Joshua Daniel Frost

The applicant brought a Charter application challenging the validity of a search warrant executed on his residence.

The applicant argued that the affiant failed to establish reasonable grounds to believe he was engaged in drug trafficking, that material misrepresentations and omissions marred the Information to Obtain (ITO), and that he was assaulted during execution.

The court found a breach of section 8 of the Charter, determining that the redacted ITO was insufficient to establish statutory preconditions for issuance.

The court excluded the evidence pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the deficiencies in the affiant's approach, combined with the serious impact on the applicant's Charter-protected rights, outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the loss of a video recording of the complainant's statement violated his fair trial rights.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's finding of no unacceptable negligence was reasonable and that the loss of the recording was not so prejudicial as to impair the appellant's fair trial rights.

The court found that contemporaneous and detailed police notes provided a sufficient substitute for the lost recording, and that the defence failed to demonstrate actual prejudice.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault after a complainant was stabbed in the eye with a beer bottle during a party.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge made several errors, including failing to remedy the Crown's improper reference to inadmissible statements in its opening address, failing to properly instruct the jury on the use of an exculpatory statement, and failing to instruct the jury on the possibility of collusion among key Crown witnesses.

The Court of Appeal agreed that these three errors of law cumulatively resulted in an unfair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

J.M. was convicted of five counts of sexual assault and sexual interference against two minor complainants, K.C.1 and K.C.2, who are his nieces.

The offences occurred over several years, involving a breach of familial trust.

The court considered aggravating factors such as multiple victims, breach of trust, grooming, and significant emotional impact on victims, alongside mitigating factors including low risk of re-offending, no prior sexual offence record, stable employment, and strong family support for his autistic daughter.

The Crown sought a five-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence argued for a reformatory sentence.

The court imposed a global sentence of three and a half years in the penitentiary, along with ancillary orders, including a ten-year prohibition under s. 161 of the Criminal Code, balancing denunciation and deterrence with the offender's unique circumstances.

Judge-alone criminal trial arising from allegations of historic sexual abuse involving three complainants and multiple counts of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching.

The court applied the similar fact evidence framework and held that the allegations relating to the younger complainants and the childhood allegations of the third complainant were sufficiently connected to be admissible across counts, while the later allegation involving the third complainant was not.

The court rejected the defence theory of collusion, finding no evidence beyond mere opportunity for contact.

The evidence of two complainants was found credible and reliable and supported convictions on counts 1 to 5, while reliability concerns regarding the third complainant required acquittals on counts 6 to 8 and a directed verdict on count 9.

The Crown applied to admit videotaped statements of two complainants under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code in a historical sexual abuse prosecution.

The court held that the governing inquiry was whether the recordings were made within a reasonable time after the alleged offences, having regard to the provision’s purposes of preserving an early account and reducing the stress of trial testimony for child complainants.

Delays of approximately four and one-third years, and in one instance more than five years, were found too long to preserve the reliability rationale of the provision.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was convicted of possession of 90.7 grams of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a two‑year custodial sentence, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for drug trafficking offences.

The defence requested a conditional sentence based on significant post‑offence rehabilitation, including educational achievements, community work with youth, and stable employment.

The court held that the offender’s exceptional rehabilitative progress, lack of reoffending, and strong community support justified restraint in sentencing.

A conditional sentence of two years less a day to be served in the community was imposed, followed by probation.

The applicant, charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, brought a pre-trial application seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

He alleged that his s. 7 rights were infringed due to late, incomplete, and inadequate disclosure by the Crown, and that the Crown's conduct amounted to an abuse of process.

The court found no evidence of missing or undisclosed relevant documents and concluded that the late disclosure was remedied by an adjournment.

The court held there was no trial unfairness or abuse of process, and dismissed the application.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for public mischief after falsely reporting an assault by his ex-common law spouse and her family.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and application of the W.D. framework were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The sentence appeal was partially allowed to grant 30 days' credit for time the appellant spent on house arrest bail, reducing the custodial sentence from 4 months and 27 days to 3 months and 27 days.

The accused were tried for multiple offences arising from the armed robbery of a restaurant.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including the accused's presence at an apartment where stolen property was found shortly after the robbery.

The court found that the evidence against one accused was not sufficient to prove his involvement beyond a reasonable doubt, as his presence could be explained by other rational inferences.

However, the court found the other accused guilty, concluding that his prior employment at the restaurant, possession of stolen currency, and other circumstantial factors proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a party to the robbery.

