Jill R. Presser

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder, aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon arising from a domestic stabbing.

The Crown conceded that the aggravated assault conviction should be stayed.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction on prior bad conduct and a W.D. instruction on the assault with a weapon charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the prior bad conduct evidence was directly relevant to the appellant's state of mind and the failure to give a W.D. instruction did not amount to misdirection.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal court decision, arguing the trial judge committed a Harper error by failing to consider evidence suggesting his daughter was present during the alleged offences.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding no compelling basis to conclude the daughter was present, as both the appellant and the complainant agreed she was not.

The court held that the trial judge's failure to review every piece of evidence pointing to a different conclusion did not constitute a reversible error.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud and sexual assault-related offences, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to sever the counts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly balanced the risk of prejudice against the public interest in a single trial, as the evidence for both sets of charges was inextricably intertwined and demonstrated a similar modus operandi.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court upholding the 15-year global sentence due to the cruelty and torture involved in the offences.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for handgun possession.

They argued that their ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights were breached during a police search following a taxi stop and their subsequent flight, and that the trial judge should have recused himself for reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding that the police had grounds for an investigative detention and the searches were valid protective pat-downs.

Even if the searches exceeded permissible limits, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The bias claim was also rejected.

The sentence appeals were dismissed, as the sentences of 8 years and 5.5 years, while at the high end, revealed no error in principle given the appellants' prior records and the context of the offences.

The applicant, a former Justice of the Peace, applied for judicial review of a Commissioner's report and an Order in Council removing him from office for judicial misconduct.

The misconduct involved inappropriate in-court treatment of an unrepresented litigant and out-of-court attempts to improperly influence an investigation into his conduct.

The Divisional Court found the Commissioner's recommendation for removal was reasonable given the severity of the misconduct and the need to restore public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application was dismissed, and fresh evidence of the applicant's improved health and character did not alter the outcome.

The appellants were charged with the attempted murder of a drug dealer.

After a jury trial, one appellant was convicted of attempted murder, while the other was convicted of the lesser included offence of aggravated assault.

The appellant convicted of attempted murder appealed, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the defence's position regarding the mens rea for attempted murder.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the key evidence supporting the appellant's position that he did not intend to kill the victim.

The conviction for attempted murder was set aside and substituted with a conviction for aggravated assault, with a reduced sentence.

The other appellant's appeal regarding the jury instructions on party liability was dismissed.

The applicant applied to reopen his appeals, which were previously dismissed as abandoned.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the interests of justice did not warrant the relief.

The court noted the proposed appeals lacked merit, as the trial judge properly applied section 16 of the Criminal Code in finding the applicant did not appreciate the nature and quality of his acts.

Furthermore, the applicant had been fully informed of the implications of abandoning his appeals, and his change of heart was consistent with his history of ambivalence.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a police officer charged with assault, attempt to obstruct justice, and perjury arising from his arrest of a demonstrator.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in permitting the defence to challenge potential jurors for cause based on their affiliation with the protest group, and that the challenge procedure was flawed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in allowing the challenge for cause and that any procedural irregularities in the jury selection process caused no prejudice to the Crown.

The appellant was convicted of four counts of robbery and disguise with intent relating to four bank robberies.

At trial, the judge applied similar act principles to use evidence from all counts to determine the identity of the perpetrator on each individual count.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding the acts sufficiently similar and in using linkage evidence to determine similarity.

The appellant also argued the offences were theft, not robbery, as there were no express threats of violence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded the acts were sufficiently similar and that a threat of violence was implied from the circumstances of demanding money from a bank teller.

The respondents were charged with multiple counts of fraud and conspiracy relating to an investment scam.

The trial judge granted a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, finding unreasonable delay.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in his allocation of the delay, his determination of prejudice, and his balancing of the accused's rights against the societal interest in having serious charges tried.

The stay was set aside and the matter was ordered to proceed to trial.

The Crown appealed a costs order made by the Superior Court of Justice.

The respondent conceded that the appeal should be allowed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the costs order.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on hair comparison, footwear impressions, voice identification, and possession of the deceased's property.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the admissibility of the footwear, voice identification, hair, and jewellery evidence, as well as the reasonableness of the verdicts and the jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal found that the footwear evidence was irrelevant and improperly admitted, as it required circular reasoning to connect the appellants to the scene.

The voice identification evidence also lacked foundation.

However, the court held that the remaining admissible evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to convict.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.