Joseph M. Fragomeni

The appellant husband brought a motion for leave to appeal an interlocutory order requiring him to pay $8,500 per month in temporary spousal support and to obtain an income valuation.

The court granted leave to appeal on two issues: whether the motions judge erred in averaging the husband's income over three years instead of using his most recent line 150 income, and whether the motions judge erred by ordering an income valuation when neither party had requested such relief.

The court found both issues raised reasons to doubt the correctness of the order and involved matters of general importance.

A request to stay the support order pending appeal was dismissed.

The respondent husband brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the applicant wife's claims for divorce, spousal support, and property equalization, arguing that their religious marriage ceremony was legally invalid because no marriage licence was obtained.

The wife argued she entered the marriage in good faith, intending to comply with the Marriage Act, and relied on the husband's representation that a licence could be obtained later.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding that the conflicting factual assertions regarding the validity of the marriage and the parties' intentions created a genuine issue requiring a trial.

During a trial for importing drugs, a voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of statements made by the accused to Canada Border Services Agency officers at the airport.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the voluntariness of the statements made by both accused due to incomplete and unreliable officer notes that lacked context.

Furthermore, the court found that the officers breached one of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights by unreasonably delaying her opportunity to contact counsel.

The statements were excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The moving party sought leave to appeal two interlocutory orders: one dismissing her summary judgment motion and awarding costs, and another dismissing her motion to set aside that costs order.

The court applied the strict test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that the moving party failed to establish conflicting decisions, reason to doubt the correctness of the orders, or matters of general importance.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the respondent's appeal regarding a credit against child support arrears, both parties made written submissions on costs.

The applicant sought $5,793.03, while the respondent sought $9,434.35 or no costs, arguing that the applicant's actions delayed settlement.

The court applied the presumption that the successful party is entitled to costs under Rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules.

After considering the factors in Rule 24(11) and prior attendances, the court awarded the applicant costs fixed at $4,000.

Following the breakdown of a marriage with three children, the court addressed child support, spousal support, and equalization of property.

The court set the respondent’s income at $45,000 for child support purposes and ordered guideline child support of $858 per month.

The court imputed income of $25,000 to the applicant and determined that spousal support was not warranted under the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

The principal property dispute concerned the value of the respondent’s insurance Book of Business, with the court accepting the respondent’s expert valuation methodology distinguishing between a brokerage and a producer’s client list.

The court fixed the value of the Book of Business at $107,500 and ordered a modest equalization payment and reimbursement of certain household expenses.

The appellant father appealed final orders varying a prior child support order, which terminated his support obligations for two adult children at specific dates and granted him a $12,000 credit toward arrears.

He argued the trial judge failed to properly determine the amount of arrears and inadequately explained the basis for the credit.

Applying the appellate standard from Housen v. Nikolaisen, the court held that the trial judge’s findings were grounded in the evidentiary record and disclosed no palpable and overriding error.

The evidentiary deficiencies created by both parties justified the trial judge’s approach to determining termination dates and granting a limited credit.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of a motion brought by the plaintiff seeking to strike the defendant’s statement of defence and requesting that defence counsel be charged with perjury under the Criminal Code, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The defendant sought $5,000 in costs, arguing the motion was improper, vexatious, and unnecessary.

Applying Rule 57.01 and the principles articulated in Boucher v. Public Accountants Council (Ontario), the court emphasized that costs should be fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party to pay rather than reflective of actual legal expenses incurred.

Considering the circumstances and the plaintiff’s lack of success, the court awarded reduced costs to the defendant.

The applicants sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter alleging a violation of their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

They were charged with importing cocaine following their arrival at Toronto Pearson Airport with suitcases containing several kilograms of cocaine concealed in altered luggage.

Applying the analytical framework from Morin and related jurisprudence, the court assessed the total delay of approximately 30 months and deducted periods attributable to inherent intake, preparation, and scheduling requirements.

The remaining delay attributable to Crown and institutional causes was calculated at approximately 13 months, below the Morin guideline range of 14 to 18 months.

Although the applicants experienced stress and hardship while on bail, the court found the prejudice largely flowed from the charges themselves rather than delay.

Balancing all factors, including the seriousness of the allegations and societal interest in a trial on the merits, the court dismissed the s. 11(b) applications.

The respondents sought costs following a motion in which they obtained part of the alternative relief requested, although the applicant’s pleadings were not struck.

The court considered written costs submissions from the respondents, while the applicant declined to provide submissions due to an inability to obtain instructions from the client residing abroad.

The court found that the respondents achieved substantial and significant relief that advanced the proceeding.

In the circumstances, the court fixed reasonable costs in a modest lump sum.

Costs were ordered payable by the applicant to the respondents.

The accused was convicted by a jury of manslaughter arising from a planned robbery of a banquet hall poker tournament that resulted in the fatal shooting of a bystander.

At sentencing, the court made factual findings consistent with the jury’s verdict and concluded the accused was a principal organizer of the robbery and knew or ought to have known that firearms would be used.

