Children's Aid Society

The applicant children's aid society moved to terminate a supervision order placing two children in the care of a family friend.

The children's lawyer opposed termination, arguing the children's anxiety about potentially returning to their father constituted a new protection concern, and alternatively sought a custodial order under s. 102 of the CYFSA.

The court found the original protection concerns had been resolved, that the children were no longer in need of protection, and that the society was not required to proceed by summary judgment.

The court declined to make a s. 102 custody order, noting it would be inequitable where the father had not filed materials and the proposed custodian was a non-party.

The supervision order was terminated and the cross-motion dismissed.

This is a motion to dismiss a child protection application for want of jurisdiction.

The respondent parents challenged whether the court retained jurisdiction to hear the protection application following alleged failures by the Children's Aid Society to comply with statutory prerequisites for removal of children to a place of safety.

The parents argued that two removals—on April 30, 2018 and June 1, 2018—were warrantless removals without proper grounds and that the Society failed to bring the matter to court within the required five-day statutory period.

The court found that while the April 30 removal lacked proper consent and statutory authority, the children were returned to parental care on May 15, 2018, creating a discrete event.

The June 1 removal was brought to court within the statutory timeframe and was supported by exigent circumstances.

The court dismissed the motion to dismiss, finding jurisdiction was retained.

The respondent brought a motion seeking a declaration that North Bay is the proper jurisdiction, return of the children to the District of Nipissing, interim custody, and alternative weekend access.

The applicant opposed the transfer and brought a cross-motion for a restraining order.

The court found that the children's ordinary residence is Mattawa in the District of Nipissing, where they had lived their entire lives prior to being taken by the applicant without warning.

The court determined there was no immediate danger to justify hearing the case elsewhere and transferred the matter to North Bay.

The court found the applicant's allegations of assault lacked credibility, noting the Crown had discharged the respondent at his preliminary inquiry.

The restraining order motion was adjourned to be heard in the proper jurisdiction.

In a child protection matter, the respondent parents sought costs against the Children's Aid Society following a case conference.

The Society had breached a court-ordered access schedule by failing to provide five community visits to the father over a five-week period.

Although the Society acknowledged the breach as inadvertent and subsequently complied with the order, the court found the breach to be significant and ongoing, occurring during a critical period for assessing parental capacity.

The court awarded costs to both parents, finding that a reasonably informed person would consider the Society's conduct unreasonable.

The Society's failure to comply with clear court orders, despite having the same family service worker throughout the case, was found to be sloppy and negligent.

The court emphasized the importance of child protection agencies complying with court orders to maintain the integrity of the child protection system.

A fourteen-year-old youth was charged with second degree murder as a party to the offence (instigator) in connection with the stabbing death of a fifteen-year-old victim.

The Crown sought detention under section 29(2) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court found that while the youth had no prior criminal record, extensive Children's Aid Society records documented a pattern of severe and escalating violence toward his mother since May 2017, including assaults with weapons, threats, and dangerous behavior.

The court determined that detention was necessary for public protection and the safety of the victim (the mother), finding a substantial likelihood the youth would commit serious offences if released.

The court rejected the proposed release plan involving the mother and family members as sureties, finding they could not adequately control the youth's violent behavior and impulsivity.

The applicant mother sought an order for substituted service of her application and affidavit on the respondents (the child's paternal aunt, uncle, and the child's other parent) who had been granted final custody of the child in a prior child protection proceeding.

The respondents could not be located at known addresses.

The Children's Aid Society opposed the motion, arguing it lacked mandate and resources to participate in private proceedings and could not disclose address information.

The court granted the motion, ordering substituted service through multiple methods: private Facebook messages to two respondents and text message to the third, as well as service through the Children's Aid Society by ordinary mail to last known addresses on file.

This is a focused hearing on access issues following a summary judgment motion in a child protection matter under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act.

The court had previously made G.C.A. and E.A. crown wards, with a genuine issue remaining regarding G.C.A.'s access with the mother and maternal grandmother.

