Impaired driving

The Ontario Court of Justice acquitted Mario Takov of impaired driving charges under s. 320.14 of the Criminal Code.

The case centered on the interpretation and application of the "evaluation" conducted by a certified Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) under s. 320.28(2)(a).

The judge undertook a detailed statutory interpretation, concluding that the "evaluation" mandated by the Criminal Code is the 12-Step Drug Influence Evaluation (12-Step DIE) as defined by the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

The court found significant reliability issues with the Evaluating Officer's administration of the 12-Step DIE, including deviations from standardized procedures and an opinion inconsistent with the expected indicators for impairment by a CNS stimulant.

The Crown failed to prove the required facts to trigger the presumptions under s. 320.31(6), and the evidence did not establish impairment by alcohol or drugs beyond a reasonable doubt.

This decision addresses the validity of a roadside demand for a breath sample under section 320.27(1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused, Andrew Ackers, was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample and impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The impaired driving charge was dismissed due to insufficient evidence.

The key issue was whether the police had reasonable suspicion to demand a breath sample.

The court found that despite some procedural missteps and lack of direct communication of all grounds between officers, the totality of objectively discernable facts—including the vehicle accident, the accused fleeing the scene, witness reports of intoxication, and the accused’s glossy eyes—constituted reasonable suspicion.

The accused was found guilty of refusing to provide a breath sample.

This decision addresses multiple Charter issues arising from an impaired driving investigation, including voluntariness of statements, grounds and timing for an approved screening device (ASD) demand, and the right to counsel under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found the accused’s statements involuntary due to an inducement by police, but upheld the ASD demand as lawful with reasonable suspicion and no Charter breach in timing or delay in providing the right to counsel.

The accused was found to be the driver in care and control of the vehicle and impaired by alcohol beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in convictions on both impaired operation and BAC ’80 plus’ charges.

This decision addresses the issue of reasonable and probable grounds (RPG) for arrest and demand in a drug-impaired driving case.

The court found that Officer Accursi had both subjective and objectively reasonable grounds to arrest Dalton Powell based on observations corroborated by a civilian witness and body camera footage.

The accused's Charter s. 8 and s. 9 rights were found not to be violated, including an overholding claim where the accused was detained for approximately six hours after the initial arrest.

The court also found the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on officer observations, Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) testing, and urinalysis results.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered after the trial judge found multiple Charter breaches, including a pat down search by a male officer that involved touching under the respondent’s breast area.

The Superior Court found that the search was brief, professional, and not unreasonable in the circumstances, and that there was no breach of sections 7, 8, or 12 of the Charter.

The stay was set aside and the matter remitted for sentencing.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of expert evidence from Cara Shepard, a forensic toxicologist, in the trial of Aysar Younes for impaired and dangerous driving causing death.

The court found that while Ms. Shepard’s evidence regarding cocaine use was necessary and within her expertise, it lacked probative value on the issue of impairment or crash phase at the time of the collision and was therefore inadmissible for that purpose.

However, the court allowed the evidence for the limited purpose of establishing continuity of the blood sample.

This decision addresses the evidentiary requirements under section 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code regarding the certification of alcohol standard solutions used in breathalyzer testing.

The court found that the qualified breath technician’s viva voce evidence, supported by certificates and physical evidence of the alcohol standard solutions (lot numbers 202205A and 202205E), satisfied the statutory requirements.

The accused’s Charter challenges under sections 8, 9, and the informational delay component of section 10(b) were rejected.

The court convicted the accused on the 80+ blood alcohol concentration charge and stayed the impaired driving charge pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

This decision addresses the application of section 10(b) of the Charter regarding the right to counsel in the context of an impaired driving charge.

The court considered whether the accused was properly informed of his right to contact any lawyer of his choice, and whether he was afforded a reasonable opportunity to speak to counsel at the roadside.

The judge found a violation of section 10(b) due to failure to properly inform the accused about the option to speak to counsel privately at the roadside.

However, the evidence from breathalyzer tests was admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter, as the breach was not serious enough to exclude the evidence.

The court also found the accused guilty of impaired driving based on the totality of the evidence, including the circumstances of the accident and observed signs of impairment.

The defendant, Vimalan Ravindran, faced charges of operating a conveyance with over 80 mg of alcohol.

The defence brought a Charter application, arguing that a six-minute delay in making an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand by the police officer, P.C. Yellapah, breached the defendant's rights under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The delay was attributed to the officer's need to confirm the defendant's identity (as he lacked a valid driver's license) and to await backup for officer safety, given the late hour, highway location, and presence of two occupants in the vehicle.

The court found that these circumstances constituted "unusual circumstances" as per Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, justifying a flexible interpretation of the "forthwith" requirement for ASD demands.

Consequently, no Charter breaches were found, the breath samples were admissible, and a conviction was registered.

The accused, Mohammed Shaikh, faced charges of impaired operation of a conveyance and operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

He brought a Charter application alleging violations of his rights under sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking to exclude breath samples.

The court found that the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, and the breath demand was valid, not violating section 8.

The court also found no unreasonable delay in facilitating the right to counsel under section 10(b), as police acted reasonably given safety and privacy concerns.

Consequently, the Charter applications were dismissed, the breath samples were admitted, and the accused was found guilty on both counts of impaired operation and over 80.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation (excess blood alcohol) after being stopped by police on private property as part of a RIDE program.

The officer believed the stop was authorized by the Highway Traffic Act.