Aggravating factors included extensive planning, the presence of over 100 patrons, the use of firearms, significant prior criminal record, and the death of a Good Samaritan attempting to intervene.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as dominant sentencing principles in armed robbery-related manslaughter.

The offender’s difficult background and limited mitigating factors did not outweigh the seriousness of the offence.

Following a successful motion for security for costs, the respondent sought costs on a substantial or partial indemnity basis.

The appellant failed to file costs submissions despite an extension of time.

The court considered the lack of complexity and the principle of proportionality, fixing costs in the all-inclusive sum of $2,500.

Motion seeking approval of Minutes of Settlement under Rule 7.08(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a mentally incapable adult and for judgment implementing the settlement terms between her three sons.

The settlement arose from mediation resolving disputes concerning a family trust and a prior transfer of Spanish real property.

A dispute later arose regarding the wording of an acknowledgement required by the settlement, leading one party to withdraw a prior approval motion and threaten to resile from the agreement.

The court found the refusal to accept the original wording and withdrawal of the approval motion unreasonable, concluding it necessitated the moving party’s motion to finalize approval.

The settlement was approved and costs were awarded to the moving party, with part payable personally by the party whose conduct caused the additional proceedings.

The applicant commenced an application seeking possession of a property, forfeiture of a $30,000 deposit under an agreement of purchase and sale, and damages arising from alleged vandalism and breach of the agreement.

The respondents argued the property was unsafe and sought to strike the applicant’s affidavit for failure to answer undertakings and refusals from cross-examination, while also seeking return of the deposit.

The court held that credibility disputes and conflicting evidence made the issues unsuitable for determination on the application record.

Pursuant to Rule 38.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the remaining issues of damages and entitlement to the deposit were ordered to proceed to trial and the application was converted into an action.

The deposit was ordered paid into court pending determination by the trial judge.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion seeking to strike the defendant hospital’s statement of defence and requesting that defence counsel be charged with perjury.

The plaintiff alleged failures to comply with a discovery timetable, failure to provide documents including surveillance footage, interference during examinations for discovery, and non-compliance with undertakings.

The court held that it had no jurisdiction to order criminal charges against counsel and found that the evidentiary record did not support striking the defence.

The court determined that the hospital had substantially complied with procedural obligations and that any alleged delays or issues did not justify the drastic remedy sought.

In a post‑separation parenting dispute involving joint custody, the applicant sought to change the children’s school to one located within her residential catchment area and requested clarification of a right‑of‑first‑refusal clause in an earlier custody order.

The respondent opposed the school change and sought additional relief including maintaining the current school placement, appointment of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer, disclosure of the Children’s Aid Society file, and a defined summer access schedule.

The court held that the moving party failed to demonstrate that changing schools would be in the children’s best interests, emphasizing the importance of stability where the children were performing well and had attended the same school for several years.

The court ordered that the children remain at their current school, set specific summer parenting time, directed disclosure of CAS records, and appointed the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking enforcement of an alleged settlement arising from a motor vehicle personal injury action.

The plaintiff argued that the parties had reached agreement on damages and prejudgment interest, leaving only costs to be assessed.

The defendant argued that its Rule 49 offer was indivisible and required acceptance of all terms, including a fixed amount for costs, which the plaintiff did not accept.

The court held that a binding settlement requires agreement on all material terms and that the plaintiff’s attempt to accept only part of the offer constituted a counter‑offer.

Because the parties never agreed on the material term of costs and disbursements, there was no meeting of the minds and no enforceable settlement.

The applicant, who was on house arrest, was stopped by police while driving a van.

After his arrest for breaching his conditional sentence, police left the van blocking the roadway, subsequently deemed it 'abandoned' under the Highway Traffic Act, and conducted an inventory search that yielded crack cocaine and a loaded handgun.

The applicant brought a Charter application arguing arbitrary detention, denial of right to counsel, and unreasonable search.

The court found the initial stop and detention lawful, but held the inventory search violated s. 8 of the Charter because the police artificially created the abandonment to justify the search.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) due to the serious and deliberate nature of the police misconduct.

The self-represented plaintiff moved for relief under Rule 52.03 seeking court assistance in obtaining a forensic psychiatric second opinion responding to the defendant's psychiatric report, and also sought a further adjournment.

The court held that Rule 52.03 concerns court-appointed experts who assist the court, not experts retained to support one party's litigation position.

The plaintiff had long been entitled to obtain her own responding expert and had delayed the action after it had been set down for trial.

The evidentiary record did not establish that a court-appointed expert was necessary, and the motion was dismissed.

In a family law motion concerning support-related disclosure, the court granted extensive financial and corporate disclosure to permit the moving party's accountant to assess the responding party's income for child and spousal support purposes.

The court found the responding party's financial affairs and related corporate structures sufficiently complex to require expert review, and applied the Rule 24(12) interim disbursements jurisprudence to level the playing field.

An interim disbursement of $14,125 was ordered for the accounting report, but the request for interim legal fees was refused.

The responding party's request for disclosure from a non-party alleged common-law partner was adjourned because the non-party had not been served.