing that the accused's 914 days of pre-trial house arrest should be credited as equivalent to the proposed custodial sentence.

The court imposed a 24-month probation order with conditions including 50 hours of community service, a 5-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order, finding that a non-custodial sentence was appropriate given the accused's vulnerability, mental health difficulties, compliance during house arrest, and the lengthy period already spent under restrictive bail conditions.

The defendant sought disclosure of a drug recognition expert's rolling log in an impaired driving by drug case.

The Crown resisted disclosure, arguing that recent amendments to the Criminal Code (Bill C-46) and new statutory provisions prohibiting disclosure of drug evaluation results rendered the earlier decision in R. v. Stipo inapplicable.

The court held that the rolling log remains relevant first-party disclosure and that the statutory prohibition on disclosure does not prevent disclosure to an accused to protect their constitutional right to make full answer and defence.

The application for disclosure of a vetted/anonymized version of the DRE rolling log was granted.

The defendant was charged with two counts of assaulting police officers in the execution of their duty, two counts of assaulting the same officers with intent to resist arrest, and assault with a weapon (a wooden staff).

The last count was withdrawn at the close of the Crown's case.

The defendant was arrested following a physical altercation in the foyer of a courthouse after he was observed filming inside a courtroom during a recess.

The court found that the police officers lacked statutory authority to detain and arrest the defendant, as their conduct fell outside the scope of powers granted under the Police Services Act.

Consequently, the defendant's resistance to the unlawful detention was justified, and he was acquitted of all remaining counts.

The applicant brought a motion under sections 15 and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings for impaired driving and over 80 operation charges.

The applicant, who has multiple disabilities including visual impairment (alternating exotropia), ADHD, and significant scarring from chemical burns, alleged that state actors (Crown, court clerks, accessibility coordinator, and police) failed to provide timely and independent disability accommodation, resulting in differential treatment contrary to section 15.

The applicant argued that inadequate accommodation led to his failure to appear on two occasions, resulting in unnecessary strip searches.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the conduct of state actors is subject to Charter scrutiny under Eldridge, the applicant failed to establish a factual foundation for a section 15 breach.

A young person was charged with assault, criminal harassment, and sexual assault of a complainant.

The defence brought a motion under section 278 of the Criminal Code seeking production of diary excerpts from the complainant.

The Crown had mistakenly disclosed the diary excerpts to the defence.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Shearing to determine that once the information had already been produced, the section 278 regime for compelled production of third-party records was no longer applicable.

The court dismissed the section 278 application but ordered re-disclosure of the excerpts pursuant to the Crown's Stinchcombe disclosure obligations, without prejudice to the Crown raising admissibility objections based on probative value versus prejudicial effect.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with blood alcohol content exceeding the legal limit (over 80) following a motor vehicle stop on January 16, 2010.

The accused brought multiple Charter applications alleging breaches of sections 8, 10(b), 11(b), 9, and 15.

The court dismissed the Charter applications.

On the substantive charges, the court found that while the Crown proved the over 80 charge beyond a reasonable doubt based on breath test readings of 170 and 180 milligrams, the impaired driving charge was dismissed because the Crown's evidence regarding impairment was undermined by the accused's pre-existing physical disabilities from a chemical fire injury, which made certain behavioral markers attributable to disability rather than alcohol consumption.

The accused sought to introduce evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity through social media accounts (Tumblr and Ask.fm) in a sexual assault trial.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the social media postings may constitute "sexual activity" under section 276 of the Criminal Code, the evidence was not admissible because it lacked relevance to the central issue of whether the complainant consented to the sexual activity.

The court rejected arguments that the evidence was necessary to explain the complainant's knowledge of sexual practices, to establish similarity with a prior alleged assault, or to impeach the complainant's credibility.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been breached.

The charges arose from an alleged impaired driving incident on January 16, 2010.

The matter had a complex procedural history, including an initial stay granted by a trial judge in September 2011, which was subsequently overturned on Crown appeal in May 2012.

The court considered the length of delay, reasons for delay, and prejudice to the accused.

The application was dismissed, finding no unreasonable delay attributable to the Crown or institutional factors, and no sufficient actual prejudice to warrant Charter relief.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving following a traffic stop in Toronto.

Police observed the defendant driving at excessive speed in a residential zone, making a rolling stop, and exhibiting signs such as bloodshot eyes and an odour of alcohol.

Upon exiting his vehicle, the defendant appeared to have difficulty.

However, video recordings of the defendant at the police station approximately 20 minutes after arrest showed no signs of impairment.

The court found that while the Crown established the defendant had consumed alcohol, the totality of the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his ability to drive was impaired.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit on January 6, 2012.

The trial was scheduled for April 3, 2013, approximately 15 months after the charges were laid.

The defendant brought a Charter section 11(b) application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds of unreasonable delay.

The court analyzed the delay using the framework established in R. v. Morin, considering the overall length of delay, reasons for the delay, prejudice to the accused, and societal interests.

The court found that while approximately 4.5 months of delay were attributable to Crown conduct and institutional factors contributed significantly, the total justiciable delay of approximately 9.75 months fell within acceptable parameters when balanced against the seriousness of the offences and minimal actual prejudice suffered by the defendant.

The application was dismissed.