The accused were charged with multiple offences following the theft of two motor vehicles and a subsequent police apprehension where officers fired approximately 60 shots at the vehicles.

The accused argued for a stay of proceedings, alleging their Charter rights were violated due to racial profiling and excessive use of force by the police.

The court found no evidence of racial profiling and concluded the police force, while perhaps objectively excessive in hindsight, was a reactive response to a perceived threat to their lives, thus not violating section 7 of the Charter.

The court acquitted the accused of assault with a weapon and attempted murder, finding the Crown failed to prove intent to strike the officers, but convicted the accused of dangerous driving, failing to stop at the scene of an accident, and theft-related charges.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility and resolving inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's application of the W.D. formula or her reasons for accepting the complainant's evidence over the appellant's.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence arising from his arrest for cocaine trafficking and the subsequent search of a condominium unit where police seized nine kilograms of cocaine.

He alleged breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms relating to unlawful arrest, seizure of keys and a key fob, warrantless retrieval of fob access information, warrantless entry into a condominium unit, and alleged deficiencies in the Information to Obtain a search warrant.

The court held that police had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest based on surveillance of a suspected drug transaction and subsequent flight.

While the warrantless entry into the condominium unit violated s. 8 because exigent circumstances were not established, the subsequent search warrant remained valid after excision of impugned material.

Applying the s. 24(2) analysis, the court admitted the seized cocaine, finding the Charter breach modest and the evidence highly reliable and essential to the Crown’s case.

In a criminal appeal arising from a brutal home invasion assault on an elderly victim, one appellant challenged his convictions on the basis of deficient jury instructions on party liability under s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code, while the other pursued only a sentence appeal.

The court held that the charge on common unlawful purpose was incomplete and misleading because it failed to explain the required elements of agreement, offence, and knowledge, and failed to instruct that the incidental offence had to be different from the original unlawful purpose.

The repeated deficiency in the recharge to the jury compounded the error.

The curative proviso did not apply because the evidence was not so overwhelming that a properly instructed jury would necessarily have convicted.

The conviction appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered for one appellant; leave to appeal sentence was granted to the other appellant, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' incarceration for domestic assault and a concurrent three months for breaching probation.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by rejecting a joint submission and failing to consider the 'jump' principle.

The Court of Appeal found it was not a joint submission case but agreed the sentencing judge erred by significantly exceeding the Crown's proposed sentence without giving counsel an opportunity to make submissions, and by failing to allow the appellant to speak before sentencing.

The Court varied the sentence to 12 months' imprisonment for the assault and three months concurrent for the breach, followed by three years' probation.

The accused was charged with possession of proceeds of crime over $5,000, possession of cocaine and cannabis for the purpose of trafficking, possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and breach of a recognizance.

Police executed a search warrant at a residence co-owned by the accused and discovered drugs, drug paraphernalia, cash, and packaging materials.

The principal issue at trial was whether the accused had knowledge and control of the drugs found in the residence.

The court held that the circumstantial evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused exercised control over the drugs or knew of their presence, particularly given evidence that other individuals resided in or frequented the home and one individual occupied the bedroom where drugs were found.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The trial involved a combined Charter voir dire and trial.

The defence challenged whether the officer had reasonable grounds to demand breath samples under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code, arguing the approved screening device was not proven to be in proper working order.

The defence also challenged whether the breath samples were obtained as soon as practicable under section 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the officer was credible and experienced, the approved screening device was functioning properly, reasonable grounds existed for the breath demand, and the samples were obtained as soon as practicable given all the circumstances.

The accused was found guilty as charged.

The appellant appealed his convictions on six counts of sexual assault against a child complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his application to introduce evidence of the complainant's prior allegations against another individual without holding a hearing, and that Crown counsel's comments during the trial rendered it unfair.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion regarding the evidentiary application and concluding that the Crown's comments did not result in trial unfairness.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the nature of his denials during his statement to the police.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's characterization of the statement as cryptic and short on details was reasonably open to her.

The appeal from sentence was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellants, Gavra and Karl Largie, were convicted of second degree murder and manslaughter, respectively, following a joint trial.

The Crown's case relied heavily on private communications intercepted with the consent of an informant under s. 184.2 of the Criminal Code.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that s. 184.2 violates s. 8 of the Charter because it does not require the state to demonstrate investigative necessity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that s. 184.2 satisfies the minimum constitutional requirements of s. 8 and is not unconstitutional despite the absence of an investigative necessity requirement.

The Court also dismissed several grounds of appeal relating to the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and jury instructions.