Stephen T. Goudge

The appellant appealed a motion judge's refusal to set aside orders authorizing collection procedures and the issuance of a further notice of garnishment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the orders as the respondent held a valid Ontario judgment against the appellant.

The court held that the appellant was improperly attempting to re-litigate previously made orders.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing her request for interim support under the Succession Law Reform Act and ordering her to vacate the deceased's home to facilitate its sale.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding interim support, finding the order was interlocutory and the motion judge made no error based on the evidence.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the eviction order, finding the motion judge erred in concluding the estate was losing money on upkeep, as a prior consent order had already addressed those expenses.

The eviction order was set aside.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action on a motion for summary judgment.

The infant appellant suffered from a serious medical condition, which the appellants alleged was caused by a motor vehicle accident involving the mother while she was pregnant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no genuine issue for trial regarding causation, as the appellants failed to provide expert medical opinion establishing that the accident probably caused or contributed to the condition.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that awarded them damages against two respondents for a serious assault but dismissed the action against several other respondents.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's findings of fact regarding the involvement of certain respondents, the assessment of damages, the refusal to award punitive damages, and the refusal to make a Bullock or Sanderson order for costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact and holding that the damages and costs awards were within the trial judge's discretion.

The respondent's first action was dismissed for delay.

The motion judge permitted the respondent to proceed with a second identical action, subject to paying the costs of the first action, relying on Rule 24.05(2).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the rule does not provide a right to commence a second identical action and that doing so constitutes an abuse of process.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a driving offence involving excessive speed and racing.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the evidence and failing to strictly follow the W.(D.) framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge fairly considered all evidence and that the sentence was entirely fit given the finding that the appellant was racing.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the nature of a prior conviction and gave inadequate weight to rehabilitation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the serious nature of the offences, the fact that the appellant was on probation and subject to a firearm prohibition at the time, and the paramount objectives of deterrence and denunciation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for simple assault, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and that the verdict was unreasonable because medical evidence was inconsistent with the violent assault described by the principal Crown witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was entitled to rely on substantial circumstantial evidence, including blood spatters and injuries, to find the appellant committed a simple assault.

The appellant appealed his one-year custodial sentence for fraud.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by considering the appellant's lack of remorse as an aggravating factor.

However, the court upheld the sentence as fit, noting that the appellant abused the trust of vulnerable fellow church members, causing an elderly couple to lose their home and life savings.

Despite the appellant being a first offender and initially a victim of a fraudulent scheme himself, the principles of denunciation and deterrence warranted the custodial sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed from a conviction and a 12-month custodial sentence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to give a Vetrovec warning regarding a witness's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no need for the warning as the trial judge was aware of the witness's problems.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed as the sentence was entirely fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding the police officer's evidence reliable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that there was no basis to find the officer's evidence unreliable.

The Crown appealed a 12-month conditional sentence imposed on a young first offender who suffered from a mental illness.

Although the law now requires a custodial sentence for the offence in question, the Court of Appeal declined to interfere because the respondent had successfully served the conditional sentence and addressed his mental health issues through prescribed medication.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of four offences under the Building Code Act related to constructing a building without a permit and ignoring stop-work orders.

They appealed, arguing a permit had been issued and never revoked, and that the fourth conviction violated the rule against multiple convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if a permit was issued, the municipality effectively revoked it under s. 8(10) of the Act when it returned the application due to non-payment.

The court also held the fourth conviction was based on continued construction on a different date, so the rule against multiple convictions did not apply.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding jurisdiction over its fraud claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the fraud claim was linked to Ontario because the alleged harm was suffered there through the receipt of invoices, and the business dealings were governed by a contract containing an Ontario forum selection and governing law clause.

The appellant insurer appealed an order requiring it to pay interest at the rate provided for by s. 46(2) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule on a sum payable to the respondent insured but unpaid for 19 months.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the clear policy intent of s. 46 is compensatory, and it was entirely consistent with that policy to calculate the loss incurred due to the late payment pursuant to s. 46(2).

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice that interfered with an assessment officer's decision regarding a solicitor's account.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appeal judge failed to apply the appropriate standard of review.

The court noted that an appeal from an assessment officer is only concerned with questions of principle, not amounts or discretion, unless the decision is unreasonable.

The assessment officer's order was restored.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision regarding the existence of an exclusive contract and the reasonable notice period for termination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions that no exclusive contract existed and that 90 days was a reasonable notice period to terminate the contract concerning 22 machines.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the accused on nine counts of historical indecent assault.

The trial judge had stayed the charges, including three to which the accused had just pled guilty, due to a 27-month delay between arrest and trial, finding a breach of s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the 16.5 months of institutional delay fell within the Morin guidelines and the accused suffered only slight prejudice, primarily related to winter travel difficulties rather than the delay itself.

The stay was set aside, and the matter was remanded for trial on the not-guilty pleas and sentencing on the guilty pleas.

The appellants appealed a decision restraining them from objecting to an application to extract aggregate from a property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the individual appellant used the appellant corporation as his agent to breach his personal covenant not to object to the extraction.

The substantive appeal was dismissed.

However, the court allowed the appeal on costs, reducing the lower court's costs award from substantial indemnity to partial indemnity, as the relative merits of the case did not justify the higher scale.

The appellants appealed an order granting the respondent relief from forfeiture of a 10% interest in a land development project.

The respondent had acquired the interest from her former common-law husband through a matrimonial order, subject to the appellants' security interest for a loan.

After the husband defaulted, the respondent tendered full payment of the loan shortly after the deadline.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the respondent met the three-part test for relief from forfeiture, noting her conduct was reasonable and there was a substantial disparity between the value of the forfeited property and the damage caused by the breach.