The court found that while a common law power existed for sobriety checks on private property, the officer's reliance on a mistaken understanding of the Highway Traffic Act rendered the detention unlawful, violating the defendant's Charter rights (sections 9 and 8).

Applying the Grant test, the court determined the breaches were technical and not serious, the impact on the defendant's rights was modest, and the reliable breath evidence was crucial to the Crown's case and society's interest in deterring drunk driving.

Consequently, the evidence was admitted, and the defendant was convicted.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation and operating a vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration above the legal limit.

He sought to exclude evidence due to alleged Charter breaches (ss. 7, 8, 10(b)) related to muted police body-worn cameras and delays in approved screening device (ASD) and approved instrument demands.

The court found no s. 7 breach, as there was no prejudice to the right to make full answer and defence.

It also found no s. 8 breach regarding the immediacy of the demands.

While the Crown conceded a s. 8 breach regarding ASD availability (due to R. v. Breault), the court found the breach minor and admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, citing good faith police conduct and minimal impact on the accused's rights.

The defendant was found guilty of operating with a blood-alcohol concentration above the legal limit but not guilty of impaired operation.

The defendant was charged with operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg within two hours of ceasing to operate it, contrary to s. 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant brought a Charter application, arguing a violation of his s. 10(b) right to counsel for being denied re-consultation after providing the first breath sample.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding no objective change in circumstances (new procedure, change in jeopardy, or deficient initial advice) as per R. v. Sinclair and R. v. Tahmasebi.

On the merits, the defence conceded all elements except the Crown's failure to prove the time the defendant ceased operating the conveyance.

The court held that the Crown must establish, directly or indirectly, whether the first breath sample was taken within two hours of driving ceasing to satisfy s. 320.14(1)(b) or to rely on the presumption in s. 320.31(4).

As the Crown failed to prove the time of driving, the charge was dismissed.

This case addresses whether the accused, Asmond Hazzard, failed or refused to comply with a demand for a Drug Recognition Evaluation (DRE).

The court examined two issues: whether the accused understood the demand and whether his actions constituted a failure or refusal to comply.

The accused was found in care and control of a motor vehicle and exhibited confusion and disorientation throughout his interaction with police and the DRE officer.

The court found that the Crown did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused grasped the demand, nor that he failed or refused to comply, concluding that his inability to cooperate was due to gross impairment rather than unwillingness.

An acquittal was entered.

The defendant, Dwight Dube, was charged with impaired driving and over 80.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) due to excessive force during arrest and improper implementation of the right to counsel.

The court found that police used excessive force, violating section 7 of the Charter, but found no violation of sections 8, 9, or 10(b).

Applying the Grant test, the court excluded the breath sample evidence and police observations of potential impairment, leading to an acquittal on both charges.

The defendant was charged with impaired care and control of a conveyance and exceeding the legal blood alcohol concentration, along with a provincial offence for having open liquor in a motor vehicle.

The central issue was whether the defendant was in "care and control" of the vehicle for the criminal charges.

The court found that the defendant successfully rebutted the statutory presumption of care and control by demonstrating he did not intend to drive.

Furthermore, the Crown failed to prove actual care and control beyond a reasonable doubt, as there was no realistic risk of danger from the stationary vehicle or that the defendant would change his mind and drive.

Consequently, the criminal charges were dismissed, but the defendant was found guilty of the provincial offence.

Mario Mendonca was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol content over 80 mg.

The defence filed a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b), and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking exclusion of evidence.

The court conducted a blended voir dire and dismissed all Charter arguments, finding no breaches.

The evidence, including blood alcohol readings, was admitted.

Mendonca was found guilty on both charges.

This sentencing decision addresses Vernon Hill's guilty pleas to multiple driving offences, including impaired driving and driving while disqualified, along with breaches of bail conditions, committed over several dates.

The court considered the seriousness of the offences, the accused's extensive criminal record involving similar conduct, and significant Gladue factors stemming from intergenerational trauma and addiction.

Despite the tragic personal circumstances and the absence of an accident with injury, the court emphasized specific deterrence and public safety, finding a conditional sentence inappropriate due to the accused's persistent disregard for court orders and public safety.

The judge imposed a total sentence of nineteen months' imprisonment, followed by three years of probation and a fifteen-year driving prohibition.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and having an excess blood alcohol concentration (BAC) within two hours of ceasing to operate a vehicle.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found no violations of sections 8 and 9, concluding that the police had reasonable grounds for arrest and breath demand.

However, the court found an impermissible delay in providing the defendant's section 10(b) right to counsel, but ultimately decided not to exclude the breath sample results under section 24(2) of the Charter, weighing the minor nature of the breach against society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

On the merits, the court acquitted the defendant of impaired operation but found him guilty of having an excess BAC, rejecting the "bolus drinking" defence under s. 320.14(5) of the Criminal Code due to lack of expert evidence.

The defendant, charged with 80 plus operation of a conveyance, brought a Charter application to exclude breath test evidence, arguing a violation of her s. 10(b) right to counsel due to a language barrier.

The court found that special circumstances existed, requiring the police to provide the informational component of the right to counsel in the defendant's native Tamil, which was not done, thus constituting a s. 10(b) violation.

However, applying the R. v. Grant test, the court found the seriousness of the breach to be low, the impact on the defendant's Charter rights to be low (as she received legal advice via an interpreter later), and society's interest in adjudication on the merits to be high.

Consequently, the breath evidence was admitted, and the defendant was convicted.