Katherine Marie Beaudoin

The Crown appealed a sentencing decision that imposed concurrent victim surcharges on an offender convicted of two counts of theft under $5,000.

The central issue was whether sentencing judges have discretion to impose victim surcharges concurrently or whether surcharges must be imposed separately for each offence.

The Court of Appeal held that victim surcharges are imposed automatically by statute for each and every offence, and sentencing judges have no discretion to order concurrent surcharges.

The court distinguished surcharges from time-based sentences and fines, finding that the legislative history and statutory language clearly demonstrate Parliament's intent that surcharges be imposed for each conviction.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of sexual assault and related charges involving alleged sexual abuse of his stepson when the victim was nine or ten years old.

The victim reported the allegations approximately eight years later.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the grounds that the verdicts were unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in various aspects of his credibility assessment and reasoning.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the verdicts were reasonable, the trial judge properly assessed credibility, and there were no errors in the application of the relevant legal principles.

The appellant was convicted of possession of child pornography and making child pornography available following a trial by judge and jury.

The conviction on the first count was stayed under R. v. Kienapple.

The appellant was sentenced to 21 months in jail plus three years' probation on the second count.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his conviction on the making available count on two grounds: first, that the trial judge failed to adequately rectify the Crown's violation of the rule in Browne v. Dunn regarding cross-examination of a defence witness; and second, that the trial judge's W.(D.) instruction was improperly limited to the appellant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds and upheld the conviction.

The appellant was convicted of assault, possession of a weapon (a knife), aggravated assault, and breach of probation following an incident with her then-boyfriend.

She was sentenced to two years' imprisonment on the aggravated assault conviction and 30 days concurrent for breach of probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's rejection of her self-defence claim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly considered and rejected the self-defence argument on the merits based on the evidence she accepted.

The appellant failed to demonstrate any palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings or inferences.

The appellant appealed a sentencing decision imposing a conditional sentence of six months followed by one year probation for two Criminal Code offences related to applying for and using a false passport.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred in law or principle in refusing to impose a conditional discharge by failing to properly consider the "public interest" factor under section 730 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge's conclusion that a conditional discharge was not in the public interest was entirely warranted given the appellant's use of a fraudulent passport to make multiple entries into the United States.