The focused hearing addressed the terms and conditions of access for G.C.A. with his mother and maternal grandmother, resulting in a detailed access order with graduated hours, overnight visits on specified occasions, and conditions regarding medication compliance and the presence of third parties.

The accused, H.F., facing sexual assault charges, brought an application for the production of Children's Aid Society (CAS) records related to the complainant, LFR, his stepdaughter.

The Defence argued H.F. was already in lawful possession of the records from prior child protection proceedings and thus the s. 278 Criminal Code regime for third-party records did not apply.

The Crown and Complainant argued the records were not in lawful possession for criminal proceedings and were subject to s. 278.

The court found that H.F. was not in lawful possession of the CAS records for the purpose of criminal proceedings, and the records were subject to the s. 278 disclosure scheme.

The court further determined that the Defence failed to establish the records were "likely relevant" to an issue at trial and that their production was not necessary in the interests of justice, considering the complainant's privacy rights and the limited probative value of the records.

The application was denied, and the records were deemed inadmissible.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa sought summary judgment to place three children (E.S., J.S., R.S.) in the legal custody of their maternal grandparents, with discretionary access for the parents.

The mother opposed, seeking the children's return or a supervision order.

The court dismissed the Society's motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues for trial.

These issues included the admissibility and apparent contradiction of medical evidence regarding the children's initial physical condition and developmental delays, and a significant change in the mother's bail conditions which allowed her to present a plan of care.

The court emphasized that summary judgment requires a full evidentiary record and should not be granted where material facts are in dispute or credibility is an issue.

The accused was charged with human trafficking and misrepresentation to immigration authorities under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The accused brought a third party records application seeking disclosure of Children's Aid Society records and police records relating to the complainant.

The court determined that the O'Connor regime applied to the CAS records and the Mills regime (section 278) applied to the police records.

The court denied production of the police records as the accused failed to establish they were likely relevant, relying solely on credibility arguments which are insufficient under section 278.3(4).

The court found the CAS records were likely relevant as they were compiled during a joint investigation that led to the charges, and ordered the second stage of the O'Connor test to proceed.

The Father brought a motion to change a divorce order, seeking sole custody and a variation of child support, citing the Mother's persistent unfounded allegations of abuse, non-compliance with court orders, and interference with the children's education and health.

The Mother sought to maintain joint custody or obtain sole custody for herself.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the deleterious effects of parental conflict on the children, the Mother's persistent unfounded allegations, and her lack of insight into the children's needs.

Sole custody and primary residence were granted to the Father, with weekly access to the Mother.

The applicant father, convicted of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon against the respondent mother, sought supervised access to their two children, whom he had not seen for over five years.

The mother opposed, citing fear for her safety and the children's well-being, a position supported by the Children's Aid Society.

The court, applying the "best interests of the child" test under the Children's Law Reform Act, found insufficient evidence that access would significantly benefit the children, particularly given the long period of no contact and the father's lack of remorse for his past actions.

The father's application for access was dismissed, but a prior restraining order against him was terminated, and he was granted rights to receive information about the children's welfare and to share his life and heritage with them annually.

A focused trial concerning access arrangements for a child born in 2009.

The applicant (biological father) sought to terminate or reduce the respondent's (mother) supervised access.

The respondent sought unsupervised access to be gradually increased to alternate weekends and holiday access.

The child was apprehended by the Children's Aid Society in May 2014 and placed in the father's care in October 2014.

The mother had been exercising supervised access at APCO since May 2015.

The court found that while there was a positive attachment between the child and mother, the mother's behaviour during supervised visits remained problematic and not child-focused.

The court ordered continuation of supervised access with conditions requiring the mother to undergo psychiatric assessment and counselling before any future variation of the order.

The applicant mother sought disclosure of the complete records of the Children's Aid Society regarding investigations into allegations that her children were sexually abused by a step-sibling.

