Gerald P. Logan

The defendant was charged with speeding, failing to surrender his driver's licence for inspection contrary to section 33(3) of the Ontario Highway Traffic Act, and obstructing a peace officer in the execution of his duty contrary to section 129 of the Criminal Code.

The defendant refused to produce his driver's licence and claimed he was under no contract with the officer.

The court found that the officer failed to comply with the "alternative identification requirement" established in R. v. Plummer, which requires that an officer must make a specific request for identification other than a driver's licence before arresting a person for failing to produce it.

Since no such request was made, the officer was not engaged in the lawful execution of his duty, and the defendant could not be convicted of obstructing a peace officer.

The defendant was acquitted of the first two charges but found guilty of speeding.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of assault against Nancy Stol, uttering threats, failing to comply with a recognizance, and obstructing justice by attempting to get witnesses to recant their statements.

The Crown relied on testimony from Michael Crosby, a witness who lived with the accused and victim, and Nancy Stol, the alleged victim.

The court found the accused's out-of-court statements to police to be reliable and credible, despite her recantation at trial.

The court rejected the accused's attempts to discredit the evidence and found him guilty of five counts of assault and related offences, but acquitted him of obstructing justice as the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that both named witnesses were asked to recant.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to establish that the accused possessed a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace contrary to s. 88 of the Criminal Code.

The accused was charged with dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and possession of a weapon.

The defence argued that the Crown had not adduced sufficient evidence to establish that the object possessed constituted a "weapon" as defined in the Criminal Code, or that it was possessed for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The court found that while the eyewitness evidence alone was insufficient, when combined with the accused's brother's police statement describing the accused pulling out, raising, and putting away a toy gun in a manner consistent with intimidation, there was sufficient evidence to commit the accused for trial on the weapon possession charge.