Christopher Liam Enright

The accused was charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder following a stabbing incident at an apartment.

The accused admitted to causing the death and injuries but raised the defence of advanced intoxication due to polysubstance abuse (alcohol, methamphetamine, and fentanyl).

The court rejected the accused's testimony regarding his memory and consumption at the scene, finding his post-offence conduct demonstrated an ability to foresee the consequences of his actions.

The court found the accused had the requisite intent for second-degree murder under s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

However, the court found the Crown failed to prove the specific intent to kill required for attempted murder, convicting the accused of the lesser included offence of aggravated assault.

This decision addresses charges against Julian Kroll for impaired operation of a conveyance under s. 320.14(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and possession of methamphetamine under s. 4(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The court considered evidence from police officers, a drug recognition evaluator (DRE), and a toxicologist.

Despite the accused initially self-representing, counsel was later retained and cross-examined witnesses.

The judge found the Crown proved both charges beyond a reasonable doubt, relying on observations of impairment, toxicology results, and the presumption under s. 320.31(6) of the Criminal Code corroborated by toxicological analysis.

The decision carefully weighs the credibility of witnesses and the limitations of evidence such as pupil dilation and inadmissible statements.

This case addresses whether the accused, Asmond Hazzard, failed or refused to comply with a demand for a Drug Recognition Evaluation (DRE).

The court examined two issues: whether the accused understood the demand and whether his actions constituted a failure or refusal to comply.

The accused was found in care and control of a motor vehicle and exhibited confusion and disorientation throughout his interaction with police and the DRE officer.

The court found that the Crown did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused grasped the demand, nor that he failed or refused to comply, concluding that his inability to cooperate was due to gross impairment rather than unwillingness.

An acquittal was entered.