The respondent father and the CAS opposed the motion.

The court applied the Stavro test for third-party disclosure and considered principles of proportionality and fairness.

The court granted partial disclosure of CAS records related to the specific investigation of the sexual abuse allegations, but denied disclosure of all statements made by the respondent to the CAS, finding the request was overbroad and amounted to a fishing expedition.

The applicant father sought a final or temporary order for sole custody of two young children, retroactive to April 11, 2014, when the Children's Aid Society placed them in his care following an investigation into alleged abuse by the mother.

The father also sought to restrict the mother's access.

The mother opposed the custody motion and sought to maintain joint custody pending trial, arguing she had cooperated fully with investigations and had taken steps to address concerns.

The court found that while a de facto sole custody arrangement had developed, there was insufficient evidence of a material change in circumstances to warrant changing the joint custody status quo on an interim basis.

The court dismissed the father's motion for custody but maintained primary residence with the father while preserving joint custody and ordering the parties to craft a meaningful access schedule.

The Children's Aid Society of the County of Dufferin sought leave to withdraw a protection application concerning a child.

The respondent, a pediatric nurse with 17 years of experience as a foster parent, consented to the withdrawal but sought costs on a full indemnification basis.

The court found that while the Society did not act in bad faith, the decision to apprehend the child was an ill-considered use of the Society's powers that could not be justified.

The court awarded costs to the respondent for the apprehension hearing and the period leading up to the temporary care hearing, but declined to award costs for work undertaken after the Society's settlement offer on May 22, 2013, which was focused on adding the Toronto Children's Aid Society as a party rather than resolving the protection concerns.

The respondent parents brought a motion under Rule 20(5) of the Family Law Rules seeking disclosure of the names and addresses of all private investigators hired by the Children's Services society, along with copies of all correspondence, retainer agreements, and exchanges between the society and investigators since November 2012.

The parents alleged they had observed unknown persons conducting surveillance of their home and taking photographs.

The society claimed litigation privilege over the surveillance materials.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the society has a broad disclosure obligation under Stinchcombe principles, litigation privilege protects work product prepared in contemplation of litigation, including surveillance conducted for litigation purposes that has not been relied upon as evidence.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection under section 37(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Child and Family Services Act, and an order that no further child protection orders be made.

The mother opposed the finding, contending the Society should never have been involved.

The court found that while the children were at risk of physical harm due to a culmination of factors including the mother's physical health issues, mental health decline, and custody and access conflicts between the parents, there was no pattern of neglect.

The court granted the motion, finding the children in need of protection under section 37(2)(b)(i) only, and ordered that no further child protection orders be necessary.

In a child protection proceeding, the parents brought a motion seeking full documentary disclosure from the Children’s Aid Society and the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

Although the Society ultimately consented to the requested disclosure after the motion commenced, the court considered whether costs should be awarded against the Society.

The court held that while child protection agencies do not have immunity from costs awards, costs should only be ordered where the Society conducts itself unfairly in carrying out its statutory responsibilities.

The court found that the Society’s delayed and piecemeal disclosure required the parents to bring an unnecessary motion and risked delaying the trial in a case involving a child already in care for over a year.

Partial indemnity costs were therefore ordered against the Society.

Two applications sought interpretation of an insurance policy issued to a Children’s Aid Society concerning legal expense coverage for foster parents charged with Criminal Code offences.

The applicants argued that the $500,000 aggregate limit applied per policy year, allowing stacking across successive policy periods in which defence costs were incurred.

The insurer argued that the legal expense rider was a claims‑made policy triggered only in the policy period when the criminal proceedings commenced and that coverage was limited to a single $500,000 aggregate limit.

The court held that the wording of the rider allowed aggregate limits to accumulate across policy periods but concluded that the foster parents ceased to qualify as “insureds” after their termination.

As a result, recovery remained limited to the $500,000 aggregate available under the 2008–2009 policy.